According to, e.g., some Western governments and the ICRC, existing rules of international law would provide adequate protection of the environment in times of armed conflict. However, a proper analysis of the existing rules, contained in relevant treaties and customary international law, suggests that this protection is currently far from adequate, in times of both international and non-international armed conflict. In order to ensure a better protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, a new approach is required which departs from the obvious necessity of a common recognition of the following three fundamental ideas: 1. the indivisibility of a healthy environment as an indispensable condition for the survival of present and future generations; 2. the necessity to disconnect the legal protection of the environment in times of armed conflict from its anthropocentric legal enclosure; and 3. the need to expand the protective scope of the relevant rules beyond the current level of merely prohibiting the known or expectable and the obsoleteness of the distinction between environment protection pursued by the law of peace and environment protection pursued by the law of armed conflict, as well as recognition of the environment as a common heritage (or at least a common concern) of mankind.

In this, the inaugural Manfred Lachs Memorial Lecture given at the seat of the International Court of Justice, we celebrate the judicial life and learning, and also the judicial wisdom of the longest-serving judge of the Court and its sometime President, who died on January 14th, 1993. Manfred Lachs came to the Court in February, 1967, having been elected in October, 1966, in the first elections following the Court's politically and, in some elements at least (judicial recusation, as example)legally controversial decision in South West Africa, Second Phase1 which had been rendered only two months before the UN Security Council and General Assembly regular triennial balloting on renewal or replacement of one third of the Court's membership.

Does contemporary international law offer sufficient and effective means to prevent any future secession by national minorities? In order to answer this question, general international instruments concerning minority-protection, as well as more recent international instruments designed specifically for the protection of minorities, will be investigated. The role that a guaranteeing of collective and, in particular, political rights to national minorities have or can have in order to prevent future secession by national minorities, will be given special consideration. It will be concluded that, in the author's view, the above-mentioned question must be answered negatively, and that an extension of political and collective rights for national minorities is needed, in order to enable a prevention of future secessionist claims by national minorities.

For many years after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, peace in the Middle East has been an elusive goal, despite the continuous attention given to it by the United Nations and the (mainly American)efforts to promote negotiations between the parties concerned. The affirmation by the UN Security Council “that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” failed to break the threefold deadlock barring the way towards peace. The Arab states and the PLO refused to recognise Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East. Their goal of a ‘comprehensive peace’ was peace without Israel. Israel refused to recognise the existence of a Palestinian people as defined by the PLO, entitled to exercise its right of self-determination. Its goal was to conclude peace treaties with neighbouring states, without the creation of a Palestinian state, however. In the context of the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (from 1945–1989) neither side could achieve peace on its own terms.

The history of indigenous peoples is not a fortunate one: colonization,discrimination, exploitation, dispossession, relocation, and genocide have been their lot.1 Indigenous peoples seek recognition as distinct groups in order to preserve their culture and, plainly, to survive. Their wish for recognition is coupled with various demands, ranging from political participation to autonomy, self-government and independence, often subsumed under ‘the right of self-determination’. Although, throughout this century,attempts have been made to improve the plight of indigenous peoples,these have proven inadequate so far.2 In 1994, after nine years of preparation,the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (hereinafter:Working Group) finalised the draft of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. With its adoption by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter:UN Sub-Commission)in August 1994, 3 the draft Declaration has commenced its course towards adoption by the General Assembly.

On 30 December 1994 in Geneva, the four major players in world trade -the United States, the European Union, Japan, andCanada - accepted the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).The entry into force of the Agreement on 1 January 1995 brings both expanded and improved trade rules and greatly improved enforcement. We have entered a new era in international dispute settlement. This brief article discusses the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the negotiating process that led to it, and the implementation of the Understanding in the United States.

Comparative advantage which motors free trade crucially depends on national differences in respect of endowment with resources – e.g. natural,human, technological – and with factors and standards of production, including standards on production processes. Yet, is it open to any GATT contracting party to unilaterally force its own standards upon others?Moreover, is it permissible for a contracting party to enforce such standards by means of ‘trade sanctions’ in the form of import prohibitions against another whose environmental standards regarding certain production processes it has judged inferior to its own? The answer is a resounding ‘yes’ from some exponents of the environmental constituency, arguing that values pertaining to global environmental welfare should prevail. Similarly, some members of the GATT constituency, particularly developing countries, emphatically reject what it they term ‘eco-imperialism’.Generally, their argument is that, in order to safeguard the welfare of world trade against disguised protectionist aberrations, governmental environmental measures must be justified under the general exceptions of GATT.

From the beginning of 1995, the following information was communicated to the press by the Registry of the International Court of Justice.

On 8 July 1991 Qatar filed an application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain existing disputes between them relating to sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibai and Qiťat Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two states. The case has been entitled by the Court the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain case. The application is in four sections: I. Geographical and Historical Background;II. The Subject of the Disputes; III. Efforts to settle the Disputes; and IV.Jurisdiction.

On 28 April 1976, after a preparation period of three years, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted by consensus the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. On 15 December 1976, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the use of these Rules, and requested the UN Secretary-General to arrange for their widest possible distribution.

In August 1993, this Journal devoted an entire special issue to the future of international arbitration in general, andthe Permanent Court of Arbitration in particular. Its editors viewed this special issue inter alia as a contribution to the UN Decade of International Law. It is not entirely coincidental that 1999, the final year of the Decade, will also mark the centennial of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). This commemorative link is expressly acknowledged in the UN Resolution initiating the Decade.

This arbitration arose under the Air Services Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter: HMG) and the Government of the United States (hereinafter: USG) concluded at Bermuda, 23 July 1977, as subsequently amended. This Agreement, which is generally referred to as Bermuda 2, provides, inter alia, that airport charges should not discriminate between a state's domestic carriers and those of the other party, and that theparties should use their best efforts to ensure that charges should be based on certain principles.