The armed conflict in Gaza raises a series of questions under international law. The most significant questions concern the Israel’s use of force under jus ad bellum, the military operations conducted by the belligerents in relation to the law of armed conflict, and the proceedings brought before certain international courts, such as the International Criminal Court. This article examines each of these three issues in two stages. Firstly, it shows that the answers to these questions give rise to uncertain solutions insofar as they depend on the point of view adopted in relation to fundamental controversies concerning Palestine, such as the latter’s statehood. Secondly, it sets out the solutions that emerge independently of these controversies, whether these solutions express certainties or likelihoods.

This article focuses on the nature-culture dimension in the Amazonian territory as an ontological question. It is argued that international law, as a product of modern Western societies, reflects and reproduces particular ideas about what the environment is. These ideas in turn reflect specific nature-culture relations that are not necessarily present in other societies. This is especially evident in contexts such as the Amazon, where the basic assumptions that modern Western society takes for granted cannot be extrapolated. The argument is illustrated through the Amazonian Kukama-Kukamiria people’s conception of the river, which was put on the ropes by the implementation of a development project. It is proposed that rethinking international law along with the Amazon means situating oneself in not only a geographically but also ontologically different place.

This article highlights the cross-disciplinary methodological potential of Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL) and microhistory by studying the active and complex exercise of agency by victims in an understudied historical instance of post-war justice, namely, the Singapore ‘Sook Ching’ trial or Nishimura trial. This trial dealt with the arbitrary massacre of Chinese residents by the Japanese military during the Second World War. Using TWAIL and microhistory methods, this article analyses trial transcripts and archival material on the Nishimura trial, with a focus on the trial experiences of witnesses, survivors, and community representatives. By studying the Nishimura trial as mobilization and meaning-making opportunity, this microhistory draws attention to the exercise of social and political agency by the Chinese community under difficult post-war conditions and British colonial rule. Chinese community leaders represented the community as collectively victimized and united in the pursuit of post-war justice. However, a close analysis of trial transcripts reveals tensions within the community and the need for a more complex understanding of victimhood.

Considered a landmark in feminist international politics, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda of the UN Security Council has been the object of many feminist explorations. Feminist legal scholars, however, have grappled with the ‘shadowy’ legality of the agenda, mostly analysing it as an ‘unsuccessful’ legal project: a partial or in progress legal norm, a defective legal form that attests (and furthers) the exile of inclusion of feminists in international law, or yet a formalistic discussion with lesser impact for feminist activists on the ground. Drawing from Avery Gordon’s considerations on taking shadows seriously in our production of knowledge, I propose, however, that reckoning with the shadows of the WPS’s legality enables a more comprehensive analysis of how the agenda has been a successful legal project in its own way. Offering a ‘shadow hauntology’ for the legal status of the WPS, I zoom in on the competing legality perceptions shared by relevant actors, the (gendered and colonially-continuous) shadows that have haunted those perceptions into formation, and how these competing visions have shaped the legality of the WPS as a shadow of its own. This study then offers an alternative way of studying legality both to feminist legal scholarship and studies on international legal sources more broadly. More concretely, it embraces the irresolvability of the legal status of a norm to take stock of the different legal projects and legality perceptions advanced by feminist actors and gender experts, in an effort to understand, in their own terms, the successes achieved.

Legal scholars continue to revisit historical treaties between Western and non-Western nations to challenge long-standing accounts of non-Western peoples’ engagement with international law. Following this trend, new scholarship has stressed African agency in Euro-African treaty-making. However, legal scholars have generally overlooked African perspectives, pointing to a lack of sources. Focusing on nineteenth-century treaty-making between France and the polities of the Western Sudan in West Africa, this article excavates African perspectives through a novel reading of Euro-African treaties in an African context. This reading analyses treaties within the Western Sudan’s broader diplomatic corpus in both French and Arabic. By focusing on markers of translation, transcription, and negotiation left on different copies of treaties, this method brings to light arguments and practices that have been obscured in published European-language versions. Reading Franco-Sudanian treaties in a Sudanian context reveals that different norms governed the ratification of treaties in the Western Sudan and Europe. Treaties that scholars have long considered unratified were in fact ratified according to Western Sudanian norms, which designated the governor of French Senegal rather than the French president as the official competent to ratify treaties for France. However, when French officials sought to use treaties to claim sovereign rights in West Africa against Great Britain, they pressed the president to ratify them again. Presidential ratification thus served to transpose Franco-Sudanian treaties from an African to a Western normative order. Uncovering the African origins of Euro-African treaties thus reveals their differential operation across autonomous inter-polity orders.

This article advocates a turn to the visual in legal scholarship. The phenomenon used to elucidate this methodological proposition is the figure of the ‘human shields’ under international humanitarian law, viewed from within the lived history of the peoples of the Global South. Today, the ‘human shields’ notion profoundly shapes how international law operates in scenes of intense organized violence. Once deployed, the human shields claim triggers a radical shift in the applicable international legal framework. After this point, harm to the civilian population and space can be legally authorized and justified. This article challenges the ways in which the ‘human shields’ notion continues to be debated in mainstream legal scholarship and discourse in terms of doctrinal interpretation, examination of evidence, or analyses of ‘asymmetricity’ and ‘urbanization’ as ‘challenges’ in ‘contemporary’ war. Before any such inquiries, I argue, it is crucial to pay attention to the visual and the lived history of the peoples of the Global South. Images that exist in the cultural realm – of and about war and crime, the human shielding spectacle and its actors, and Global South societies – structure and delimit the legal conversation and predetermine its possible outcomes. I propose, in sum, an attention to the visual as a site of the legal inquiry that can inform our understanding and critique of the law and politics of human shields. Images enable, rationalize and provoke the emotions necessary for an ‘exceptional’ operation of international law that authorizes massive violence against Global South spaces and peoples.

The principle of proportionality under international humanitarian law prohibits an attack if the expected harm to civilian persons and objects is excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. In this article we argue that, when applying the principle of proportionality, the incidental harm to a child must be given a higher value as compared to incidental harm to an adult. This reflects the broader framework of international humanitarian law, which creates stratifications amongst different groups of civilians and provides special protection for children in times of war. This aligns with the practice of many militaries, which tends to implicitly assign a heightened worth to the lives of children due to moral and political considerations. Such reasons stem from the perceived vulnerability of children as well as their moral innocence reflecting harmlessness and blamelessness. Indeed, harm to children’s lives tends to generate a greater backlash among the community to which they belong and, as a result, a military disadvantage. We argue that the greater weight assigned to the lives of children in proportionality assessments is not simply a matter of morality or strategic calculations, but in fact a requirement from a more wholistic interpretation of international humanitarian law.

Malicious cyber activities against space activities (MCASAs) add to the complexities of the legal attribution of malicious cyber activities violating international law. The ‘space’ implies the possibility of applying international space law considering the lex specialis derogat legi generali (more specific rules will prevail over more general rules) principle. However, neither the attribution rules of international space law nor of general international law could completely tackle this dilemma. This study categorizes MCASAs into three categories based on the role of the involved space activities and analyses the crux of legal attribution in each scenario. It proposes different coping approaches, including a four-pronged way, introducing a peculiarity test, and specifying substantive international obligations of the states responsible for space activities.

The dispute over the Matthew and Hunter Islands (MHIs) has long been a constant strain on Vanuatu-French relations. The article examines this dispute in light of the Chagos Advisory Opinion and a few other cases concerning territorial disputes. It first submits that sovereignty over the MHIs had never been raised until 1962, when, at the occasion of a private claim, France and Britain, the two administering powers of the New Hebrides at that time, considered the issue. The two states reached an agreement in 1965, asserting that the MHIs were part of the French colony of New Caledonia and not the British-French Condominium of the New Hebrides. This article then considers the legal implications and lawfulness of the agreement, which did not take into account the local populations’ will. Although there are some important differences between the Chagos and MHIs disputes, mainly due to the fact that the MHIs are uninhabited, the applicability of the right of self-determination to both cases is nevertheless beyond doubt. The article contends therefore that the 1965 Agreement between France and Britain may constitute a violation of the right to self-determination of the people of the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), who were not consulted on the decision to attach the MHIs to the French territory of New Caledonia, and suggests that there may be, however, some other legal principles under international law that can come into play. Finally, the article contends that negotiated solutions could be a potential way forward for the parties involved.

This article analyses the law-making power of international sports federations, with a specific focus on their authority of shaping global norms on gender. It explores a variety of international sporting rules from feminist and queer perspectives. These include the ban of rainbow armbands at the 2022 FIFA (Men’s) World Cup, rules on the participation of transgender persons in rugby, gendered and racialized uniform regulations in sports, and the Semenya case concerning the sports participation of women with variations in sex characteristics The analysis asserts that despite being non-state actors, international sports federations are de facto international lawmakers that disseminate hegemonic gender norms reflecting cis-hetero-sexism and white body norms. However, analysing the Semenya case and the decision of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case shows that the law-making power of international sports federations in shaping gender norms is not absolute but embedded in a transnational network of norms. The article concludes that subjecting international sports federations to a feminist, queer, and anti-racist legal analysis assists in understanding how hegemonic norms on gender circulate transnationally and enhances knowledge on how international law works in practice.

The legally binding unilateral application of norms holds potential for abuse. Nonetheless, self-judgment is alive and kicking. Self-judgment language commonly features in treaties and states frequently invoke their authority to ‘self-judge’ sensitive issues, such as matters related to national security, before international judicial bodies. In many of these cases, the controversy whether a norm has a self-judgment quality or not has been decisive for the outcome of the dispute. Yet, the meaning and consequences of self-judgment remain contested.

This article develops self-judgment as the authoritative application of international legal norms by states. It posits that steps towards the judicialization of self-judgment by judicial bodies have given rise to state efforts to preserve unfettered discretion. Notably, states have responded to attempts by judicial bodies to gain authority over the application of self-judgment by drafting provisions more explicitly. This dynamic continues to make self-judgment a site of judicialization and pushback. The only way to understand the meaning, limitations and development of self-judgment is by studying this process. Doing so conceptually refines self-judgment and allows for more meaningful references to the notion in practice.