The armed conflict in Gaza raises a series of questions under international law. The most significant questions concern the Israel’s use of force under jus ad bellum, the military operations conducted by the belligerents in relation to the law of armed conflict, and the proceedings brought before certain international courts, such as the International Criminal Court. This article examines each of these three issues in two stages. Firstly, it shows that the answers to these questions give rise to uncertain solutions insofar as they depend on the point of view adopted in relation to fundamental controversies concerning Palestine, such as the latter’s statehood. Secondly, it sets out the solutions that emerge independently of these controversies, whether these solutions express certainties or likelihoods.

This article focuses on the nature-culture dimension in the Amazonian territory as an ontological question. It is argued that international law, as a product of modern Western societies, reflects and reproduces particular ideas about what the environment is. These ideas in turn reflect specific nature-culture relations that are not necessarily present in other societies. This is especially evident in contexts such as the Amazon, where the basic assumptions that modern Western society takes for granted cannot be extrapolated. The argument is illustrated through the Amazonian Kukama-Kukamiria people’s conception of the river, which was put on the ropes by the implementation of a development project. It is proposed that rethinking international law along with the Amazon means situating oneself in not only a geographically but also ontologically different place.

This article highlights the cross-disciplinary methodological potential of Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL) and microhistory by studying the active and complex exercise of agency by victims in an understudied historical instance of post-war justice, namely, the Singapore ‘Sook Ching’ trial or Nishimura trial. This trial dealt with the arbitrary massacre of Chinese residents by the Japanese military during the Second World War. Using TWAIL and microhistory methods, this article analyses trial transcripts and archival material on the Nishimura trial, with a focus on the trial experiences of witnesses, survivors, and community representatives. By studying the Nishimura trial as mobilization and meaning-making opportunity, this microhistory draws attention to the exercise of social and political agency by the Chinese community under difficult post-war conditions and British colonial rule. Chinese community leaders represented the community as collectively victimized and united in the pursuit of post-war justice. However, a close analysis of trial transcripts reveals tensions within the community and the need for a more complex understanding of victimhood.

Considered a landmark in feminist international politics, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda of the UN Security Council has been the object of many feminist explorations. Feminist legal scholars, however, have grappled with the ‘shadowy’ legality of the agenda, mostly analysing it as an ‘unsuccessful’ legal project: a partial or in progress legal norm, a defective legal form that attests (and furthers) the exile of inclusion of feminists in international law, or yet a formalistic discussion with lesser impact for feminist activists on the ground. Drawing from Avery Gordon’s considerations on taking shadows seriously in our production of knowledge, I propose, however, that reckoning with the shadows of the WPS’s legality enables a more comprehensive analysis of how the agenda has been a successful legal project in its own way. Offering a ‘shadow hauntology’ for the legal status of the WPS, I zoom in on the competing legality perceptions shared by relevant actors, the (gendered and colonially-continuous) shadows that have haunted those perceptions into formation, and how these competing visions have shaped the legality of the WPS as a shadow of its own. This study then offers an alternative way of studying legality both to feminist legal scholarship and studies on international legal sources more broadly. More concretely, it embraces the irresolvability of the legal status of a norm to take stock of the different legal projects and legality perceptions advanced by feminist actors and gender experts, in an effort to understand, in their own terms, the successes achieved.

Legal scholars continue to revisit historical treaties between Western and non-Western nations to challenge long-standing accounts of non-Western peoples’ engagement with international law. Following this trend, new scholarship has stressed African agency in Euro-African treaty-making. However, legal scholars have generally overlooked African perspectives, pointing to a lack of sources. Focusing on nineteenth-century treaty-making between France and the polities of the Western Sudan in West Africa, this article excavates African perspectives through a novel reading of Euro-African treaties in an African context. This reading analyses treaties within the Western Sudan’s broader diplomatic corpus in both French and Arabic. By focusing on markers of translation, transcription, and negotiation left on different copies of treaties, this method brings to light arguments and practices that have been obscured in published European-language versions. Reading Franco-Sudanian treaties in a Sudanian context reveals that different norms governed the ratification of treaties in the Western Sudan and Europe. Treaties that scholars have long considered unratified were in fact ratified according to Western Sudanian norms, which designated the governor of French Senegal rather than the French president as the official competent to ratify treaties for France. However, when French officials sought to use treaties to claim sovereign rights in West Africa against Great Britain, they pressed the president to ratify them again. Presidential ratification thus served to transpose Franco-Sudanian treaties from an African to a Western normative order. Uncovering the African origins of Euro-African treaties thus reveals their differential operation across autonomous inter-polity orders.

This article advocates a turn to the visual in legal scholarship. The phenomenon used to elucidate this methodological proposition is the figure of the ‘human shields’ under international humanitarian law, viewed from within the lived history of the peoples of the Global South. Today, the ‘human shields’ notion profoundly shapes how international law operates in scenes of intense organized violence. Once deployed, the human shields claim triggers a radical shift in the applicable international legal framework. After this point, harm to the civilian population and space can be legally authorized and justified. This article challenges the ways in which the ‘human shields’ notion continues to be debated in mainstream legal scholarship and discourse in terms of doctrinal interpretation, examination of evidence, or analyses of ‘asymmetricity’ and ‘urbanization’ as ‘challenges’ in ‘contemporary’ war. Before any such inquiries, I argue, it is crucial to pay attention to the visual and the lived history of the peoples of the Global South. Images that exist in the cultural realm – of and about war and crime, the human shielding spectacle and its actors, and Global South societies – structure and delimit the legal conversation and predetermine its possible outcomes. I propose, in sum, an attention to the visual as a site of the legal inquiry that can inform our understanding and critique of the law and politics of human shields. Images enable, rationalize and provoke the emotions necessary for an ‘exceptional’ operation of international law that authorizes massive violence against Global South spaces and peoples.

The principle of proportionality under international humanitarian law prohibits an attack if the expected harm to civilian persons and objects is excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. In this article we argue that, when applying the principle of proportionality, the incidental harm to a child must be given a higher value as compared to incidental harm to an adult. This reflects the broader framework of international humanitarian law, which creates stratifications amongst different groups of civilians and provides special protection for children in times of war. This aligns with the practice of many militaries, which tends to implicitly assign a heightened worth to the lives of children due to moral and political considerations. Such reasons stem from the perceived vulnerability of children as well as their moral innocence reflecting harmlessness and blamelessness. Indeed, harm to children’s lives tends to generate a greater backlash among the community to which they belong and, as a result, a military disadvantage. We argue that the greater weight assigned to the lives of children in proportionality assessments is not simply a matter of morality or strategic calculations, but in fact a requirement from a more wholistic interpretation of international humanitarian law.

The legally binding unilateral application of norms holds potential for abuse. Nonetheless, self-judgment is alive and kicking. Self-judgment language commonly features in treaties and states frequently invoke their authority to ‘self-judge’ sensitive issues, such as matters related to national security, before international judicial bodies. In many of these cases, the controversy whether a norm has a self-judgment quality or not has been decisive for the outcome of the dispute. Yet, the meaning and consequences of self-judgment remain contested.

This article develops self-judgment as the authoritative application of international legal norms by states. It posits that steps towards the judicialization of self-judgment by judicial bodies have given rise to state efforts to preserve unfettered discretion. Notably, states have responded to attempts by judicial bodies to gain authority over the application of self-judgment by drafting provisions more explicitly. This dynamic continues to make self-judgment a site of judicialization and pushback. The only way to understand the meaning, limitations and development of self-judgment is by studying this process. Doing so conceptually refines self-judgment and allows for more meaningful references to the notion in practice.

This article analyses the law-making power of international sports federations, with a specific focus on their authority of shaping global norms on gender. It explores a variety of international sporting rules from feminist and queer perspectives. These include the ban of rainbow armbands at the 2022 FIFA (Men’s) World Cup, rules on the participation of transgender persons in rugby, gendered and racialized uniform regulations in sports, and the Semenya case concerning the sports participation of women with variations in sex characteristics The analysis asserts that despite being non-state actors, international sports federations are de facto international lawmakers that disseminate hegemonic gender norms reflecting cis-hetero-sexism and white body norms. However, analysing the Semenya case and the decision of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case shows that the law-making power of international sports federations in shaping gender norms is not absolute but embedded in a transnational network of norms. The article concludes that subjecting international sports federations to a feminist, queer, and anti-racist legal analysis assists in understanding how hegemonic norms on gender circulate transnationally and enhances knowledge on how international law works in practice.

The article focuses on reparations, as ordered by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against a convicted individual. It has long been orthodoxy that such measures fulfil solely compensatory objectives, for they lack any punitive intent. This article offers a rival account. An analysis of the respective regulatory and contextual framework reveals that, by design, reparations are allowed to pursue compensatory and punitive goals equally. An analysis of the reparations orders themselves affirms that, in practice, the ICC utilizes reparations as a means to accomplish compensatory and punitive objectives both. It is maintained that reparations orders are both remedial and punitive in nature. Ignoring this reality has a negative impact on individual prerogatives, and contradicts fundamental sentencing ideals of international criminal justice. It follows that the current reparations order regime should be reformed. The ICC should either explicitly acknowledge reparations as punishment, or detach them from criminal proceedings altogether.

Usual accounts of international law-making and international legal change focus on formal secondary rules. Others include societal and institutional facts. But international law consists of ideas too. Arguably it exists only in minds. To be sure then, the conditions of ideational change codetermine when and how international law is made, unmade, and otherwise changes. This is what this article is after. It first draws a general sketch of international legal change (including its making and unmaking) to then zoom in on its ideational elements, with a narrower focus on market opportunities for ideas. These market opportunities, it is argued, are determined by: paradigm shifts, struggles between competing schools of thought, the formation of distinct epistemic subfields, the core individuals’ different capitals, and changes in beliefs.

Sexgender has become politicized by neo-conservative and populist movements in Europe and elsewhere. This article explores how the sexgender binary is foundational to the social and material construction of the non-heterosexual legal subject and unveils binary hierarchies embedded therein. Furthermore, it develops a new materialist methodology called BinaryTech, which exposes the binary formulas of inequality and difference in the Court’s jurisprudence. This new materialist approach, based on Karen Barad’s agential realism, is used to critically examine how differences are produced as stable features of subjects and objects. The human of the Convention being heterosexual is thereby the result, constructed on material-discursive differentiation of non-heterosexuals. The article concludes by describing how new materialist interventions and Nordic feminist perspectives on law can offer valuable insights within the emerging material turn.

The law of international organizations is often described in terms of both its universality and its unity. Writers in this field begin their texts with an acknowledgement that there are common legal principles that have been developed by, and can be applied to, a variety of international organizations. The idea that there are legal principles applicable to multiple organizations – whatever their membership, location, powers, technical functions, or financial resources – is also implicit in the reports of the International Law Commission discussing the immunities, responsibilities, and law-making capacity of international organizations. But despite this search for common principles, a question remains whether international institutional law is based on the practice of all, or at the very least, a range, of organizations. Writers in this field have tended to focus on the activities of organizations based in either Europe or North America, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the European Union, and Council of Europe. This article argues that the omission of the principles and practices of organizations outside Europe and the United Nations’ system, specifically Asia Pacific organizations, undermines the claim of international institutional law to be universal. It explores the way in which a more inclusive approach – one that pays attention to the perspectives of Asia Pacific organizations – could illuminate certain features of the law and lead international lawyers to reconceive some of its central principles.

This article builds upon the common metaphor of international organizations as the ‘machinery’ of international law to present a theoretical exploration of these institutions. This metaphor has remained unexamined, a reflection of the paradoxical status of international organizations as objects lacking theoretical attention. By tapping into the metaphor’s full theoretical potential and expanding it into a theory of international organizations as machines, this article introduces a new conceptualization of their role and operation. This is accomplished by applying a particular machine concept from social theory, as developed in the work of Felix Guattari and his collaboration with Gilles Deleuze. The proposed machinic perspective enables the casting of the relation between international organizations and states in a new light, building on the classical concerns with these entities’ attributed powers and granted international legal personality. It presents an image of these institutions as agents focused on the production of connections and links with external ideas and forces, in order to produce unforeseen powers and capacities.

Article 12 of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) requires that states afford children the opportunity, subject to certain qualifications, to express their views on all matters that affect them. Alongside the substantive, procedural and normative significance of this right, Article 12 both reflects and contributes to progressive understandings of childhood more generally; it recognizes children as agentic beings ‘with integrity and personality and the ability to participate freely in society and articulate a view’. Nevertheless, the fulfilment of this legal right is often not realized, requiring ongoing efforts to help translate it into practice. This article examines how the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CommCRC), through recommendations to state parties issued as part of its monitoring function, can assist, or hinder the realization of Article 12. The primary argument advanced is that when issuing recommendations, the CommCRC ought to draw on the Lundy Model of Child Participation as an organizing concept- one utilized to weave together the substance of their recommendations in ways more instructive, useful, and impactful than the current approach.

A visible sign of changing relations between the Global South and Global North are reparation claims for colonial injustice. An interesting case is the 1904–1907 Namibian Genocide. Germany has recently concluded a draft agreement with Namibia on reconciliation and compensation. Nevertheless, Germany maintains that it is not under any legal obligation to pay reparations. This article challenges that position, arguing that colonial international law was far too ambiguous to support this conclusion. For this purpose, the article contrasts this ‘conventional view’ of colonial international law with post-colonial and pluralistic approaches. Post-colonial approaches reveal colonial-era law as a deeply ambiguous, contradictory practice that mirrors the identity crisis of the colonizers. Pluralistic approaches juxtapose colonial international law with autochtonous views of inter-polity law, i.e., the normative framework governing colonial encounters. To reconstruct autochtonous views, the article draws on letters by Hendrik Witbooi and Maharero, traditional leaders from Namibia, and examines the contours of their inter-polity law relating to territorial sovereignty and warfare. These contending perspectives undermine the cogency with which the conventional view rejects reparation claims. While ambiguity as such does not give rise to compensation claims, other options come to mind, such as a duty to negotiate, shifts in the burden of proof – or a profound recalibration of international law towards greater solidarity.

Persons with disabilities suffer disproportionately in every armed conflict, and Russia’s war in Ukraine is no exception. The atrocities committed against persons with disabilities in this conflict, however, are in part a consequence of the state’s longstanding policy of institutionalization, which heightens existing vulnerabilities and places persons with disabilities at an unacceptable risk of acute harm. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry for Ukraine must investigate the extensive and varied acts of violence that have been committed against persons with disabilities in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion, with a focus on persons with disabilities who are institutionalized. In recommending future action, the Commission must be driven by a victim-centred approach to accountability that contributes both to the criminal prosecutions of individual perpetrators, and to systemic reforms that contribute to the project of deinstitutionalization. This article can assist the Commission’s analysis by: (i) canvassing the reports of violence against persons with disabilities during the war in Ukraine, particularly those persons in institutions; (ii) reviewing the Commission for Ukraine’s mandate and explaining its primary purpose – that is, to ascertain the facts of the conflict, through an intersectional lens, with the aim of promoting accountability – with reference to the work done by United Nations commissions of inquiry in the past; and (iii) providing concrete examples on how the Commission’s investigations and report can further both legal accountability and systemic accountability for violence against persons with disabilities in Ukraine.

The global climate crisis response envisioned by the Paris Agreement is commonly understood as demanding transformative change. International law, however, lacks a holistic conceptual framing for making sense of what such change would entail, how it might unfold, and who and what it will involve. Moreover, there has been little critical engagement with the question of what is at stake when invoking the notion of transformation. Contributing to the broader debate about what the climate crisis demands of international law, this article offers a critical conceptual appraisal of the notion of ‘transformation’. Conceptually, it describes transformative dynamics as processes which work towards radically different states of affairs that seem practically impossible under the status quo, but which could arguably be realized if different conditions were in place. Developing an ontology of transformative change, the article identifies heterogenous temporality, the actualization of impossible possibilities, and distributed engagement as three central features of transformations in climate crisis. Having laid the conceptual groundwork, the article then takes a critical turn and foregrounds unresolved tensions that run through transformation thinking. The aim here is to connect to critical discourses and show how these tensions can serve as entry points for international law to meaningfully engage with the notion of transformation. The article closes by offering some reflections on what engagement with the notion of transformation might mean for international law’s disciplinary identity, rationale, and sense of purpose.