Matthias and I clearly agree on a great deal: a voluntarist approach to defining public international law is unsatisfactory; any rule of recognition in international law must provide a basis for a link between legality and legitimacy; one of the central contributions that law can make to international society is procedural in nature. However, our respective positions on the utility of a binary distinction between law and not-law have significant impacts on our approaches. We are both concerned, I think, with preserving the autonomy of politics – with ensuring that politics (or, more specifically, international public authority) do not come to be invaded by law. My own concern with preserving the autonomy of law leads me to two conclusions with which Matthias would take issue: that international public authority must be constituted by law; and that the rules which those authorities administer must be treated differently, depending on whether or not they meet a set of formal criteria that legal rules must satisfy. I will also address Matthias's discussion of Lon L. Fuller's internal morality of law and Benedict Kingsbury's concept of publicness in international law. I believe that both sets of concepts may be useful to Matthias's argument and deserve further attention. First, however, I would like to explore what it means, or could mean, to cut off the head of the king.

Although initially perceived as illegal and illegitimate, targeted killing has gained legal approval and greater acceptance as a tactic in the US fight against terrorism. Rather than being accomplished extra-legally or gradually normalized as an exception to the rule, as critics proclaim, targeted killing becomes inscribed into a law that was, and is, prepared to accept it as a practice. Conceiving of law as a practice renders the mutually constitutive relationship between targeted killing and the law visible. As a practice, law is indissoluble from the forms of knowledge both that enact it and that its enactment invokes. Targeted killing could assert itself as a security dispositif that displaces and relocates political notions underlying and defining international law.

As a result of the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the former third pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), several cases were referred to the Court for interpretation, inter alia, of the dispositions of the Schengen Convention dealing with criminal matters, especially the ne bis in idem principle. This principle was also addressed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court of the United States. While addressing the problem at international level, this article focuses principally on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in the field of the ne bis in idem principle, concisely presenting the legal framework, findings of the Courts, and some conclusions on the interpretation of the principle. The study also analyses the absence of uniformity in interpretation and the use of different criteria in addressing identical situations by different courts, or even by the same court, concluding on a (seemingly) fortunate approximation in interpretation at European level.

One of the most common features of international investment treaties is the obligation of a state to grant ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to investors and investments. Treatment giving rise to allegations of breaches of this obligation has taken many forms, namely bad faith, discrimination, denial of justice, frustration of legitimate expectations, lack of transparency, coercion and harassment, and arbitrariness or arbitrary conduct. This latter form of treatment – arbitrariness – has rarely been the focus of scholarly works and, thus, its scope and meaning are difficult to ascertain. When examined in the context of international investment disputes, however, one may conclude that, while its scope and meaning may vary, arbitrariness is indeed a legitimate basis for claim under the fair and equitable treatment standard. The thresholds for demonstrating arbitrariness, however, are decidedly and consistently high.

When the editors of this journal asked me to write a comment on Jaye Ellis's paper, I was immediately fascinated by the prospect of engaging in a rigorous debate, perhaps one as controversial as that between Hans Kelsen and Eugen Ehrlich on legal scholarship and legal sociology about 100 years ago – although I am unable to reach the brilliance of those thinkers, and probably also their level of polemics.1 Now that I have read Jaye's paper, my expectations have somewhat changed. I realize that Jaye and I agree on many important points – points that would have brought large parts of the ‘invisible college’ up in arms a few decades ago. In particular, we agree that legal scholarship should find ways of dealing with the multiplicity of soft-law instruments that look like law because they consist of sometimes quite precise rules; that function like law because they effectively guide the behaviour of states, international organizations, and private entities; and that are therefore not adequately described as ethical, political, or moral rules. We also agree that the traditional concept of international law, which considers state consent as the one and only source of legitimacy, has come under stress since the advent of global governance, particularly because other actors like international bureaucracies or non-state entities play increasingly important, indispensable roles.

This article examines international responses to the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, where two distinct governments were established due to contradiction between the election results proclaimed domestically and those certified by the internationally entrusted authority observing the election. Between two competing authorities, the international community stood firmly in favour of the internationally recognized president-elect as ‘legitimate authority’ while acting against the opponent whom they considered to hold ‘illegitimate authority’. Considering the principle of democracy as the underlying rationale grounding the international responses, this article identifies three mechanisms that incorporate and thus promote the principle of democracy: international election monitoring as setting mechanism, international representation as consolidating mechanism, and international intervention as enforcing mechanism. In accordance with these analyses, the current stage of democracy in international legal discourse is queried, particularly the democratic entitlement of a government in relation to determination of its international legitimacy.

In the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ held that rules of jus cogens did not automatically displace hierarchically lower rules of state immunity. The Court's decision was based on the rationale that there was no conflict between these rules as the former were substantive rules while the latter were procedural in character. The ‘substantive–procedural’ distinction has been heavily criticized in the literature. Much of the criticism seems to be motivated by the unwanted result of the distinction, namely de facto impunity for the most serious human rights violations. This paper takes a step back from the alleged antinomy of human rights and state immunity and broadens the picture by looking at the relationship between substantive and procedural rules more generally. It is shown that substantive rules of a jus cogens character generally leave procedural rules unaffected and, in particular, do not automatically override such rules. Substantive rules may, however, have a limited effect upon the interpretation and application of procedural rules. It is argued that the ‘substantive–procedural’ distinction is well established in international law and makes eminent sense even when substantive rules of jus cogens and procedural rules of immunity are involved.

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is neither fish nor fowl. Its primary purpose is to consider coastal states’ proposed limits of the outer continental shelf and to make recommendations thereto. Albeit the establishment of the outer limits is an act within the sole discretion of a state, the role of the Commission in the establishment of such limits is of pivotal importance. Due to its mandate, it can reasonably be argued that the Commission is, by way of implication, deemed to be vested with rights that cannot be seen to be limited to a technical review stricto sensu. This paper seeks to determine the exact terms of reference of the Commission and to what extent it comprises powers to undertake legal interpretations of the Convention. It will be concluded that a fair balance governs the operations of the Commission, although they, at times, comprise tasks that are essentially of a legal nature.

The case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, better known as the ‘Nicaragua case’ or simply Nicaragua, is arguably one of the most important and controversial cases ever to be heard by the International Court of Justice. Twenty-five years after the judgment on the merits was handed down, it is high time to reassess the impact of Nicaragua on international law. The joint efforts of the Grotius Centre of the Leiden Law School, the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University College London, the Netherlands Society of International Law, and the law firm Foley Hoag LLP resulted in a one-day conference, on 27 June 2011, the very day on which the judgment on the merits of the Nicaragua case was handed down, 25 years ago.

The potential for conflicts of norms is particularly great in modern international law. Yet until now, the International Court of Justice has said very little as to what it considers a conflict of norms. The opportunity to do so arose in the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening). There, it was argued that granting Germany sovereign immunity in proceedings before Italian courts involving civil claims for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945 would come in conflict with prevailing peremptory (jus cogens) norms of international law. In its 3 February 2012 Judgment, the ICJ rejected this argument. In the present article, the author argues that the conceptions of conflict of norms underlying the Court's judgment and the dissent of Judge Cançado Trindade both have weaknesses. The author suggests an alternative framework to ascertain conflicts of norms. He then applies this framework to the rules of state immunity and the IHL rules breached by Germany, agreeing in the end with the conclusion reached by the majority of the ICJ that these rules did not conflict.

The Treaty of Asunción in 1991 gave rise to the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) as a promising economic integration process. Over the past 20 years, as the legal personality of MERCOSUR was reinforced, there were also important changes in its legal system. International law and international economic law played a fundamental role in the development of MERCOSUR law. The main aim of this article is to provide some insights into the current stage of MERCOSUR law, taking into account the evolution of the legal system, the dispute settlement mechanism, and the relationship with international law. In order to do so, the author examines various turning points in the case law of the arbitration tribunals constituted so far and the Permanent Review Tribunal established by the Olivos Protocol.

International environmental law (IEL) as a discipline has failed to respond to problems of fairness in a meaningful and systematic fashion. Whilst IEL has long acknowledged the existence of competing claims regarding the fair distribution of costs, resources, and responsibilities, fairness remains at the periphery of the disciplinary discourse. The present essay considers some possible explanations for this neglect. The first part of the essay examines a set of implicit assumptions and beliefs in which IEL is embedded, which somewhat prevent genuine and critical engagement with fairness issues. The second part of the essay considers normative and policy arguments recently developed in the law and economics literature that explicitly argue against the notion that fairness should play a role in the design and implementation of environmental regimes. The essay concludes by calling for a more robust engagement with fairness issues and by considering some of the implications this project may have for IEL.

According to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, a third state can be granted permission to intervene before the Court provided ‘that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case’. The interest of a legal nature is a crucial requirement under Article 62 and the scope of intervention largely depends on the definition of such a requirement. In light of the recent case law of the Court, the author explores the different types of legal interest that could justify permitting a third state to intervene before the ICJ.

At the time the United States withdrew from participation in the Nicaragua case at the International Court of Justice, the US government expressed concern that ‘the course on which the Court may now be embarked could do enormous harm to it as an institution and to the cause of international law’. This essay examines whether or to what extent the anticipated negative effects came to pass. It concludes that dire predictions of harm to the Court were overstated. Twenty-five years later, the rate at which states accept the Court's jurisdiction has held steady. Only a few states have added jurisdictional reservations concerning military activities. The mix of cases being brought to the Court has shifted towards a more representative distribution. States are generally complying with the Court's decisions, though some compliance problems remain. The most serious negative impact has been on the willingness of the United States (still the Court's most active litigant) to participate fully in international dispute settlement.

Teck v. Pakootas revisits the infamous Trail smelter, which made history in public international law. This more recent case should be set to make history as well, due to the manner in which the issue of extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction was handled. The substantive result reached in the courts seems fair, reasonable, and appropriate: a notorious polluter, Teck Cominco Metals Inc., is called to account by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and required to study the feasibility of cleaning up a site it contaminated by dumping effluents in a transboundary river over the course of several decades. Yet, both courts that examined this case on the merits failed to understand the ramifications of this extension of the Environmental Protection Agency's jurisdiction across the Canada–United States border. This article begins with a doctrinal analysis of jurisdictional rules in private and public international law, and then proceeds to evaluate those rules with the help of insights from scholarship on global administrative law and international public authority.

This article considers fairness in international environmental law (IEL) in light of the convergence of two contemporary phenomena: the rise of social movements and the increasing power of large developing countries. These two trends will be determinative for the future of IEL. They have brought issues of fairness, equity, and justice to the forefront of contemporary IEL debates. Despite inability to adequately address issues of fairness at the international level, as demonstrated by negotiating gridlock at international summits, IEL can evolve in more equitable directions through the influence of subaltern experiences. This article examines domestic law-reform efforts of Indian social movements, focusing particularly on indigenous movements responding to extractive industries, with a view to determining international implications. The way states such as India address environment-related conflict, respond to demands for fairness, and evolve domestic understandings of inclusive and sustainable law and development will increasingly shape IEL.

Since the late 1980s, governments have increasingly relied on the services of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in attaining their defence and foreign-policy objectives. States with advanced armed forces (notably the US and UK but also many others) have seen the outsourcing of various support functions, such as logistics or communications, as a way of cutting costs. Conversely, states with weak militaries (for example, Croatia at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia and Angola during the civil war) have used PMSCs to boost their actual war-fighting capabilities. More recently, international organizations and non-governmental organizations have also turned to PMSCs, largely to ensure the safety of their humanitarian operations in zones of conflict.

Identifying the range of lawful reactions to non-performance of treaties is still problematic, as shown by the case concerning the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (FYROM/Greece). After reviewing the current understanding of the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of international responsibility, the author analyses the legal regime pertaining to suspension and termination of treaties on grounds of breach, on the one hand, and, on the other, to countermeasures, arguing that the exceptio inadimpleti contractus may still play an independent, albeit limited, role as a reaction to lawful non-performance of international treaties.

The Nicaragua case demonstrates the Court's competence in receiving and interpreting evidence, and in making reasoned findings of fact, even in the most complicated evidentiary context, as is often presented in cases involving use of force and armed conflict. The Court applied well-established standards for evaluating the conflicting evidence presented to it. In particular, the Court determined that greater weight should be given to statements against interest made by high-level government officials than to a state's self-serving declarations. The Court also determined that statements by disinterested witnesses with first-hand knowledge should receive greater weight than mere statements of opinion or press reports. In applying these guidelines, the Court found, correctly, that (i) the United States had used military and paramilitary force against Nicaragua both directly and indirectly, by organizing, financing, arming, and training the Contra guerrillas to attack Nicaragua; (ii) the evidence did not support a finding that the United States exercised direct control over the Contras’ day-to-day operations; and (iii) there was no evidence that Nicaragua supplied arms to guerrillas fighting against the government of El Salvador during the relevant period, or carried out an armed attack against that state. While Judge Schwebel's dissent criticized the last of these findings, in fact, the evidence fully supported the Court's conclusion. In subsequent decisions during the past 25 years, the Court has continued to rely on the approach to evidence first elaborated in the Nicaragua case and has continued to demonstrate its competence as a finder of fact, including in cases involving armed conflict (Bosnia Genocide) and complex scientific and technical issues (Pulp Mills).