At the end of the nineteenth century, the northern port of Liverpool had become the second largest in the United Kingdom. Fast transatlantic steamers to Boston and other American ports exploited this route, increasing the risk of maritime disease epidemics. The 1901–3 epidemic in Liverpool was the last serious smallpox outbreak in Liverpool and was probably seeded from these maritime contacts, which introduced a milder form of the disease that was more difficult to trace because of its long incubation period and occurrence of undiagnosed cases. The characteristics of these epidemics in Boston and Liverpool are described and compared with outbreaks in New York, Glasgow and London between 1900 and 1903. Public health control strategies, notably medical inspection, quarantine and vaccination, differed between the two countries and in both settings were inconsistently applied, often for commercial reasons or due to public unpopularity. As a result, smaller smallpox epidemics spread out from Liverpool until 1905. This paper analyses factors that contributed to this last serious epidemic using the historical epidemiological data available at that time. Though imperfect, these early public health strategies paved the way for better prevention of imported maritime diseases.

This paper addresses the relative scholarly oversight of the history of public health in Haiti through a close examination of the colonial public health system constructed and operated by the United States (US) during its occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. More than simply documenting a neglected aspect of Caribbean history, the paper offers the US occupation of Haiti as a remarkably clear example of a failed attempt to use a free public health service to cultivate a health conscientiousness among the Haitian citizenry through the aggressive treatment of highly visible ailments such as cataracts and yaws. I argue that the US occupation viewed the success of the Haitian Public Health Service as critical to the generation of a taxable, compliant and trusting citizenry that the colonial state could enter into a contract with. This idealistic programme envisioned by the US occupation was marred by financial mismanagement, racism, delusions of grandeur and contempt for Haitian physicians that resulted in the production of a far more precarious public health service and administrative state than the US occupation had hoped. By the time the Great Depression arrived in 1930 the Haitian Public Health Service was gutted and privatised, having successfully provided the majority of Haitians with free healthcare, yet failed to have persuaded them of the value of being governed by a centralised administrative state.

Mammographic screening for breast cancer is a widely used public health approach, but is constantly a subject of controversy. Medical and historical research on this topic has been mainly conducted in Western Europe and North America. In Brazil, screening mammography has been an open topic of discussion and a challenge for health care and public health since the 1970s. Effectively, Brazilian public health agencies never implemented a nationwide population-based screening programme for breast cancer, despite the pressures of many specific groups such as advocacy associations and the implementation of local programmes. This article examines the complex process of incorporating mammography as a diagnostic tool and the debates towards implementing screening programmes in Brazil. We argue that debates about screening for breast malignancies, especially those conducted in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, took place in a context of change and uncertainty in the Brazilian health field. These discussions were strongly affected both by tensions between the public and the private health care sectors during the formative period of a new Brazilian health system, and by the growing role of civil society actors. Our study investigates these tensions and their consequences. We use several medical sources that discussed the topic in Brazil, mainly specialised leading oncology journals published between 1950 and 2017, medical congress reports for the same period, books and theses, institutional documents and oral testimonies of health professionals, patients and associations collected in the framework of the ‘The History of Cancer’ project from the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation and Brazilian National Cancer Institute.

An expansive, worldwide smallpox eradication programme (SEP) was announced by the World Health Assembly in 1958, leading this decision-making body to instruct the World Health Organization Headquarters in Geneva to work with WHO regional offices to engage and draw in national governments to ensure success. Tabled by the Soviet Union’s representative and passed by a majority vote by member states, the announcement was subject to intense diplomatic negotiations. This led to the formation, expansion and reshaping of an ambitious and complex campaign that cut across continents and countries. This article examines these inter-twining international, regional and national processes, and challenges long-standing historiographical assumptions about the fight against smallpox only gathering strength from the mid-1960s onwards, after the start of a US-supported programme in western Africa. The evidence presented here suggests a far more complex picture. It shows that although the SEP’s structures grew slowly between 1958 and 1967, a worldwide eradication programme resulted from international negotiations made possible through gains during this period. Significant progress in limiting the incidence of smallpox sustained international collaboration, and justified the prolongation and expansion of activities. Indeed, all of this bore diplomatic and legal processes within the World Health Assembly and WHO that acted as the foundation of the so-called intensified phase of the SEP and the multi-faceted activities that led to the certification of smallpox eradication in 1980.

Despite numerous global health initiatives after World War II, tuberculosis still poses a major threat in sub-Saharan Africa. This article examines one attempt to tackle this problem: the Somalia-Finland Tuberculosis Control Project. Conducted in the 1980s as a bilateral development aid project between the two countries, it became the most extensive – and expensive – tuberculosis initiative in Somalia in that decade. An interesting feature of the project is that, despite a lack of previous experience in tuberculosis work in developing countries, the Finnish partner decided not to follow the WHO global guidelines designed to standardise tuberculosis activities across the developing world. Instead, Finns established their own treatment programme based on X-ray and short-course chemotherapy – otherwise rarely used in clinical practice in Africa. Through a close reading and comparison of the correspondence, project plans, memos and minutes, the article analyses the formation of this strategy. Focusing on ground-level decision-making, it argues that the decisions were based not only on a belief in the superior clinical effectiveness of these methods, but also on the fact that they better suited Finnish ambitions and project logic. Thus, the article supports the notion that donor perspectives on resources and project objectives determined what was seen as feasible treatment in a developing country. By shedding light on the debate between the supporters of short-course chemotherapy and the WHO standard treatment strategy, it also contributes to the early history of DOTS (directly observed treatment, short course).

In early twentieth-century France, syphilis and its controversial status as a hereditary disease reigned as a chief concern for physicians and public health officials. As syphilis primarily presented visually on the surface of the skin, its study fell within the realms of both dermatologists and venereologists, who relied heavily on visual evidence in their detection, diagnosis, and treatment of the disease. Thus, in educational textbooks, atlases, and medical models, accurately reproducing the visible signposts of syphilis – the colour, texture, and patterns of primary chancres or secondary rashes – was of preeminent importance. Photography, with its potential claims to mechanical objectivity, would seem to provide the logical tool for such representations.

Yet photography’s relationship to syphilographie warrants further unpacking. Despite the rise of a desire for mechanical objectivity charted in the late nineteenth century, artist-produced, three-dimensional, wax-cast moulages coexisted with photographs as significant educational tools for dermatologists; at times, these models were further mediated through photographic reproduction in texts. Additionally, the rise of phototherapy complicated this relationship by fostering the clinical equation of the light-sensitive photographic plate with the patient’s skin, which became the photographic record of disease and successful treatment. This paper explores these complexities to delineate a more nuanced understanding of objectivity vis-à-vis photography and syphilis. Rather than a desire to produce an unbiased image, fin-de-siècle dermatologists marshalled the photographic to exploit the verbal and visual rhetoric of objectivity, authority, and persuasion inextricably linked to culturally constructed understandings of the photograph. This rhetoric was often couched in the Peircean concept of indexicality, which physicians formulated through the language of witness, testimony, and direct connection.