• The world economy will grow by 3.3 this year, and by 3.7 per cent in 2014: still below trend.

• In the developed world, divergence continues; the US will grow just over 2 per cent in each year, while the Euro Area remains in recession and will grow only about I per cent next year.

• Unemployment remains very high in most countries, and at depression-era rates in some peripheral Euro Area countries.

• The economy will grow by 0.9 per cent this year, and by 1.5 per cent in 2014.

• Unemployment rate will remain roughly flat at about 8 per cent both this year and next.

• Consumer price inflation will temporarily rise above 3 per cent this year but will fall back to 2.3 per cent, on average, next year.

• We expect a slight decline in public sector borrowing this year, to 7.1 per cent of GDP, although even that is only as a result of the change to the accounting treatment of the Asset Purchase Facility.

This paper addresses the issue of underemployment in the UK labour market – the demand for hours of work is less than workers’ willingness to supply extra hours. Workers would like to work more hours, but there is insufficient product demand to justify additional hours. This phenomenon has been evident in the UK labour market for some time, but has grown significantly during the Great Recession. In this paper, we develop a new index of underemployment which is intended to combine indicators of excess capacity on the extensive (jobs) and intensive (hours) margins of the labour market. This index continued to increase during 2012, though unemployment was stable. The paper also investigates the microeconomic determinants of underemployment, finding that it is particularly prevalent among the young and unqualified.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, the Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

What policies and institutions are needed to sustain long-run growth in the UK? We describe an optimistic story of the UK economy over the past 30 years. From the late 1970s, the UK reversed a century of relative decline in terms of per capita GDP with our main counterparts in the US, France and Germany. A key factor behind this improvement was an array of policy changes including an expansion of higher education and greater competition in product and labour markets. However, major weaknesses with respect to long-run investment in human capital, infrastructure and innovation remain. These are hampered by problems of short-termism and policy risk. We propose a series of radical reforms to address these problems: such as more flexibility in schooling with a new focus on disadvantage; a new architecture for national infrastructure decisions and more competition in banking.

OECD projections for European countries imply that the crisis will have no long-term effect on trend growth. An historical perspective says this is too optimistic. Not only is the legacy of public debt and its requirement for fiscal consolidation unfavourable but the experience of the 1930s suggests that much needed supply-side reforms are now less probable – indeed policy may well become less growth friendly. Whereas the 1940s saw the Bretton Woods agreement and the Marshall Plan pave the way for the ‘Golden Age’, it is unlikely that anything similar will rescue Europe this time around.

There is an enduring belief by UK policymakers that a large higher education sector is an important driver of long-run economic growth, which has been part of the narrative since the Robbins Report. Back then, there was plenty of conjecture and assumption, but strikingly little concrete evidence to support such a belief. This paper asks whether the evidence base has strengthened in the 50 years since it was published. It looks at a number of different growth equation specifications and, using international education data, attempts to draw out the contribution of both the number of, and the growth in, graduates since the 1960s. There are three main findings. Firstly, many growth relationships, including those estimated elsewhere in the literature, are quite sensitive to the countries included – which often depends on the variables used – and time period of analysis. I argue that, given these issues, growth equations should always be treated with caution. Secondly, and remembering this caveat, neither the increase nor the initial level of higher education is found to have a statistically significant relationship with growth rates both in the OECD and worldwide. This result is robust to numerous different specifications. Thirdly, there is some evidence, consistent with the existing literature, that levels of technical skills at the end of compulsory education matter. The employment of higher level technical skills (proxied by the number of employed researchers in an economy) is also a strong predictor of growth. This gives a possible mechanism linking the output of (some) of the higher education sector with economic growth. However, it does not imply that mass higher education necessarily leads to higher growth. This depends on the skills produced by an expanding tertiary sector and their utilisation (or underutilisation) in the jobs available to increasing numbers of graduates.

This paper investigates whether intangibles might explain the UK productivity puzzle. We note that since the recession: (a) firms have upskilled faster than before; (b) intangible investment in R&D and software has risen whereas tangible investment has fallen; and (c) intangible and telecoms equipment investment slowed in advance of the recession. We have therefore tested to see if: (a) what looks like labour hoarding is actually firms keeping workers who are employed in creating intangible assets; and (b) the current slowdown in TFP growth is due to the spillover effects of the past slowdown in R&D and telecoms equipment investment. Our main findings are: (a) measured market sector real value added growth since the start of 2008 is understated by 1.6 per cent due to the omission of intangibles; and (b) 0.75 per cent per annum of the TFP growth slowdown can be accounted for by the slowdown in intangible and telecoms investment in the early 2000s. Taken together intangible investment can therefore account for around 5 percentage points of the 16 per cent productivity puzzle.

If official figures overstated the growth of banking output in the UK in the recent boom, does this mean that GDP growth was overstated too? The answer is no. It is truer to say that if banking output was overstated then the output of some other industry or industries must have been understated, leaving GDP relatively unaffected. The reason is that the Office for National Statistics measures the real growth of GDP primarily from the expenditure side. And from the expenditure side most of the problematic part of banking output drops out since it constitutes intermediate consumption not final expenditure. Consequently, the effect of any mismeasurement of banking output on GDP growth in the boom of 2000–7 is likely to have been small; GDP growth might have been overstated by about 0.1 per cent per annum.

Three years after the implementation of the Adjustment Programme for Greece, public debt remains at unsustainable levels. Despite recent improvements in meeting deficit targets and the fact that the risk of exit from the Euro Area has subsided, growth is still missing and unemployment has surpassed 25 per cent, causing major social tensions. The paper argues that a critical parameter of such failure was that the Programme grossly underestimated the adverse effects that fiscal correction might have on growth. Fiscal multipliers are found to be significant in the Euro Area so that fiscal cuts had strong and permanent Keynesian effects, rather than a transitive and minor downturn as initially assumed. In light of this, the paper argues that policies should now concentrate on enhancing growth and by relaxing fiscal targets allow the multipliers to raise activity as the only route to safeguard the exit from recession and ensure sustainability of debt.