Among the numerous relations between the rulers of the Imperial Russia and the USSR on the one hand, and Georgia on the other, the question of national self-determination deserves a position of a paramount importance. An adequate treatment of this perplexing topic requires a broader theoretical framework dealing with nationalism in general and its historical significance in particular.

The determination of the Estonian people and the support of Russian democratic forces made Estonia's statehood possible again. But the crisis in society has not yet been overcome. Estonia's further development can go on undisturbed only when there is stability in national relations, taking into consideration the interests and rights of all the groups of society, and people's safety and domestic tranquility is secured. Today, Estonia's prime goal is to become integrated once again into Europe. Experience has already shown that it is possible to join Europe's current movement towards unity only with a modern, civilized, democratic and stable society. This is how EDLP sees the future Estonia, and it is why EDLP is against all political steps that might endanger democracy, political and economic rights and freedoms, restrict a person's or society's free development, or endanger the stability and domestic peace. EDLP is categorically against all kind of extremism in the political sphere and is intolerant of discrimination aimed against political views. Without opposition there is no democracy. The majority may be right, but the minority has the right to its views, the right to express and protect those views freely—this is the firm conviction of the EDLP.

In March 2002 the United States and Uzbekistan signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership. This document marked a qualitative break in the international relations of Uzbekistan and, to some degree, the United States' relations with Central Asia. Uzbekistan had sought closer relations with the United States since its independence in September 1991. But the course of U.S.-Uzbek relations was not smooth. Various obstacles hindered Tashkent's progress in making a positive impression on successive U.S. administrations in the last decade of the twentieth century. Tashkent's abysmal human rights record and the snail's pace of democratic reforms made the notion of closer ties with Uzbekistan unsavoury for U.S. policy makers. At the same time, Washington was more concerned with developments in Russia. Other former Soviet republics, especially the five Central Asian states, were relegated to the periphery of the U.S. strategic outlook. But the dramatic events of September 11 and the subsequent U.S.-led “war on terror” changed the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. The consequent development of ties between Tashkent and Washington was beyond the wildest dreams of Uzbek foreign policy makers. Virtually overnight, Uzbek leaders found themselves in a position to pursue an ambitious foreign policy without being slowed by domestic considerations.

Since the end of World War II more than one million citizens of the USSR have emigrated to the West in a unique and unprecedented movement today called the “Third Soviet Emigration.” In contrast to two earlier flights of refugees from the Revolution and from World War II, the Third Emigration is a voluntary, legally-sanctioned process involving mainly three nationalities—Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians. The origin of the exodus goes back to the early postwar years, but the vast majority of the emigrants have left since 1971, when the Soviet government relaxed its historic antipathy to free movement by its citizens.

In 1919, Polish nationalist forces led by Josef Pilsudski succeeded in re-establishing an independent Polish state. Poland had disappeared from the map of Europe in 1794 following the third partition. It had been devoured by its traditional enemies; Prussia, Austria and Russia. Historically, Poland had been a state without fixed borders, and via a combination of changing dynastic alliances and a pattern of eastward migration, from the twelfth century formerly Slav areas east of the rivers Oder and Neisse became progressively germanicized. By 1921, following the end of World War I, several peace conferences, and after a series of referenda in disputed (former) German areas and a series of wars with all of its neighbors, including an especially successfully prosecuted war against the embryonic Soviet Union, the new state had managed to become a state which incorporated virtually all ethnic Poles. However, in addition to incorporating the overwhelming majority of ethnic Poles, the borders of the new Polish state also included huge numbers of other ethnic, religious and national groups.

The territory of this new European state is crossed by strategically important passes, the lowest in the entire Alps, leading from the Danubian basin to the Mediterranean (Italy). Thus, the Slovenes had been under cultural, civilizational and political domination of centers from these two parts of Europe until 1918. Because the mountainous land forms, dissected also by valleys and basins, were prone to processes of diffusion rather than fusion, the Slovenes became a national and political subject of their own as late as the nineteenth century. From 1918 to 1990 they were joined to Yugoslavia, a South-East European state, and learnt, to their cost, all the differences between the cultures of West and Central Europe on the one hand, and South-East and Eastern Europe and the Near East on the other. Hence the plebiscite decision by the nation for an independent state.

Empire depends not only upon the strength of the center but upon compliant behavior in the periphery, and the nature of interactions between center and periphery. Each of these three variables is changing rapidly in the former Soviet empire.