This article examines attribution of conduct and responsibility in peace support operations, which is, and will continue to be, a troubling subject of international law. It particularly examines two specific questions: what is the proper test for attribution of conduct, and whether and, if so, how dual attribution of conduct and responsibility can be established in international joint operations? As regards the former question, a brief critique of the major case law and documents recently dealing with attribution of conduct and responsibility in peace support operations shows that Behrami and Saramati poses a serious obstacle to determining the most suitable test without any confusion, thus there is a strong need to radically depart from this decision of the European Court of Human Rights. With respect to the latter, the meaning of the 'effective control' criterion, which is to be the basis for dual attribution in joint military missions, ought to be clarified. In this respect, the Mustafić and Nuhanović judgments delivered by The Hague Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, to which the article pays special attention, are exemplary – to the extent that the latter did not conflate the notion of dual attribution of conduct with that of (dual or) multiple attribution of responsibility – and these judgments can be seen as a source of inspiration for the future application of the ‘effective control’ standard in practice.

This article addresses the question whether the European Union defaulted on the ‘strict observance’ of international law and ‘respect’ for the UN Charter, which are now express objectives of the EU following the Lisbon reform, in the course of the famous Kadi cases. With the final appeals judgment having been handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in July 2013, this question can now be conclusively answered in the negative. Despite the general tension these legal challenges created between EU law and international law, the EU managed, in the course of twelve years, to weave a seamless coat of compliance with international law. The article contrasts this finding with the general academic discourse on this case law, which tends to depict Kadi as a ‘sacrifice’ of compliance with international law for the benefit of fundamental rights (as well as the autonomy of the EU legal order). By retracing the entirety of this string of cases, the article demonstrates that, all rhetoric aside and for all practical purposes, the EU courts and other institutions managed to avoid any violations of international legal obligations towards the UN Security Council in this matter. The EU discontinued its own sanctions against Mr Kadi only after he had been delisted by the UN by means of a political decision, not by virtue of judicial intervention.

China has long supported the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, but it cast a negative vote at the end of the Rome conference in 1998 due to certain concerns that had not been addressed to its satisfaction. The specific Chinese concerns regarding the Rome Statute to some extent echo China's traditional position with respect to international judicial bodies. This article investigates the ways in which China has characterized the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a human rights court of the traditional kind. It examines the substance of the articulated Chinese concerns regarding the ICC in light of China's engagement with international judicial bodies, and some of the traditional concerns that have had an impact on that engagement. This article argues that the ICC is distinct from the UN human rights treaty bodies, and that China's progressively wider engagement with international adjudication should not be hindered by putting the ICC in a ‘human rights box’.

The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive provides tools to deal effectively with unsound or failing banks. Some provisions of this directive are designated as overriding mandatory provisions as referred to in Article 9 Rome I Regulation. The author analyses the effectiveness of the designation of a rule as an overriding mandatory provision, given the principle of private international law that parties can choose the applicable law and the competent forum. His conclusion is that in an international context overriding mandatory provisions are not always as overriding or as mandatory as they may seem at first sight. This may be acceptable with regard to 'normal' overriding mandatory provisions. However, the author argues that financial stability is so important that overriding mandatory provisions that protect financial stability need special treatment.