The year 2009 marks the entry into force of the first two EC regulations on choice of law: one on torts and other non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’), and one on contracts (‘Rome I’). In both regulations, the need for uniform choice-of-law rules is explained, generally, in the preamble. In ‘Rome II’, various recitals specify the purposes some particular rules are meant to achieve. Apart from ambiguous statements on ‘the need to do justice in individual cases’ and the intention ‘to ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the parties’, there are various references to the objectives of substantive law, said to be reflected in specific conflicts rules. As will be shown in this article, the ‘Rome II’ preamble promises much more than its rules can possibly deliver. Not only do most of the arguments in support of uniform conflicts rules turn out to be spurious, the policies underlying specific provisions have been translated into connecting factors that are mostly incapable of fulfilling the purposes they are meant to achieve. Since most provisions are focused on the principle of the closest connection they are obviously not inspired by the function of substantive law, nor do they allow a choice of the law best suited to the objective the rule is supposed to promote.

This article examines the proposal that, in order to overcome the comparative law problem of diverse national positions in relation to corporate criminal liability, a scheme involving administrative or civil liability should be adopted if corporations are to be included in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is argued that, despite the obvious practical appeal of such a solution, a criminal liability scheme should be preferred as perpetrators of international crimes – both natural and legal – should be subject to the full expressive and stigmatising capacities of the criminal law. However, recent international developments in corporate liability suggest a possible middle ground that may provide an acceptable solution to a majority of states.

The ongoing maritime operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia have not only put naval enforcement against piracy at sea in the spotlight, but also the legal aftermath of what to do with pirates after their capture. While warships at sea within the current legal framework of UNCLOS and the UN Security Council amplifications specifically adopted for the case of Somalia can effectively perform their tasks, the question of what to do with the pirate suspects is still not satisfactorily resolved. As a consequence, attacks against merchant vessels and international trade run the risk of being ‘consequence free’, in which the perpetrators are not being held accountable. Participating nations are confronted with the fact that military operations against piracy, which is essentially a criminal offence, need a comprehensive approach to ensure accountability. To counter this criminal activity at sea nations try to strengthen the judicial infrastructure through national prosecution or transfer suspects for prosecution in the Horn of Africa region. As these options are not considered to be enough, and hampered by other non-legal factors, some nations call for an international court as a possible long term solution.

Without rules on maritime delimitation in marine spaces where the jurisdiction of coastal states overlaps, the legal uses of these spaces cannot be enjoyed effectively. In this sense, the international law of maritime delimitation is of central importance. There is no doubt that international courts and tribunals play an important role in developing the international law of maritime delimitation. Hence it is important to analyze the development of case law in this field. This article examines the maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea before the International Court of Justice. After reviewing the delimitation process in the Romania/Ukraine case, this article will address three principal issues: methodology of maritime delimitations, baseline issues and questions concerning the disproportionality test.

This article focuses on the role and contribution of the International Court of Justice to developing and interpreting the right of peoples to self-determination. The most relevant cases decided by the Court so far, and briefly noted here, broadly fall within the decolonization context, save for the ongoing advisory proceedings in the Kosovo case. This simple taxonomy is based on a wide separation of the Court's case law in two main categories, namely decolonization and secession. The analysis of the place of secession under current international law serves to put into perspective the inquiry into whether any of the main principles applicable to the decolonization process, as elaborated by the Court, continue to be valid in the case of secession of a part of a state from an existing independent state. The article ends with a number of concluding remarks on the contribution of the Court to clarifying the right of peoples to self-determination as part of the corpus of international human rights law.

Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008 has proven to be a controversial action. Although recognised by a not insignificant number of states, the opposition of a greater number reflects the uncertainty over the legality of an entity's secession from its parent state within international law. The present article considers three ways in which international lawyers might choose to respond to Kosovo. Firstly, it seeks to assess whether the norm of self-determination affords grounds upon which Kosovo's secession might be justified. It will be shown that the scope of self-determination, as a norm which evolved in response to post-War pressures for decolonisation, is insufficiently clear and certain to apply to the case of Kosovo. Secondly, the case for broadening any right of secession afforded by international law so as to apply to cases such as Kosovo is considered. However, it will be shown that to take such an approach would open a pandora's box and risk legitimising serious fragmentation of the international states system. Finally, the possibility of treating Kosovo as a unique and exceptional situation is considered. However, it will be concluded that it is difficult to establish any genuinely unique and exceptional characteristics applicable to Kosovo.