Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T22:40:13.920Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Plundering of Epirus in 167 B.C: Economic Considerations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2013

Adam Ziolkowski
Get access

Il sacco dell'epiro nel 167 a.c: le considerazioni economiche

Nell'articolo si esamina il motivo del sacco dell'Epiro nel 167 a.C., ordinato dal Senato e eseguito da Lucio Emilio Paolo. Non sonso convincenti recenti spiegazioni che ricercano questo motivo nelle ragioni politiche o nel ricordo dell'invasione di Pirro. Per spiegare una decisione che ebbe come effetto la più grande caccia all'uomo nella storia di Roma (150 000 prigionieri), bisognerebbe considerare la grande richiesta di mano d'opera di schiavi, conseguenza dello sviluppo dell'economia schiavistica in Italia dopo la scconda guerra punica. Secondo l'autore il sacco dell'Epiro deve essere messo in relazione alia diminuzione della popolazione di schiavi in Italia, causata dalla grande pestilenza del 175–174 a.C. Questo deficit fu ulteriormente aggravato dalla politica conciliatoria propugnata dal Senato nei confronti degli stati confinanti in vista della prossima guerra con Perseo e dagli insuccessi dei primi anni della guerra macedone. La decisione del Senato mirava a risolvere la carenza di schiavi in Italia: la scelta cadde sull'Epiro perchè esso era l'ultima tappa del viaggio di Paolo, esecutore dell'ordine senatoriale, e vicino ai grandi porti di Brindisi e Taranto.

Type
Research Article
Information
Papers of the British School at Rome , Volume 54 , November 1986 , pp. 69 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © British School at Rome 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The history of the Epirote koinon during the Third Macedonian War, cf. Hammond, N. G. L., Epirus, Oxford 1967, 626–35Google Scholar; Cabanes, P., L'Épire de la mart de Pyrrhos à la conquête romaine (272–167), Paris 1976, 291–310Google Scholar.

2 Cf. Harris, W. F., War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C., Oxford 1979, passim, esp. 54–8Google Scholar.

3 Pol. XXVII 15–16; Liv. XLIII 18, 2, 23, 3–6, XLV 26, 3–10; Diod. XXX 5.

4 Liv. XLV 29–33; Plut. Aem. 28; Diod. XXXI 8; Iustin. XXXIII 2, 7.

5 Liv. XLV 34, 1: ‘ne quid ea, quae fierent moveretur: senatus enim praedam Epiri civitatium quae ad Persea defecissent, exercitui dedisse suo’.

6 Liv. XLV 34, 1–6, Plut. Aem. 29; Strabo VII 7, 3 = Pol. XXX 16. App., Ill., 9, 28Google Scholar mistakenly identifies Paullus' victims with Genthios’ Illyrians. Archaeological evidence of the destruction wrought by the Romans, Cf. Hammond, Op. cit., 657–71, 687; Cabanes, Op. cit., 295–7, 502–16 and 326–8, 524–6 (notes).

7 Pol. XXX 13, 32, XXXII 5, 6; Liv. XLV 28, 6–7, 31, 34, 9; Paus. VII 10, 7–12; Iustin. XXXIII 2, 8.

8 Apart from Epirus the only Greek town destroyed by the Romans after the end of the war was Antissa in Lesbos, whose inhabitants had admitted and supplied with food the Macedonian fleet operating in the Aegean. However, unlike the Molossi, they retained their life and personal liberty, and were just resettled in Methymna (Liv. XLV 31, 14).

9 Larsen, J. A. O., Greek Federal States, Oxford 1968, 481Google Scholar, claims, contrary to Livy's evidence, that the decision was taken by Paullus and the commissioners.

10 In 146 the Senate issued an identical order in regard to Punic towns that were still in arms against Rome, Cf. App., Lib. (135) 640Google Scholar. The Senate's order was, however, an extension of the normal Roman practice during that war: all towns captured before the fall of Carthage were destroyed and their inhabitants sold to slavery. Furthermore, it seems that only two towns, Hippo Diarrhytus and Clupea, were then still holding on (Cf. Gsell, S., Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord, Paris 1913–1929, vol. III, 403Google Scholar n. 7), while in Epirus the order of the Senate affected 70 towns and the whole people.

11 Oost, S. I., Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the Roman Conquest of Greece, Dallas 1954, 84–6Google Scholar, Cf. Larsen, Op. cit. 480–2.

12 Thiel, J. H., Studies on the History of Roman Sea-power in Republican Times, Amsterdam 1964, 372–415Google Scholar.

13 Scullard, H. H., Charops and the Roman Policy in Epirus, JRS 35 (1945), 58–64Google Scholar. His view has been accepted, among others, by E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique, Nancy 1967, vol. II, 239–40, and Cabanes, Op. cit., 305.

14 Pol. XXVII 15.

15 Pol. XXX 12, 3.

16 Pol. XXXII 20–1.

17 Pol. XXXII 21, 5.

18 At the end of 168, long after the end of hostilities, Paullus plundered three Macedonian towns (Liv. XLV 27, 1–4): Agassai (‘quod, cum Marcio consule tradidissent urbem petita ultro societate Romana, defecerant rursus ad Persea’), Aiginion (‘famae de victoria Romanorum fidem non habentes in quosdam militum urbem ingressos hostiliter saevierant’) and Aineia (‘quod pertinacius quam finitumae civitates in armis fuerant’).

19 Liv. XLV 28, 7, 31, 1–2; Pol. XXX 11, 3–5.

20 Cf. also Oost, Op. cit., 85 n. 106, 112, and 133–6; Larsen, Op. cit, 481.

21 Vogel, K. -H., Zur rechtlichen Behandlung der Römische Kriegsgewinne, ZSS (Röm. Ab) 62 (1948), 402 n. 22Google Scholar.

22 CAH, vol. VIII (1930), 272.

23 Hammond, Op. cit., 635 n. 1; Gruen, E. S., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley 1984, 298–9, 516–7Google Scholar.

24 Frank, T., Roman Imperialism, New York 1914, passim, esp. 277–97Google Scholar.

25 Id., An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, vol. I, Baltimore 1933, 188.

26 It is quoted without comment by Toynbee, A., Hannibal's Legacy, Oxford 1965, vol. II, 170Google Scholar.

27 Cf. esp., Tibiletti, G., Ricerche di storia agraria romana, Athenaeum 38 N. S. 28 (1950), 183–266Google Scholar, Id., Lo sviluppo del latifondo in Italia dall'epoca graccana al principio dell'impero in X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Roma 1955, vol. II 235–92Google Scholar; Toynbee, A., Op. cit., vol. II, 155–312Google Scholar; Società romana e produzione schiavistica. I: L'ltalia: insediamenti e forme economiche, Bari 1981Google Scholar, passim.

28 M. Frederiksen, I cambiamenti delle strullure agrarie nella tarda Repubblica: La Campania in Società romana …, 265–87.

29 Kolendo, J., Il lavoro servile e i mutamenti delle tecniche agrarie nell' Italica antica dallsecolo a.C. allsecolo d.C. in Storia sociale ed economica dell'età classica negli studi polacchi contemporanei, Milano 1953, 9–53Google Scholar.

30 Cf. Wallon, H., Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'Antiquité, Paris 1879, vol. II, 16–66Google Scholar.

31 Salvioli, G., Le capitalisme dans le monde antique, Paris 1906Google Scholar; Ciccotti, E., Le déclin de l'esclavage antique, Paris 1910Google Scholar.

32 Cf. the discussion of the opinions of the Soviet scholars by Štaerman, E., Rascvet rabovl'ad'elčeskikh otnošenii v Rimskoi respublike, Moskva 1964, 14–15Google Scholar (German translation: Die Blutezeit der Sklavenwirtschaft in der römischen Republik, Wiesbaden 1969)Google Scholar.

33 Westermann, W. L., Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, Philadelphia 1957–1962Google Scholar; Toynbee, , Op. cit., vol. II, 168–73Google Scholar.

34 Štaerman, Op. cit., 36–67.

35 Naturally, not all war captives were brought to Italy.

36

The numbers of Punic captives taken at Castra Cornelia and Zama are given after Appian; in Livy's account the respective numbers are twice as high. I have omitted the alleged numbers of prisoners taken in evidently spurious Roman victories (the elder Scipio's in Spain in 214/213, Flaccus' at Beneventum in 212, Marcellus' at Himera, Scipio's at Baecula and over Indibilis, minor successes of Roman commanders in Italy against Hannibal).

37

I have omitted Livy's numbers of prisoners taken in battles which are doublets of Roman victories at Aebura and Alke, and in Paullus' dubious victory over the Lusitanians in 189. The number of prisoners taken at Kynoskephalai is Antias'.

38 In his report to the Senate Gracchus is said to have mentioned 15,000 Sardinians killed (Liv. XLI 17, 2), while on a tablet dedicated in the temple of Mater Matuta he wrote that ‘hostium caesa aut capta supra octoginta milia’ (Liv. XLI 28, 9). Taken together, the two accounts, both derived from Gracchus himself, imply that the number of Sardinian captives was greater than 65,000.

39 Finley, M. I., The Ancient Economy, London 1973, 85–6Google Scholar.

40 Cf. Harris, Op. cit., 200–33.

41 Liv. XXXIX 1, 8: ‘nee deerat umquam cum iis vel materia belli vel causa, quia propter domesticam inopiam vicinos agros incursabant’.

42 Liv. XL 38, 1–7.

43 Liv. XLI 18, 16–19, 2.

44 Liv. XLII 7, 3–9, 6, 10, 9–15, 21–22; Cf. Harris, Op. cit., 270–1.

45 Liv. XLIII 1,4–12,5, 1–10.

46 Festus 428 L; de vir.ill. 57, 2. Cf. Pais, E., Storia della Sardegna e della Corsica durante il dominio romano, Roma 1923, vol. I, 85; De Sanctis, G., Storia dei Romani2, III 1, Firenze 1967, 273, (discussion of the meaning of the term Sardi venales)Google Scholar.

47 Earlier epidemics: in 187 (Liv. XXXVIII 44, 7), in 182–180 (Liv. XL 19, 3–7, 26, 5, 36, 14–37, 7, 42, 6–13) and in 178 (Liv. XLI 5, 11, 6, 6).

48 Liv. XLI 21, 5.

49 If Livy's information is correct, then the pestilence in question would have resembled the bubonic plague of medieval and modern times (men and cattle victims of the same disease).

50 Cf. Brunt, P. A., Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.–A.D. 14, Oxford 1971, passim, esp. 73–74, 135–136Google Scholar, on epidemics as a factor limiting the population growth in Italy.

51 Liv. XLI 21, 6.

52 Liv. XLI 21, 6; Obsequens (65) 10.

53 Liv. XLI 21, 8–9.

54 Unfortunately, census figures cannot provide us with a decisive argument for or against the gravity of the pestilence of 175–174: one of the figures for 178 or 173 is certainly corrupt (Brunt, Op. cit., 72); moreover, the quantitative jump in census returns from the uncommonly thorough and efficient census of 168 onwards, makes further comparison virtually impossible. All that we know is that the number of citizens registered in 173, i.e., immediately after the pestilence, was markedly lower than in 178 (Liv. XLII 10, 3), so as to warrant Livy's explanation (Ibid.), although in 173 only three legions served abroad and thus escaped census, as opposed to four in 178 (Brunt, Op. cit., 72, 424, 661–3). Livy explains the lower figure of 173 by the exclusion of Latins illegally registered by previous pairs of censors, but, considering the ineffectiveness of such measures (cf. Liv. XXXIX 3, 4–6, XLI 8, 6–12), his explanation carries little weight. Another suggestion of considerable loss of manpower that could be attributed to the pestilence in question, is the increasing difficulty of raising new levies during the Third Macedonian War once the initial enthusiasm for the war cooled down (Liv. XLIII 14), although before 168 Roman military effort was not great (Cf. Afzelius, A., Die römische Kriegsmacht während der Auseinandersetzung mit den hellenistischen Grossmächten, Kobenhavn 1944, passim, esp. 47Google Scholar; Brunt, Op. cit., 424–5). It seems therefore that there was a distinct drop in Roman manpower after 178 that could be caused only by the pestilence of 175–174. For a suggestion why this disease was more deadly to slaves than to free people, Cf. next note.

55 Strabo relates (V 2, 7) that the Corsicans could not stand slavery and that even if they survived, they so annoyed their masters through apathy and negligence, that even those who bought them very cheaply later regretted the purchase. Geographic and ethnic proximity of Corsica and (much less healthy) Sardinia suggests that the Sardinians withstood slavery at least as badly as the Corsicans, which would make them even more subject to the pestilence. The bad reputation of the Sardi venales (Cf. note 46) could have had one of its roots in their having been wiped out by the plague of 175–174: after all, the worst thing a slave could do was to die prematurely.

56 Walek, T., Dzieje upadku monarchii macedońskiej, Kraków 1924, 204–6Google Scholar. The Senate must have decided to crush Macedonia soon after Perseus' visit to Delphi in 174 provided a first convenient pretext for war. Cf. also Harris, Op. cit., 227–33.

57 In 173 Popillius sold 10,000 inhabitants of the chief town of the Statellates; the campaign of the following year, in which 6,000 Ligurians allegedly lost their lives, must have procured another batch of slaves, Cf. Liv. XLII 7, 9, 21, 2. The ambassadors of only one of the Alpine tribes plundered by Cassius accused him of having enslaved thousands of their kinsmen (‘multa milia hominum in servitium abripuisse’—Liv. XLIII 5, 2).

58 An additional misdemeanour of Cassius, very grave in Roman eyes, was his leaving the allotted province.

59 Out of five consulates which the Popillii Laenates held before 173, four belonged to M. Popillius Laenas (cos. 359, 356, 350, 348), the fifth to his son M. Popillius Laenas (cos. 316). For the next century and a half the family kept in the background. The only member of the gens Cassia who held consulate before 171 had been the semi-legendary Sp. Cassius (cos. 502, 493, 486).

60 Liv. XLII 63, 10; the inhabitants of Koroneia and Abdera, sold into slavery in the years 171–170, were subsequently liberated ex senatus consulto, Cf. Liv. XLIII 4, 11, per. XLIII.

61 An imaginable objection that because of their ignorance of economic phenomena the Romans would have never grasped the relationship between wars and slave supply, does not carry much weight. The ancients were aware of economics, no matter how crude, naive and defective their knowledge thereof was, measured by our standards. The age that saw a connection between Rome's policy towards the pirates and the latter's role as suppliers of slaves to Italy (Strabo XIV 5, 2), would have had no need of an Adam Smith to divine that a sudden and acute shortage of slaves could best be met by a slave-hunting operation on a grand scale.

62 The date of Paullus' triumph, Cf. Fasti Triumphales, Ins. It. XIII 1, 554Google Scholar, ed. Degrassi, A.: an. DXXC [VI] IIII.III.prid.k.decem., i.e., 2–4 or 24–26 (25–27) September 167Google Scholar (we do not know whether 167 was intercalary or not, Cf. Derow, P., The Roman Calendar, 190–168 B.C., Phoenix 27 (1973), 345–56Google Scholar). The plundering of Epirus must therefore have taken place some time in July, assuming a lapse of two months between Paullus' setting sail for Italy and his triumph.

63 Varro, , RR I 17, 5Google Scholar.

64 Heurgon, J. (Varro, , Res Rusticae, ed. Belles Lettres, Paris 1978, 141Google Scholar) explains the quoted passage in the following manner: ‘il semble qu'ils [les Romains] aient entretenu sur leur terres d'Epire des families au sens moderne du mot, d'esclaves unis par des liens de parente [cognationes] et que l'on vendait en bloc’. This explanation is hardly convincing. To become proverbial the Epirote slave families had to be numerous, and as the only known instance of the Romans enslaving Epirotes was the plundering of 167, the quoted sentence, inserted in the passage dealing with the privileges of a vilicus, must be an erudite digression thrown in on the association principle (the previous sentence speaks of the vilicus' family), not the writer's own remark on some peculiarity of his own days. The use of the present tense is no argument since Varro uses it throughout his work, and when quoting Cassius Dionysius and Cato the Elder. It seems that this remark, like the rest of the material collected in the Res Rusticae, had been taken by Varro from the veteri auctores, who lived before the turn of the first century (Varro's sources, Cf. Heurgon, Op. cit., introduction); the Epiroticae familiae whose praise they put in their writings may therefore have belonged to still earlier generations. The assumption that the Romans already possessed great estates in Epirus in the second century B.C. is unlikely in itself apart from the total lack of evidence, Cf. Brunt, Op. cit., 213–4, Shatzman, I., Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics, Bruxelles 1975Google Scholar, passim (the estates of T. Pomponius Atticus and his Synepirotae lay, logically enough, in Chaonia, near the sea; thus there is no link between the land of the Molossi enslaved in 167 and the Roman presence in Epirus attested for the first century B.C.). Equally unfounded is Heurgon's view that those hypothetical landowners encouraged slave-breeding with the intention of selling slave families in Italy—why should they, in the first place, raise those families in Epirus, not in Italy? The identification of the Epiroticae familiae with Paullus' Molossian captives is both more obvious and simpler.