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Discussion: Quantum Logic and The Lüders Rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Allen Stairs
Allen Stairs*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Lüders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Lüders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Lüders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 422 - 436
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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References

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