The Russian South Pole expedition carried out in 1819–1821 was an early milestone in the scientific exploration of the Antarctic. The expedition took place under the command of the Baltic German Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen. Bellingshausen came from the Island of Saaremaa in Estonia. The Russian empire, and followed by the Soviet Union, did not attach much importance to Bellingshausen's expedition. It was only after World War II as the question of the Antarctic received close attention that the Bellingshausen expedition received political significance in the Soviet Union. The fact that the expedition really took place was used by the Soviet Union to claim rights to the Antarctic and also to argue for its participation in Antarctic exploration (see Tammiksaar 2007; Bulkeley 2011). In the early stages of exploration of the continent, Estonians were given the opportunity to carry out investigations there. The first Estonian research programme in the Antarctic, on noctilucent clouds, was elaborated by the astronomer Charles Villmann. Altogether some tens of Estonians have visited the southern continent performing investigations in earth sciences, atmospheric physics, hydrology and ecology of surface waters and the human influence on them. They have also carried out isotope studies of the ice sheet to reconstruct environmental conditions in the past.

In 1949 a reassessment of the Imperial Russian Navy's Antarctic expedition of 1819–1821 was promulgated in the Soviet Union. The contention was that Russian seamen had made the first discovery of the mainland of Antarctica, two or three days before the northern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula was sighted by a British expedition, under William Smith and Edward Bransfield, sent to take formal possession of the South Shetland Islands. The new Soviet line apparently required that an important passage in a report which Captain Bellingshausen had sent from Australia in 1820 should, as far as possible, be overlooked or downplayed. Nineteenth century editions of the report and its covering letter are translated, the contemporary ice vocabulary in which they were phrased is explained, and the practice of discounting parts of them in the past and continuing to ignore those passages today is discussed.

At the start of the heroic age of Antarctic exploration there was great confusion concerning the cause of scurvy. It was known that it was related, in some way, to food but it was uncertain as to how, and there were two main theories. The first was that it was caused by a deficiency of fruit and vegetables and the other that it was caused by a toxic material in tinned foods. In addition, older theories that it was caused by dirt and damp still carried weight and Almroth Wright had proposed that scurvy was caused by too much acid in the blood. An additional confusion was that vitamin C deficiency was often combined with other vitamin deficiencies and so other diseases might be labelled as scurvy. The discovery of vitamins occurred over the same period but, as with all new scientific concepts, the knowledge that scurvy was caused by a vitamin deficiency took time to be universally accepted. It was generally accepted by about 1920, although some people did not accept it until vitamin C has been isolated in 1932.

The Baltic Sea is one of the major maritime highway. During the middle ages, many of its southern ports belonged to the Hanseatic League. Since then, maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea has grown, having its trading activities internationalised through the diffusion of new shipping technologies. In 2007, the volume of cargo handled in Baltic ports was approximately 850 million tons. Moreover, the Baltic has an excellent network for passenger transportation: approximately 30 million people travel every year by ferry.

Nowadays, its winter traffic represents about one quarter of the annual traffic. Nevertheless winter navigation is relatively recent in the extremities of the gulfs of Bothnia and Finland. Indeed, at the beginning of maritime transportation, the activity was seasonal and occurred only in open water, threatening to stop completely in winter due to sea ice formation. But for over a century, the evolution of materials and shipping techniques has allowed continuous maritime navigation. Despite the fact that sea ice conditions require the assistance of icebreakers, adapted port infrastructures, the introduction of ice classes and winter restrictions to the navigation, harsh winter conditions inevitably induce an increase in maritime incidents. There is the question of the future of winter navigation in the context of global warming and a possible significant reduction of sea ice.

Energy companies and builders of energy transportation infrastructure find it difficult to evaluate Arctic natural gas development. Their business critical decisions require the assessment of not just technical risks but intangible issues regarding the future and past interactions of an energy system. These concerns call attention to the problem of time. In this article, I examine three types of time from which efforts to commercialise Alaska natural gas are drawn into the temporality of global energy markets: (1) volatility time, in which price spikes determine outcome; (2) government time, in which law and regulation assist in commercial enterprise, and; (3) entrepreneurial time, in which individuals of industry take initiative. These types of expectation in Alaska natural gas development correspond consequently to three methods for fixing time and space. In short, they are three development time-spaces or chronotopes. By offering these forms of time, taking place between 2000–2005, this article draws attention to concrete visualisations of constructing a pipeline to deliver natural gas from Alaska to continental United States. I argue that these efforts represent precise and well-marked steps and reflect a specific course of development, passing from self-confident ignorance, to self-reflective consultation and finally to genuine understanding.

When the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition 1955–1958 advance party sailed from the Millwall Docks in November 1955, bound for the Weddell Sea, their departure was the product of five years of intensive effort on the part of Vivian Fuchs to achieve the first overland crossing of the Antarctic continent. This paper investigates the many obstacles that had to be overcome leading up to Theron sailing and explains the manner in which they were overcome by the Fuchs-Wordie-Clifford triumvirate. The British Foreign Office was particularly opposed to the expedition with the office's focus on sovereignty rather than science while an alternative proposal from Duncan Carse raised a unique set of difficulties. The withdrawal from involvement by the Scott Polar Research Institute Director, Colin Bertram, indicated further disaffection. Most important, if political and financial goals were to be met, was the need for participation by several Commonwealth countries of which New Zealand was the essential partner. Fortunately, the vigorous efforts of a few Antarctic enthusiasts in New Zealand were successful in moving their government to assert its long dormant position in the Ross Dependency. New Zealand's commitment turned the tide of commonwealth apathy towards the TAE. Although the TAE preceded the IGY, events, including the dominating IGY presence of the United States, caused the two projects to become tightly interwoven. For these reasons the years leading up to the departure of Theron were as intriguing as the crossing journey itself.

The availability of modern computer models of plausible atmospheric pressure versus altitude for a grid of points over the earth's surface permits a reexamination of Richard Byrd's dead reckoning navigation on his flight in May 1926 from Spitsbergen northwards and his return. Although details of how Byrd converted atmospheric pressure to altitude are ambiguous, the recent atmospheric models probably indicate a small systematic bias that would cause Byrd to overestimate his dead reckoning distance traveled. The same models provide a range of computed winds versus time, altitude, and location, leading to the conclusion that, if Byrd's reported winds during his flight are correct, it was the result of a very unusual and fortuitous circumstance.

Captain Scott has been criticised for indecisiveness and for not making use of the dog teams for his own relief in his Terra Nova Expedition (1910–1913). This essay will demonstrate how a mistake made in Roland Huntford's double biography of Scott and Amundsen in 1979, repeated in polar writing by various authors until the present day, has maligned Scott's reputation. In fact, Scott left appropriate written orders in October 1911 for the polar party's relief by the dog teams, orders that were not subsequently implemented by the men at base. A re-examination of the actions and roles of two expedition members in particular, Lieutenant E.R.G.R. Evans and Surgeon Edward Atkinson, suggests strongly that misjudgements back at Cape Evans led to the failure of the mission to rescue Scott and his polar party. In this account all distances are in geographical miles.

Edward Augustus Inglefield is usually credited with penetrating Jones Sound to 84°W longitude during his Franklin search voyage of 1852. His chart of the region including Coburg Island replaced Horatio Austin's chart made in 1851 and became the accepted standard until the 20th century. By analysing Inglefield's map of Coburg Island it is shown that he made several errors in navigation and surveying which resulted in him believing he was further west than he really was and overestimating his speed. The results suggest he mistook Stewart Islands for Cone and Smith Islands and that his Sir Robert Inglis Peak reportedly seen near 84°W was actually Cone Island. Thus his penetration of Jones Sound was no further than Austin's the year before and the ready acceptance of his charts set back the mapping of that region of the Arctic for three quarters of a century.