Within the context of a game-theoretic model with incomplete information, three dimensions of performance are defined and used to evaluate and analyze an institutionalized legislature. The performance of an institutionalized legislature is also compared to that of a noninstitutionalized legislature, one without any internal differentiation and in which members are equally uninformed about key parameters of the choice environment. Among the results are that increasing institutionalization (lower member turnover and the application of universal decision criteria) can diminish legislative performance. Additionally, a noninstitutionalized legislature always dominates the institutionalized legislature on at least one performance dimension. Institutionalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for superior legislative performance.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator gives biased coefficient estimates if coefficients are not constant for all cases but vary systematically with the explanatory variables. This article discusses several different ways to estimate models with systematically and randomly varying coefficients using estimated generalized least squares and maximum likelihood procedures. A Monte Carlo simulation of the different methods is presented to illustrate their use and to contrast their results to the biased results obtained with ordinary least squares. Several applications of the methods are discussed and one is presented in detail. The conclusion is that, in situations with variables coefficients, these methods offer relatively easy means for overcoming the problems.

This article compares a variety of models of presidential approval in terms of their dynamic properties and their theoretical underpinnings. Exponential distributed lags, partial adjustment, error correction, and transfer function models are considered. The major difference between the models lies in interpretation rather than statistical properties. The error correction model seems most satisfactory. Approval models based on individual level theories are examined, and found to give no additional purchase.

We propose a methodological strategy that addresses some of the widespread criticisms of survey research. Traditional survey research has, to a great extent, neglected the role of contested concepts in politics and respondents' subjectivity. Our mix of methods—including conceptual analysis, Q-methodology, and survey research—enables us to measure people's subjective understandings of contested concepts while allowing us to reap the benefits of survey research. In two case studies, one on patriotism and the other on participatory citizenship, we demonstrate that the mixed method more accu rately measures respondents' subjectivity and leads to greater predictive abil ity through more accurate measures.

This article addresses the lack of cohesion in econometric model building. This incoherence contributes to model building based on statistical criteria—correcting residuals—and not theoretical criteria. The models we build, therefore, are not valid replications of theory. To deal with this problem, an agenda for model building is outlined and discussed. Drawing on the methodological approaches of Hendry, Qin, and Favero (1989), Hendry and Richard (1982, 1983), Sargan (1964), and Spanos (1986), this agenda incorporates a “general to simple” modeling philosophy, a battery of diagnostic tests, reduction theory, and the development of models that include short-term and long-term parameters. A comparison is made between a model based on this agenda and a model based on corrected residuals. The findings show that the agenda-based model outperforms the residual correction model.

Recent efforts at estimating bias and responsiveness in electoral systems typically proceed by assigning observations to subsamples according to which party controlled the redistricting process. We show this traditional procedure to introduce selection bias into the resulting estimates of bias and responsiveness and present an alternative strategy for estimating these parameters. Using data from the state legislatures, and employing two different measures of partisan control of redistricting, we obtain results that modestly differ from those obtained with the traditional approach. Measures of control of redistricting utilizing information about the partisan intent of redistricting commissions and tribunals are exogenous to the seats-votes relationship.