Critical Islam is an intellectual orientation that prizes timeliness and broad-mindedness and a political sensibility that tends to honor majority rule, minority rights, and the good of pluralism. This essay considers how an important European Muslim scholar, Tariq Ramadan, promotes critical Islam in his call for a moratorium on stoning, his argument for the reformation of fatwa committees, and his analysis of the Arab Awakening. The essay argues that the art of controversy and the building of civil society—more so than political revolution—can cultivate a critical sensibility among Muslim scholars and publics.

The introductory paper of this symposium compares the impact of “political secular” governing regimes in the countries of both the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe. The overall objective is to assess the impact of political secularism in both regions, as a key component of inter-religious and cultural discord and contention with significant political ramifications. The concept of “political secularism,” a contentious term, often lacking in analytical clarity, is briefly assessed. That is, what does “political secularism” mean and what does it look like both within and across Europe and the MENA? Opinions differ from scholar to scholar. As there is no consensus regarding the meaning of the term “political secular,” a core contribution of this introduction is to examine what the term means analytically in the contexts of the MENA and Western Europe.

This paper highlights the impact of religious oppositions in Muslim-majority states towards security cooperation with the U.S. Such cooperation provides security but is risky as the U.S. can coerce its weaker allies and push for regime change. To protect against this possibility, this paper suggests that incumbents in recipient states strategically extend or limit cooperation based on the strength of Islamist opposition parties. Weaker Islamist oppositions pose a threat to incumbents in recipient states as the U.S. can coerce and replace them without fear of bringing anti-U.S. elements to power, which results in lower cooperation. In case of a stronger Islamist opposition, the regime's replacement cannot offer better policy concessions to the U.S.; hence, a strong Islamist opposition leads to more extensive cooperation. This mechanism is demonstrated through U.S. military aid acceptance in 40 Muslim-majority states during 2002–2015, and a comparison of U.S. security relations with Algeria and Tunisia.

In 1967 the Church of Scientology's tax-exempt status was revoked on the basis that it failed to meet the criteria outlined in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service. Between its loss, and eventual reacquisition in 1993, the Church of Scientology employed a number of political based tactics in an attempt to legitimize itself to the public sector. This article explores these tactics in relation to the religion's use of perception management. The article argues that the processes of both legal recognition and legitimization draw upon each other in a new faith's transition to mainstream theology. In this, the Church employed perception management in attempt to influence both processes. In exploring this, the paper contributes to our understanding of role that public legitimacy plays in a new faith's development.

The communal elements of Christianity are of increasing concern to religious thinkers. Indeed, for some religious thinkers, the importance of community is paramount in Christian belief and practice, especially as these communitarian views interact and enhance Christian pacifism. The community of Christians as the “peaceable kingdom” becomes the core element of Christian life. But is this pacifist communitarian Christianity tenable? In this article, I will argue that pacifist communitarianism leads to unexpected and objectionable consequences. Specifically, I will consider the views of John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas. By explicating the weaknesses of their pacifist views, most especially on the issue of coercion and the notion of “Constantinianism,” I will show that both thinkers tend toward a view of Christian separatism vis-à-vis the secular world. Both thinkers' systems present problems in communicating truth to those not already in the community. Finally, their communitarian views conflict with their pacifism, in the end requiring those not within the community to act as if they were members.

While the role of theology in Jefferson's political thought and its implications for how we should understand the role of “Nature's God” in grounding natural-rights republicanism are topics of ongoing scholarly interest, scholars have missed important continuities between Jefferson's natural-law theory and that of classical, theistic natural-law. Many scholars who have considered Jefferson in this light have emphasized Jefferson's discontinuity and even subversion of that tradition. In critical dialogue with this vein of scholarship, we argue that Jefferson espouses a creational metaphysics and a natural-law theory of morality that has surprising continuities with classical natural-law. We seek to shed new light on Jefferson's theory of the moral sense and his the earth belongs to the living principle, which we contend encapsulates his theistic understanding of equality and property.

How do we measure religious violence? This study is focused on utilizing new methodological approaches and data sources to measure religiously motivated violence. Previous attempts to measure religious violence concentrated on coding U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom reports or utilizing existing datasets on armed conflict/civil wars. These previous attempts provided state-level data of the levels of religiously motivated violence, but due to data limitations cannot provide more fine-grained measures of specific acts of violence tied to religious motivation. In particular, accounting for varying levels of intensity especially in regards to non-lethal acts of religiously motivated violence is missing. This study builds upon previous attempts focusing on the creation of more fine-grained measures and accounting for its variation at the sub-national level utilizing natural language processing. The data generated are used to examine incidences of reported religious violence in India from 2000 to 2015.

Although violence over Northern Ireland's constitutional position has largely subsided, the problem of sectarian animosity between sections of the Protestant Unionist British and Catholic Irish Nationalist population remains. One such area of communal contestation is attitudes to Protestant parades, organized mainly by the Orange Order. For many Protestants, Orange Order marches are legitimate cultural, religious, and political expressions of Protestant culture, loyalty to the British Crown and a pro-United Kingdom position. For many Catholics, the Orange Order is seen as a sectarian and anti-Catholic organization, which prohibits its members marrying Catholics or attending Catholic Church services. The Parades Commission was established two decades ago to adjudicate on Orange Order parading routes. Its decisions have sometimes involved re-routing marches away from Catholic areas and the inability to satisfy both sides has been followed by riots on several occasions at the annual height of the Protestant “marching season.” This article examines levels of support or antipathy toward Orange Order marching rights among Protestants and Catholics. Drawing upon evidence from the most extensive recent study of public opinion in Northern Ireland, the 2015 Economic and Social Research Council general election study, the piece tests the importance of demographic, religious, political, and geographical variables in conditioning attitudes towards Orange parades.

How far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.

There is a paradox: why are there so many political and economic Islamic actors in the Middle East but not a large willingness on their part to adopt and promote Islamic banking and finance methodologies? This paper argues that the more vague and ambivalent these actors are on economic policy, the wider their appeal; and, by extension, the more compatible Islamic ideas and ideologies are with neoliberalism. The case of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan is given as it has adopted an emphasis on Islamic middle-class values and ethical concerns of neoliberalism in order to gain political support. The case of the IAF demonstrates that there are points of compatibility between the neoliberal economy and Islamist politics. In the calibrations of the relationship between the state and Islamist party politics in line with Islamic neoliberal tenets, this approach ensures enhanced appeal for neoliberal Islamism into the future.

This paper examines the Holy See as a political actor amid hard power conflict. While many debate the legal and religious personalities of the Holy See, few engage with an approach that illustrates the Holy See and its citizen-like laity in light of its combinative religious–political dynamic. This paper argues that resulting from this dynamic, the Holy See's sui generis statehood enables the comprehension of a similar sui generis citizenry. These citizens, which this paper labels pseudo-citizens, are the result of connections between the recognized sovereignty of the Holy See and its role over the Roman Catholic Church. This paper examines this connection contextually amid the Holy See's interaction with the underlying international moral framework on just conflict and the protective motivating factors associated with its pseudo-citizens. This motivation is consistent with historical Holy See positions, and is significant for understanding the Holy See's approach amid future hard power events.

Pakistan has strived though unsuccessfully to introduce reforms into thousands of religious seminaries. Among the different sects of seminaries, Deobandi madaris which are mostly led by Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) have posed the greatest challenge. This paper seeks to analyze why and how JUI-F obstructs the state's attempts of convincing madaris for reforms. Based on the findings of elite group interviews and constructs of “elite instrumentalism” and “political survival theory,” this study argues that JUI-F has political interests, both strategic-cum-existential and tactical, at stake in resisting these reforms. This study of Fazlur Rehman's behavior vis-à-vis state's madrassah reform initiatives allows one to bring home the theoretical premises set by “political survival theory” and “elite instrumentalism.” Accordingly, JUI-F opposes madrassah reforms because the instrumental use of religion (madaris) has long been vital for retaining its political power which in turn has ensured party's political survival.

Lengthy debates over the process of secularization in the West have concluded. In many ways, secularization theorists appear to have “won” the debate: traditional measures of religious vitality reveal a decline in religion. Yet, recent events, especially those involving politics and national identity, have encouraged scholars and members of the public to reconsider the ways in which something like religion might endure and influence public life in secularized Western nations. This paper uses the “exceptional-typical” case of Iceland—a modern, Western, secularized country of comparatively small population size—to observe and conceptualize a variety of processes which are here collectively named “post-secularization.” Its findings suggest that processes which may appear as unrelated or opposing forces—the emergence of new religious movements, the transformation of traditional religious symbols into profane branding, far right nationalist movements—may be part of a single, post-secularization process. Secularization, having fissured the sacred, leaves religion a pliable cultural tool.

We ask how the theopolitics of a nation-state, and especially its soteriology, engage with traditions that preceded the state and relay messages that contradict this theopolitics. To discuss this question, we address the evolving (re-)interpretation of the Ninth of Av—a ritual commemoration of the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of Jewish (Judean) self-rule in ancient times—by Religious-Zionist commentators. We further compare this interpretation to the Religious-Zionist appropriation of Jerusalem Day, a civic holiday celebrating the establishment of Israeli control over East Jerusalem in the June 1967 war. We argue that the statist imperative of the superiority of nation-statist theopolitics suggests that traditions are co-opted to fit in with its soteriology, with varying degrees of resistance or willing accommodation by carriers of these traditions. This co-opting may result in either the de-politicization of what the statist view would see as religion or the religionization of the state's own civic and so-called secular holidays.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a dramatic increase in social scientific literature on the topic of “religious violence,” much of it arguing that there is a uniquely intense and disturbing connection between religion and political conflict and bloodshed. In this article, I challenge mainstream accounts of “religious violence” with an illustrative example from the 16th century of the theoretical and empirical problems with all such essentialist claims. The terms employed in the construction of “religious violence” might today just as easily be applied to the violence of the putatively “secular” nation-state. Furthermore, framing the debate in these sharp binary terms, as William Cavanaugh compellingly demonstrates, is itself part of a political project that had a very particular historical beginning and that conceals as much as it reveals about the nature of violence, both in the past and in the present.

The goal of this article is to examine the association between church attendance and the party identification of black Americans. Using ordinary least squares and logistic regression to analyze data taken from the 1996 National Black Election Study, I find that church attendance has dual effects for determining the party identification of blacks. On one hand, church attendance encourages blacks to be Republican. On the other hand, attending voting churches does not foster Republicanism. Attendance at voting churches influences blacks to be Democrats. Also, blacks who attend voting churches with increasing frequency are likely to identify themselves with the Democratic Party.