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On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Luigi Ventura
Luigi Ventura*
Affiliation:
University of Rome “La Sapienza”†
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Summary

In this note the decision problem of a strategic firm in a general equilibrium setting is analyzed. It is shown that a problem of unanimity arises when such a firm has many shareholders, and that a well known criterion used in the case of market incompleteness can be quite interestingly transposed to an imperfectly competitive framework.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans cette note, nous analysons le problème de décision rencontré par une firme stratégique en équilibre général. Nous montrons qu’un problème d’unanimité surgit quand il y a de nombreux actionnaires, pour le résoudre nous suggérons de transposer à ce cadre de concurrence imparfaite un critère fréquemment utilisé dans l’analyse des marchés incomplets.

Keywords

imperfect competition,shareholders’ unanimity,incomplete markets.D21,D52,D70.D21,D52,D70.
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 3 , 1999 , pp. 283 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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Footnotes

*

The author is gratefully indebted to prof. R. Amir, C.d’Aspremont, J. Drèze, J. Gabszewicz, J.F. Mertens, H. Polemarchakls and two anonymous referees for very useful discussions and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. Acknowledgements are due also to Human Capital and Mobility Program and M.U.R.S.T. 60% for financial support.

†

Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Via A. Cesalpino, 12-14 1-00161 Roma; e-mail : ventura@caspur.it

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