The political economy of the Asia-Pacific region has been transformed over the past decade. Three important developments are (1) the demise of the US–Japan economic rivalry and the associated competition over the most appropriate model of capitalism; (2) challenges to the ‘Washington Consensus’ on the optimal foreign economic strategy for emerging economies; and (3) the renewal of US hegemony in the context of a unipolar international structure. An understanding of these developments requires attention to the interaction of international and domestic forces. These developments suggest that a major challenge facing governments in the region will be to manage the tension between the state and the market. They also suggest that the United States is well positioned to play the role of regional stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific. Whether it does so effectively will depend on its domestic politics and the quality of its statecraft.

The literatures on globalization and regionalization on the one hand, and on the institutional distinctiveness of national capitalisms on the other, seem to pull in very different directions. Nonetheless, an increasing number of international and comparative political economists sensitive to the institutional and cultural variability of contemporary capitalism identify tendencies towards convergence—often towards an Anglo-US model of deregulated neoliberal capitalism. In this article I critically review the literature on convergence, difference and divergence in the global political economy, differentiating between neoclassical and institutionalist perspectives. Resisting arguments which posit a natural selection process initiated by untrammelled free market competition and free capital mobility, I identify the contingent, political and frequently coercive nature of the convergence process. This is illustrated through a discussion of regional selection mechanisms in the context of European Monetary Union and the East Asian financial crisis. In so far as evolutionary selection mechanisms can be identified in the European context, selecting for a more residual social model, these are more a product of the contingent process of European economic integration than they are a necessary consequence of globalization. Moreover, in so far as similarly convergent processes can be identified in contemporary East Asia, they are less a product of globalization than of the ‘predatory neoliberalism’ of a beleagured Washington Consensus.

The activity of workers' organizations and labour issues is once again on the international relations agenda in fields ranging from labour standards at the WTO, to the terms of regional integration, to corporate codes of conduct, to civil society coalition building. This article argues that the role of the international union movement is transforming from a supporter of US capitalism to a brake on neoliberal industrial relations, to potentially advocating a different form of political economy in alliance with other groups. This transformation has taken place partially because unions have has been expelled from the corridors of power in key states and partially because of their encounter with a series of social movements. The cases of the ICFTU's activity in engaging international organizations and MNCs are used as examples to illustrate this trend. The implications for activity in, and the theory of, the global political economy are potentially significant.

This article examines the changing status of ‘sovereignty’ in the context of some of the world's poorest countries. An examination of the relationship between the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and these countries suggests that the norm of sovereignty is increasingly being ‘trumped’ by the IFIs' commitment to the achievement of good political and social arrangements and economic development within these countries. The article explores the historical roots of this development by tracing the way sovereignty became bound up with the idea of self-determination, the achievement of the ideals of the Enlightenment, and the pursuit of a ‘national economic project’.

IR constructivism maintain that a proper understanding of the way subjects interact with the world and with each other alerts us to the fallacy of conventional IR theory. And yet, for a theory that is so obviously dependent upon a rigorous working of the relationship between social theory and its IR variant, it is curious that, with one or two exceptions, IR constructivists often advance incompatible theories. I argue that the confused manner by which, in particular, ‘soft’ constructivism relates to social theory is not accidental but a necessary component of a theory that asserts, but never proves, the primacy of norms and laws over material considerations, in domestic and international politics.

This article analyses the early American commitment to maintaining its neutral rights from several theoretical perspectives. Rejecting recent constructivist interpretations as unsubstantiated by the empirical evidence, it concludes that early American leaders largely mirrored traditional eighteenth century mercantilist practices to suit the interests of the United States. In particular, Jefferson's ‘two-tiered’ approach to the international system was based on astringent calculations of power rather than prevailing notions of ‘republicanism’. This ideology, while manifest in partisan rhetoric, had little measurable impact on the conduct of early American neutral rights policy. By focusing on the relationship of theory and practice in this context, this article offers a case study of the role of norms and ideology in the shaping of foreign policy in a republican state.

Traditionally, the central problematic of the Westphalian states system has been how to counteract the so-called ‘security dilemma’, the tendency for states in a context of uncertainty to defect from cooperative arrangements if they perceive other states' security preparations as threatening (misperception; arms racing). As the states system became more centralized and the number of major players declined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nondivisibility of benefits—the dangers of potential defection (world wars; nuclear annihilation)—grew while states' incentives to defect increasingly necessitated control from the centre. The end of the Cold War, however, has reflected not a further centralization (nondivisibility) of benefits in the international system but (1) an increasing divisibility of benefits in a globalizing world economy and (2) the declining effectiveness of interstate mechanisms at preventing defection not only by states (‘defection from above’) but also by non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors (‘defection from below’). In this ‘new security dilemma’, the range of incentives grows for the latter to defect from the states system itself—unless coopted through the increased availability of divisible benefits. Furthermore, attempts to impose security from above (intervention) can create backlashes which interact with complex globalization processes to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict. In this context, emerging mechanisms of stabilization will be uneven, characterized by structural tensions and suboptimal performance.

Focusing primarily on questions of methodology, this article argues that mediation in international affairs has yet to be properly analysed using the theoretical tools provided by the post-positivist turn in international relations theory. Recognizing the familiar distinction between power-political and facilitative approaches, the article makes the case for a third approach based on the political theory of Jurgen Habermas. The debate between neorealist forms of analysis and critical theory is well known. More contentious, however, is the argument that facilitative forms of third party intervention, such as the Norwegian mediation of the Oslo Accords, cannot operate without a more formal and abstract notion of the ‘right’ in politics. Facilitation's gently working of the lifeworld has much in common with the hermeneutic approach to social science. Like hermeneutics, therefore, facilitation may suffer as it fails to root out relations of power and domination. Even ‘interim stages’ in conflict resolution need a sense of ‘final status’ to gather a sense of pace and direction. The Oslo Accords, for example, demonstrate the need to create a strong vision of ‘final status’ during the interim stage. The article leaves the practical political questions to one side. However, a ‘methodological space’ for critical theory opens up once the defects of the tradition are highlighted, a space which may be filled by distinct forms of mediation practice.

Tony Evans (ed.), Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998)

Robin Holt, Wittgenstein, Politics and Human Rights (London: LSE/Routledge, 1997)

Peter Van Ness (ed.), Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia (London: Routledge, 1999)

Questions concerning the linkage, or lack of it, between theory and practice are perennial in International Relations (IR). This is particularly acute in the case of studies of universal human rights in world politics. Problems associated with universal human rights are familiar; what are their foundations?, what are their origins?, do they exist in all cultures?, why, when it comes to implementation, do we see such failure and inconsistency across the globe and the persistence of human wrongs?, why does power seem to play such a large role in stifling ‘progress’? All these questions appear in one form or another in the books under review here and readers will, perhaps, take comfort from their familiarity as old, difficult friends.