Our work Is our words, but our words do not work any more. They have not worked for some time. We can obviously start with the misleading label—‘International Politics’—which is given to our subject. As a result of this problem, I have wanted to use increasing numbers of inverted commas; but most have never seen the light of day because copy-editors have regarded them as an over-indulgence. Even so, the very temptation of these little scratches indicates that words at the heart of the subject are i n trouble:

The dominant role of the realist paradigm in international relations theory has left little room for the study of the role of cultural variables in world politics. The two central tenets of the realist theoretical game-plan—the primacy of the sovereign state system, and the autonomy of that system, from domestic political, social and moral considerations—focus our attention on the vertical division of the world into sovereign states, rather than on the horizontal forces and ties that cut across state frontiers. The result is the metaphor for the interaction of states as the mechanical one of the billiard table, with power politics as the primary dynamic.

The use of game theory to study international conflict has seen peaks and troughs of enthusiasm, high hopes alternating with disillusionment. A revival in recent years is evidenced by the wide interest aroused by non-technical, accessible applications—notably Axelrod’s work on cooperation. Meanwhile, the increasing use of computers to analyze many types of decision lends credence to the notion that with this new-found analytical power, one can move beyond the simplified models previously on offer. Indeed, several pieces of game-based software are now commercially available. The enthusiastic might claim that we stand on the threshold of an age in which no important decision involving conflict should be made without the backing of powerful, on-line analysis. The even more enthusiastic (of whom more below) are prone to claim that the threshold has already been crossed. However, there remain those for whom such claims cut very little ice, and there Is little consensus amongst theorists as to what sort of practical help can be offered to decision-makers.

This essay is about the response by the United Nations system to financial pressures in the 1980s and early 1990s. These pressures resulted from two developments: the decision of the main contributing states to adopt a policy of zero growth in real terms in the budgets of the organizations; and the additional withholdings by the United States which resulted from the Kassebaum Amendment to the Senate Foreign Relations Act of August 1985. This required a 20 per cent underpayment by the United States of its assessed financial contributions until a range of reforms in budgetary procedures, judged acceptable by the US Administration, had been introduced. The impact of the resulting financial squeeze is considered with particular reference to three Specialized Agencies: the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

The field of international relations (IR) theory is something of a misnomer; since it is constituted by two distinct, though not unrelated, scholarly enterprises. Its core consists of first order theorizing about the structure and dynamics of the international system, and as such it attempts to contribute directly to our understanding of world politics in the form of substantive theories like realism, liberalism, and so on. The proliferation of such theories in recent years, however, has been a cause for some disciplinary concern (or celebration as the case may be), not least because the substantive disagreements between them are as often over what kinds of questions and answers are important or legitimate as they are over the 'facts of the matter'. This has helped open the door since the mid-1980s to a wave of second order or meta-theorizing in the field. The objective of this type of theorizing is also to increase our understanding of world politics, but it does so indirectly by focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of the international system per se.

The agent-structure problem is not settled by deciding what proportions to put in the blender. Agents and structures do not blend easily in any proportions, and solutions to the problem tend to be unstable. Alexander Wendt's thoughtful review article makes this clear, identifies some of the difficulties, and boldly sketches a possible resolution of them. Since his relections are addressed in part to our recent book Explaining and Understanding International Relations, we welcome the chance to pursue them further. Greatly encouraged by his many friendly comments, we shall concentrate on those suggestive or critical points which have prompted us to think afresh.