The so-called Madisonian dilemma has dominated recent debates over the role of the Supreme Court and suggested a “majoritarian paradigm” for constitutional interpretation. But a reexamination of James Madison's unique contributions to republican theory indicates that the “Madisonian dilemma” is in many ways misleading and unfaithful to his political vision. Madison, argues the author in Section I, worked a conceptual change in republican theory. Madison did so because he was convinced that republican liberty (and government) was primarily threatened by popular majorities and legislative majoritarianism in Congress and the states. For that reason, Madison advanced his well-known “naturalist” argument for republicanism and, on that basis, argued for buttressing the political architecture of republican government with “auxiliary precautions” for securing republican liberty. From Madison's reconstruction of republicanism, Section II moves to his conversion to the project of amending the Constitution with a declaration of rights and the basis he laid for the Supreme Court's role in defending republican government and liberty. Finally, Section III takes up Madison's view of the role of the Supreme Court and his articulation of a novel theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism.