This paper explores some of the basic ideological tenets of former Iranian President Muhammad Khatami, showing how they prevented him from realizing his reform agenda. Ideological inconsistencies and ambiguities exposed Khatami and his allies to criticism from both conservatives and radical reformers. Consequently, many Iranians who once voted for Khatami and his allies boycotted the presidential elections of 2005, paving the way for a conservative to succeed Khatami as president of Iran.

It is widely acknowledged that the style of Plato's political philosophizing is radically different from the systems and doctrines approach established by Hobbes and confirmed and redirected by Kant. But what about Aristotle? Does he intend to produce systematic political theory in sharp contrast to Plato's question-centered dialectics? This essay argues that Aristotle's political science is equally as dialogical as Plato's. Taken together, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics form a single set of lectures, craftily organized to lead its immediate Greek audience (the equivalent of Socrates' interlocutors in Plato) deeply into the questions and problems that are Aristotle's theoretical basis for the paradigmatically human activities of practical reason (phronêsis) and thoughtful choice (prohairesis). He accomplishes this goal by allowing none of the answers he or his audience might propose to stand unchallenged, thus acting as another, albeit soberer, Socrates to his politically concerned audience then and, potentially, now.

Human, All Too Human has received less critical attention than many of Nietzsche's other works, and yet it constitutes a crucial turning point in Nietzsche's overall philosophical development. This essay argues that the problem of culture that had preoccupied Nietzsche in his earlier works continues to animate his thinking in Human, All Too Human, but his position on this problem changes fundamentally. Instead of attributing the fragmentation of modern culture to the uncontrolled growth of science and looking to art and myth to restore cultural unity, Nietzsche now explores the possibility of grounding culture on scientific knowledge. This new concept of culture requires a critique of the Wagnerian romantic-artistic cultural project, which Nietzsche reveals rests on erroneous religious, moral, and ultimately metaphysical assumptions. The radical critique of these latter assumptions forms a bridge to Nietzsche's mature philosophy.

Michael Oakeshott's concerns about political developments in twentieth-century Europe seem to shape his philosophical writings. Yet Oakeshott persistently portrays himself as a philosopher who has little practical interest in politics. This essay argues that Oakeshott's genteel conception of the good life leads him to develop a political doctrine for practical reasons while disclaiming any practical motives. His diagnosis of collectivist politics in the 1930s reluctantly solicits a philosophical defense of a pluralist political order that is hospitable to his ethical ideal. His writings concerning the self, society, and state develop such a defense. Yet for Oakeshott, political engagement is incompatible with gentility because it conflates worldliness with spirituality. Oakeshott, therefore, disavows the practical aspirations that shape his work.