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Wallet-Based Redistricting: Evidence for the Concentration of Wealth in Majority Party Districts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Justin H. Kirkland
Justin H. Kirkland*
Affiliation:
University of Houston, USA
*
Justin H. Kirkland, University of Houston, 447 Phillip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204 Email: jhkirkla@email.unc.edu
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Abstract

This article examines the role of wealth in the redistricting process in state legislative contests. I argue that the decision by state redistricting mapmakers to pursue a “seatswing” or “protection” strategy involves more than just a choice between where to move partisan voters. Redistricting may also allow parties to consider wealth as an additional resource to be concentrated or dispersed across legislative districts. To test this wealth-based hypothesis, I examine state redistricting plans in California and North Carolina. Logistic regression analyses of census block group exchanges between state legislative districts reveal that income plays a significant role in redistricting decisions.

Keywords

redistrictingstate legislatures
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 49 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2012

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