Internet surveys of the general population have been growing in use over the last few years because they are less expensive, faster, and greener than most other survey modes. However, they have been used less frequently to survey elites, and little is known about the representativeness of their results. This article helps fill that void by using an experiment where half of a sample of state legislators are given an Internet survey and half a mail survey, and then the response rate, representativeness of respondents, and similarity of responses are compared. The results indicate that mail and Internet surveys generate fairly representative samples, albeit with few biases, and similar responses; however, mail surveys generate a significantly higher response rate than Internet surveys. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Social services in the United States are supplied by both the public and private sectors. Previous political science research has focused on public transfers or Medicaid; I study “Other Public Welfare” programs that include contracts and grants to private social services providers, focusing on the relationship between the two sectors. My results imply that an increase in either Other Public Welfare spending or private individual and family services employees leads to an increase in the other sector. I find weaker evidence of similar relationships involving private residential care or day care services, and private social services employment is generally independent of public spending on transfers and Medicaid. My results have implications for the full effects of changes in public welfare spending, including the effects on the private sector, as well as the effects of organized interests on public welfare spending.

In mid-2011, the Florida state legislature passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355) and in so doing placed new regulations on community organizations that historically have helped eligible Floridians register to vote. Among the legal changes promulgated by this bill were new regulations on the operations of groups like the League of Women Voters and a new oath, warning of prison time and fines, that voter registration agents were required to sign. Such changes raised the implicit costs that eligible Florida citizens faced when registering to vote, and we show that voter registrations across the state in the second half of 2011 dropped precipitously compared with registrations in the second half of 2007. This pattern is evident among registrants in general, among registrants age 20 and younger, and among individuals who registered as Democrats. Outside of HB 1355, we know of no credible explanations for these results. Our findings thus show how restrictions on the way that third-party organizations register voters can have tangible effects on actual registrations. Given that registration prior to an election is a civic necessity in Florida and in many other states, such restrictions have the potential to affect electoral outcomes as well.

The study of U.S. state supreme courts has been significantly constrained by a lack of available data. To remedy this deficiency, this article introduces an original data set of every state supreme court ruling from 1995 through 2010. We utilize automated textual analysis to search the text of thousands of state supreme court decisions and extract critical information on each case. This automated coding approach produces reliable measures of state supreme court decision making when compared with data collected by human coders. We present trends in docket size, dissent rates, and legal issues being heard in front of the court. This new data set will offer scholars numerous opportunities to expand our knowledge of judicial politics in the American states.

This article examines differences in the drivers of state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid immigrant eligibility policies, determined in the wake of the 1996 Welfare Reform. The findings show that differences in the incentive structures of the two programs may affect the way race politics influence each. Specifically, race is a strong negative correlate for TANF inclusion of immigrants as states with large African American populations were more likely to exclude legal permanent residents from the program. In the case of Medicaid, the size of the immigrant population is a strong positive correlate for inclusion. The effect of the size of the black population, although negative, is small and not significant. The study confirms extant research findings that ideological factors play an important role in the formation of both policies.

We modify Berry et al.‘s congressional-delegation-based measure of state government ideology to construct a new measure—which we call the state-legislative-based state government ideology measure—by relying on Shor and McCarty's National Political Awareness Test common space estimates of the ideal points of U.S. state legislators. We conduct tests of convergent and construct validity for the two measures. We find that they correlate highly in each year for which the state-legislative-based indicator is available (1995–2008), and when observations are pooled across all years. We also replicate numerous published studies assessing the impact of state government ideology using each indicator of ideology and find that the two measures nearly always yield similar conclusions about the effect of government ideology. Because the state-legislative-based measure is based on more direct estimates of the ideal points of state legislators than is the congressional-delegation-based measure—which uses estimates of ideal points for members of Congress from the same state as a proxy—we believe the state-legislative-based measure is superior, and we recommend that scholars use it when it is available for the state-years being studied. Because our empirical evidence indicates that Berry et al.‘s congressional-delegation-based measure is also valid—and it is available for a much longer period (annually beginning in 1960)—we advise that it be used when the state-legislative-based measure is not available.

Does the thermostatic model exist in the states? Using a unique data set on state spending preferences on education and welfare, I find evidence of dynamic policy representation and dynamic public responsiveness, but with important qualifications. As state support for spending on education or welfare increases, state expenditures increase, but only for states that are highly professional and, presumably, able to accurately gauge the preferences of residents. In other states, legislators are responding to national policy sentiment instead of specific state opinion. I find no evidence that initiative states are more responsive to state opinion. Empirical evidence for dynamic public responsiveness is more consistent across model specifications. As state expenditures on education or welfare increase, state preferences for additional spending decrease, even after controlling for federal expenditures. Finally, I find that policy representation and public responsiveness in the states are conditional on issue saliency. The results provide a more nuanced understanding about the degree of dynamic representation and responsiveness in the states and the thermostatic model more generally.

I argue that candidates shape their issue agendas—the sets of related issues on which they focus—in part in response to the issue agendas of their opponents and that competitive campaigns stimulate candidates to respond to one another at higher rates. I test my theory of candidate interaction using weekly advertising data at the media market level from 146 statewide elections—54 gubernatorial and 92 U.S. Senate contests—from six election years and across all 50 states. I find that candidates systematically respond to one another's issue agendas and do so to a greater extent in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections.

Do citizens have the information they need to hold state politicians accountable? We consider what people know about state politics and whether knowledge of state government is rooted in the same factors that explain knowledge of national matters. We argue that while knowledge of national politics is rooted within individual dispositions like education and political interest, knowledge of state politics depends on the political climate of the state. When state political environments provide more information and greater incentives to become informed, people are more knowledgeable about state matters. Even if citizens are not always well versed in matters of state politics, they appear to monitor the business of the states. Citizens are most knowledgeable about state politics in the cases where information is arguably most important—when state governments are underperforming, when political competition is high, and when the political parties in the state are ideologically divided.

This article examines the role of wealth in the redistricting process in state legislative contests. I argue that the decision by state redistricting mapmakers to pursue a “seatswing” or “protection” strategy involves more than just a choice between where to move partisan voters. Redistricting may also allow parties to consider wealth as an additional resource to be concentrated or dispersed across legislative districts. To test this wealth-based hypothesis, I examine state redistricting plans in California and North Carolina. Logistic regression analyses of census block group exchanges between state legislative districts reveal that income plays a significant role in redistricting decisions.

Over the past several decades, women's office holding at the state level has grown substantially, but there is still a large range of electoral service across the 50 states. In this article, I revisit the most common explanations provided by the literature in helping us understand this variation and assess whether these explanations can be effectively applied to different racial/ethnic groups of female legislators. Using data from a 20-year time span, I find that there are differences between the factors that predict white women and women of color's state legislative presence.

Why are statewide ballot initiatives used more frequently in some states relative to others? Using Gerber as a theoretical baseline, I argue that groups use initiatives in response to conditions surrounding representative government. Specifically, I argue that groups are best able to mobilize the resources necessary (i.e., citizens) to draft, qualify for the ballot, and pass an initiative when conditions surrounding representative government render it incapable of addressing citizens' policy preferences efficiently and effectively. Groups, that is, are best able to mobilize the resources necessary to pass initiatives as legislatures become insulated from citizens, or ineffective at digesting policy items. I extend the literature in this vein by finding strong evidence that initiatives are used in response to partisan conditions, which undermine legislatures' capacity to process legislation effectively. However, I find only limited empirical support for the argument that initiatives are used in response to legislative insulation.

In this article, we create, validate, and analyze new dynamic measures of state partisanship, state policy mood, and state political ideology. The measures of partisanship and policy mood begin in 1956 and the measure of ideology begins in 1976. Our approach uses the advantages of two leading techniques for measuring state public opinion—multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) and survey aggregation. The resulting estimates are based on nearly 500 different surveys with a total of more than 740,000 respondents. After validating our measures, we show that during the last half century, policy preferences in the states have shifted in important and sometimes surprising ways. For example, we find that differences in political attitudes across time can be as important as differences across states.

We present a new unified dataset of common-space ideal points, committee assignments, and financial interests for all state legislators in 1999. We describe the compilation of the dataset and offer a few possible applications.

We analyze the effect of redrawn constituents on incumbent vote shares in Georgia U.S. House elections from 1992 to 2006. The Georgia General Assembly redrew the congressional boundaries for the 2006 midterm and the new lines redistributed approximately 31% of residents into districts with a different incumbent than the one representing them in 2004. With the use of Voting Tabulation District (VTD) data, we use a hierarchical model to evaluate the effect these redrawn constituents had on their new incumbent's vote share. We find a consistent pattern: both Democratic and Republican incumbents experienced significant reductions in their vote shares as a consequence of the redrawn VTDs placed in their districts. The short-term political climate featuring a national Democratic tide and a simultaneous statewide trend favoring the Grand Old Party (GOP) helps to explain this finding. With offsetting partisan conditions, the incumbency advantage came to the fore as Georgia U.S. House members, irrespective of party affiliation, performed better among the constituents they retained prior to redistricting. Our findings for the 2006 election run counter to the significant Republican redistricting advantage prevailing in Georgia congressional contests from 1992 to 2004.

Studies of state judicial selection systems require accurate classification of electoral systems. While agreement exists for most states, Ohio and Michigan are difficult to classify. In this paper, we discuss the different practices and explain how, in the absence of candidates' party affiliation on the ballot, elections in these states may justifiably be classified as partisan. Replicating the results of an important study on participation in judicial elections, we show how the treatment of these states may result in differing substantive conclusions. We conclude by urging scholars to provide evidence that their results are robust to alternative classifications.

How do state legislatures use statutory language to control policy implementation by state agencies? In this article, I consider—in a specific policy area and time period—the extent to which this decision is affected by legislative anticipation of the likely actions of state courts. Previous literature has argued that the legislative use of statutory language to control bureaucrats varies with the availability of nonstatutory methods of control, but it does not explicitly consider the potential role of courts. My expectations are derived from a simple formal model of executive–legislative relations and are supported when I test them using data on the number of words added to a state's Medicaid laws from 1995 to 1996. In particular, I find that state legislatures write longer, more constraining, statutes when the likelihood that state courts intervene on their behalf is neither very high nor very low.

Scholars of social networks often rely on summary statistics to measure and compare the structures of their networks of interest. However, measuring the uncertainty inherent in these summaries can be challenging, thus making hypothesis testing for network summaries difficult. Computational and nonparametric procedures can overcome these difficulties by allowing researchers to generate reference distributions for comparison directly from their data. In this research, I demonstrate the use of nonparametric hypothesis testing in networks using the popular network summary statistic network modularity. I provide a method based on permutation testing for assessing whether a particular network modularity score is larger than a researcher might expect due to random chance. I then create a simulation study of network modularity and its simulated reference distribution that I propose. Finally, I provide an empirical example of this technique using cosponsorship networks from U.S. state legislatures.

Policy representation requires legislators to advance the interests of their constituents. As a consequence, much research on representation examines the congruence between constituents' preferences and legislators' behaviors. This article argues it is more realistic to think of policy representation as listening—a process—than congruence—an outcome. Listening involves legislators monitoring constituent interests and using that information in making decisions. Using data from a survey of state legislators in 26 states, this research finds that monitoring contributes to using constituent information and offers a measure of listening based on these two behaviors. Furthermore, it finds that compared with the decisions of others, the decisions (measured as cosponsoring gay, lesbian, and bisexual [GLB] issue legislation) of legislators who listen are more strongly influenced by district preferences (measured as district votes on same-sex marriage ballot initiatives). This suggests that listening contributes to representation.