About USD7 trillion of quantitative easing funds has flooded emerging markets since 2008. These funds, created to stimulate a recovery in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and to stabilise financial markets, ended up mostly as emerging markets’ corporate bonds and loans (often after being leveraged into many multiples of their original value). Not for the first time, emerging markets became the financial markets of last resort. These funds were then either mainly invested (Asia) or used (as in Latin America and South Africa) for almost anything except for creating additional productive capacities. Enquiries into these issues, especially how corporations financed their investment, were subjects that fascinated economist Ajit Singh. He was the first to find out that corporations in emerging markets relied much more on external finance than those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (where retained profits played a major role). The implication was that they were likely to be more susceptible to the vicissitudes of financial markets, and these have become even more weird since quantitative easing, as Northern ‘investors’, in search for elusive yields, have been happy to take on ever higher risks, leverage and illiquidity in the South. This is a key difference between current global financial fragilities and those at the onset of the current global financial crisis in 2007. The stakes for emerging economies and international financial markets could scarcely be higher, but unfortunately these huge new challenges occur at the worst possible time, as our social imagination has seldom been so barren.

Discussion of the implications of precarious work for individual workers remains hesitant and often confused. A clear conceptualisation would separate out five analytical levels: precariousness in employment, precarious work, precarious workers individually and as an emerging class, and precarity as a general condition of social life. To illustrate the need to avoid slippage between the concepts of precarious work and precarious workers, we present one ‘theory-relevant’ example – full-time secondary school students in Australia who hold part-time jobs in the retail sector. Their part-time jobs are indeed precarious but the negative effects on the student-workers are modest, both because participation in precarious work is limited (moderate weekly hours and intermittent work within the framework of a brief stage of the life course) and because many (though not all) of the associated risks are cushioned by structural forces such as access to alternative income sources and career paths. At the same time, however, a longitudinal perspective reveals that the same group of student-workers faces major risks in the future, as a result of increasingly insecure labour markets. Reflections on this example help to identify conceptual tools that can be applied to a wide range of other examples of precarious work.

Mainstream economists argue that unemployment must be tackled with ‘flexibilisation’ or ‘labour market deregulation’. The public policy application has been the principle of ‘flexicurity’, with mixed labour market outcomes and limited success. Central contributions to theoretical and empirical economics writing on unemployment issues still espouse ‘flexibilisation’ as a general approach and warn about the detrimental effects of systematic deregulation under expectations of outcomes such as lower unemployment. Departing from a review of this literature, we take a step further from the ‘flexicurity’ prescription, to follow the capabilities approach of Sen and others, and develop a concept of social capabilities – based flexicurity for a learning economy, arguing that labour market performance must be targeted in an approach that includes a strong commitment to social well-being.

It is often argued that job insecurity and precarious work are on the rise. However, the evidence to back these arguments remains mixed and inconclusive. In this study, we define and measure precarious work in Finland using five variables that reflect both objective and subjective insecurity: atypical employment, actually experienced unemployment, the threat of dismissal or unemployment, poor chances of finding a new job, and low earnings. Results based on Statistics Finland’s Quality of Work Life Surveys from 1984 to 2013 indicate that, from a labour market or forms of employment perspective, the proportion of precarious wage earners has increased from 11% in 1984 to 13% in 2013. From a second perspective, however, focusing on changing working conditions, growing inequality and eroding social security mechanisms, we also analyse how a precarious labour market position is related to intrinsic job quality. Precarious workers experience decreased levels of skill and discretion, and they work in a less supportive environment than other employees.

The use of part-time jobs is steadily increasing in most advanced economies. Previous literature has concluded that part-time workers suffer a wage penalty, but its magnitude varies across studies and countries. The part-time penalty is the otherwise unexplained element of the gap between full-time and part-time hourly earnings. One potential factor accounting for international differences in this penalty is the coverage of collective bargaining. This article outlines research examining wage differences between part-time and full-time male and female workers in Spain, a country with a very high level of coverage of collective agreements but very heterogeneous regional labour markets. Results are obtained using an econometric decomposition specifically adapted to matched employer–employee data. They show that intra-firm wage differentials for part- and full-time workers with the same characteristics are negligible. But results that are perhaps less expected are those based on the regional analysis – an unprecedented perspective compared with the previous literature. These results show that despite very significant differences in economies and labour markets, observed wage gaps between part-time and full-time workers in each Spanish region are also mainly explained by different endowments of individual, job and firm characteristics. Overall, our evidence highlights the over-riding role of wage setting mechanisms, specifically collective bargaining coverage, in minimising inter-regional differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers.

Youth unemployment rates in most countries are considerably higher than total unemployment rates and increased significantly in many countries following the global financial crisis. Young people in long-term unemployment risk becoming a ‘lost generation’. We investigate individual and family characteristics predicting young people’s vulnerability to the scarring effects of long-term unemployment. After overviewing aggregate youth unemployment trends in several European countries, we focus on Russia and Italy – countries with contrasting structural and institutional conditions and exhibiting different macroeconomic trends – in order to determine whether, despite these differences, there were similar patterns in the relationship between individual and family characteristics and the of risk of unemployment and its adverse impacts. We use a Heckman probit model to estimate the unemployment risk of young people – compared to adults – during the period 2004–2011, before and after the global financial crisis. Despite many differences between the two countries, most of the explanatory variables acted in the same direction in each and so we compare the relative size of such effects. The policy significance of the findings is that personal and family characteristics are more amenable to modification than macroeconomic variables. Specific school-to-work interventions are needed to avoid creating a ‘lost generation’.