Inflation has long been a fact of economic and political life in Argentina. The Peronist government which assumed office in mid-1973 attempted to control inflation through the so-called Social Pact, a wage-price agreement of two years’ duration involving the leading labor union organization, a leading businessmen's organization, and the Argentine state. An awareness of the principal issues of the economic situation is essential to an understanding of the crisis of contemporary Argentina, and a description of the evolution of the Social Pact reveals some of the essential contours of the economic debate. But the importance of the Social Pact extends beyond mere economic considerations. The study of the latest Argentine experience with anti-inflationary policy suggests some generalizations about the nature of populist political movements, the symbolic functions of economic policy initiatives, and the functions of such policies in co-opting private economic actors and legitimating governmental interference with free market forces. It also reveals some important characteristics of Argentine politics, especially concerning relations between the state and private economic groups. With economic and political implications of comparative significance, the Argentine Social Pact is an important case study in political economy.

The accelerating mobilization of Chile's working class from 1965 onward appears to support Huntington's cautious evaluation of the effects of that process rather than Deutsch's more optimistic one. Instead of resulting in more massive support for Dr. Allende's minority-based UP government (which, needing support, stimulated even further a process that had been noticeable from at least 1965), increased mobilization resulted in (a) heightened but unattainable economic demands; (b) increased support for the extreme left (a severe threat to the regime's policies and even existence, as Allende recognized); (c) increased support for the opposition Christian Democrats; (d) a general de-authorization of all institutions, including those tailored specifically to working-class needs. In some situations, mobilization may sweep away the remnants of an old regime. But where that is not possible or not the real issue, it may overwhelm rather than aid an already weak government, even if it is change-oriented.

In the struggle to find a successor to the totalitarian model for study of Soviet politics, the interest-group approach has won significant support. Yet this concept fails to meet all three of Huntington's criteria for a “useful” model. First, the group concept emphasizes the peripheral at the expense of what is of critical importance. Second, as a comparative concept it introduces errors in logic as well as a myriad of ambiguities in definition and taxonomy. Third, it is more likely to obscure than to clarify the dynamic character of the Soviet system. The group approach does not promise, as some assert, to bring the study of Soviet politics into the mainstream of comparative political theory.

In contrast, the totalitarian model still goes far toward meeting Huntington's criteria. When supplemented by the notion of political culture and by middle-range concepts of organization theory and bureaucracy, the totalitarian model retains great heuristic value as an ideal construct from which Soviet realities diverge in various ways.

The paper attempts to examine the impact of East-West trade on the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe, carried out under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The discussion is focused on the proposition that, other things being equal, the continued growth of East-West trade is at the present time incompatible with the increase in the level of economic integration in that part of Europe.

The problem is analyzed in the context of several factors: the process of regional economic integration; the attitude of the Soviet Union and of the East European political and economic elites toward both integration and East-West trade before and after détente; the influence of economic reforms in Eastern Europe; and the impact of the energy crisis and of the developing global shortage of raw materials.

The conclusion emerges that, on balance, the chances of economic cooperation if not integration in the region are today better than in the past, albeit at the expense of closer economic relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

Studies on the relationship between internal politics and external behavior present many contradictions. This paper attempts to modify previous research methods by focusing on the relationship between internal mobilization and articulated external hostility in China during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1967-1969.

The findings suggest that during times of authority crisis, domestic mass mobilization tends to be associated with increased antiforeign verbal accusations and mass protests. The Maoists manipulated the expression of external hostility for the purpose of mobilizing internal support for their own domestic programs. Some suggestions concerning the study of China's international behavior and about cross-national research on the linkage of internal politics and external behavior are provided.