Private standards are increasing in number, and they affect trade, but their status in the WTO remains problematic. Standards-takers are typically countries with little bargaining power, who cannot affect their terms of trade, and, thus, even if they possess domestic antitrust laws, will find it hard to persuade standard-setters to take account of their interests. Our concern is to bring more of these standards within the normative framework of the trade regime – that is, we worry that these private forms of social order can conflict with the fundamental norms of transparency and non-discrimination. The WTO membership has consumed itself in endless discussions regarding mundane, legalistic issues, and has not moved at all towards addressing the real concerns of developing countries. We discuss one aspect of the problem: How reclusive should the WTO allow product standards to be? We argue that the WTO should adopt a ‘Reference Paper’ that would encourage its members to apply WTO rules for adopting those standards that already come under the aegis of the WTO to private standards. In the absence of centralized enforcement, utopia in the WTO legal paradigm, transparency disciplines imposed on standard-setters is the best the WTO could offer to those who are negatively affected by private standards.

Food security emerged as a major source of political deadlock in the WTO Doha Round negotiations. Concerns about food security only intensified at the WTO following the 2008 Global Food Crisis, with the Bali and Nairobi Ministerials revealing polarized views between the US and India on the financing of public food stockholding. These ‘food fights’ at the WTO have attracted significant international media, civil society, and scholarly attention. In this article, I argue that inter-state disagreement on food security is not new or specific to the Doha Round but instead has been a recurrent phenomenon in the multilateral trade system for decades. Employing an historical approach, I show that food security has repeatedly been an item of negotiation in successive GATT negotiating rounds and has been steadily codified in international trade law over time. Today, food security is deeply integrated into the rules of the trade regime, making the WTO an important yet largely unacknowledged institution in global food security governance.

In the OECD countries, the decline of manufacturing and the employment implications have long been matters of concern. Recently, policymakers in several countries have set out to try and achieve reindustrialization. The servicification of firms is related to these concerns and aspirations. However, servicification, and particularly its role in trade policy, has received limited attention. I review micro-level evidence and discuss its implications. I find that imported, domestic and exported services are all important to contemporary firm competitiveness and participation in international value chains. Therefore, historic policymaking divisions between trade in manufactures and trade in services services, between export and import interests, and among modes of supply are becoming less relevant. I conclude by suggesting potential steps forward.

Conventional wisdom holds that international trade agreements can serve as a source of external pressure and credible commitment to overcome opposition and to lock in domestic economic reforms. This belief, however, underestimates the ability of politicians not only to circumvent these pressures, but to leverage international trade agreements to advance their own policy preferences – preferences that may be highly anti-reformist. Thus, trade agreements do not necessarily induce reforms and, in certain circumstances, they can even be counterproductive. Through an analysis of aggregate data and 40 interviews with senior politicians, government officials, and state-owned enterprise managers in Vietnam, this paper illustrates these insights by analyzing the political economy of SOE reform backsliding on the eve of Vietnam's accession to the WTO.

Contemporary international trademark law is subject to a dynamic process. As communication and marketing strategies steadily evolve, enterprises seek to develop non-traditional signs as trademarks in international trade. Since non-traditional trademarks have received broad protection among WTO Members, the international registration of non-traditional trademarks has raised certain questions. This article focuses on issues of the registration of non-traditional trademarks from an international perspective. With a brief introduction to the new category of trademarks, Section 2 discusses whether non-traditional signs can constitute trademarks by analyzing the trademark definition that is stipulated in Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and introduces the current status of the legal protection afforded to non-traditional trademarks under the domestic trademark legislations in WTO Member states. Section 3 presents an in-depth analysis of Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention and aims to address the significance of Article 6quinquies with regard to the international registration of non-traditional trademarks by comparing the essential difference between the two modes of international registration of trademarks. The conclusion provides strategical suggestions and practical guidance for both trademark applicants and competent authorities of WTO Members.

This dispute concerned the imposition by Colombia of a ‘compound tariff’ on the importation of certain textiles, apparel, and footwear classified under Chapters 61 through 64 of Colombia's Customs Tariff. The compound tariff was composed of an ad valorem levy, expressed as a percentage of the customs value of goods, and a specific levy, expressed in units of currency per unit of measurement. The ad valorem component of the compound tariff was 10% for all products regardless of their value; the specific component depended on price thresholds for certain textiles, apparel, and footwear, imposing a higher levy on products imported below the price threshold set out in the corresponding Chapter of Colombia's Customs Tariff.

In a case of first impression, a tribunal at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rejected Claimants' novel legal argument that the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in Article II of the World Trade Organisation's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) enabled Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. (MMEA) to access the offers to arbitrate under the Senegal–Netherlands and the Senegal–United Kingdom bilateral investment treaties (BITs).