Using several case studies and data from the Economic Freedom of the World annual report and from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, we estimate the effect of human rights abuses on economic liberalization. The data suggest that human rights abuses reduce rather than accelerate the pace of economic liberalization.

The globalization of production and finance is responsible for much of the variation in political contestation over exchange rates since the end of Bretton Woods. On the one hand, globalization increases the salience of the policy decisions that affect exchange rates, as more firms and their workers engage more in international trade and compete more against imports. On the other hand, globalization offers firms a myriad of opportunities to manage their exchange rate risk, through operational and financial hedging. But hedging is available to only certain types of economic actors and in certain situations of exchange rate risk. In this way, globalization has redrawn traditional political cleavages on exchange rates. This argument is tested with an original survey of US firms, labor unions, and trade associations on their preferences and political activity on exchange rate policy.

While the literature on political action committees' (PACs) contributions to congressional campaigns is substantial, one key variable has been missing: the ideology of the PAC. Such a measure is needed to evaluate a normatively important yet unanswered question: to what extent do PACs give to candidates with whom they agree ideologically, as opposed to candidates they may want to influence after the election? This study shows that many interest groups' preferences for an electoral strategy or an access strategy can be predicted by their left-right ideology and their level of ideological extremism. The analysis finds that more ideologically extreme groups and more liberal groups spend more money on PAC contributions relative to lobbying. Further, groups' underlying left-right ideology is also highly predictive of their allocation of PAC contributions between the two parties—even controlling for group type.

Real exchange rate movements are robustly related to the rise and fall of trade protectionism. I demonstrate this by presenting a theoretical model that incorporates the real exchange rate into a standard factor proportions model of trade policy preferences. The model demonstrates why some firms' trade policy preferences, and thus total demands for protectionism, change in response to real exchange rate movements. I evaluate the model with data on antidumping investigations in six industrialized countries between the late 1970s and 2004. The exercise suggests that the real exchange rate hypothesis offers a more compelling explanation for protectionist waves than the business cycle hypothesis.