This article reviews the procedures used to determine refugee applications. Using Kenya and Egypt as case studies, it discusses the basic international due-process considerations that should be observed when adjudicating asylum claims. Issues surrounding access to territory and procedural information, the competency of decision-makers, and legal assistance and advice in making applications are evaluated. Also examined are the nature of asylum decisions and the extent to which these outcomes promote appeal rights. It is contended that adjudication procedures fall considerably short of due-process guarantees. The article concludes that, in order to meet minimum standards, a comprehensive approach is required.

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded in its Report, dated 25 January 2005, that no genocide had been committed by the Government of Sudan. From the Commission’s perspective, the heinous atrocities committed in Darfur did not reveal ‘the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the African tribal population’ on the part of the Sudanese government. Apparently, the Commission found that the subjective element of the definition of genocide, i.e., genocidal intent, was not complied with in the case of Darfur. This article examines the extent to which the Commission’s conclusion that genocidal intent had been missing on the part of the Sudanese Government is sufficiently well-founded. The content of the part of the Report that considers the question whether or not there was genocidal intent is critically analysed in the light of the components of genocidal intent. While analysing the elements the Commission adduced to show the lack of genocidal intent, the author discusses each relevant element of genocidal intent at length and reveals that there are contending approaches as regards the level of intent that is required to establish genocidal liability. Arguments are presented that indicate why the purposeful standard which the Commission resorted to is debatable and attention is given to a broader interpretation of genocidal intent, i.e., the knowledge standard. By means of her analysis the author demonstrates that the elements the Commission brought forward are, in general, insufficiently convincing evidence to prove the absence of genocidal intent on the part of the central authorities. They appear to be too superfluous, contentious and legally weak.

This article is a prospective analysis of whether the established principles for delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 NM will apply for delimitation of outer continental margins. On the basis of the established normative jurisprudence of delimitations within 200 NM it can namely not be ruled out that the established equitable criteria and methods for delimitation, for finding an equitable solution, were solely set to prevail in delimitations within 200 NM.

Title commands delimitation and the title for the zone beyond 200 NM differ from the title within 200 NM. Wherein the distance criterion is the title for the zone within 200 NM, geological and geomorphologic criteria are the basis of the title for the legal continental shelf that extends 200 NM. Accordingly, the established normative principles in delimitation of continental shelves beyond 200 NM are susceptible to differ from the established prevailing principles within 200 NM and may have an important impact on delimitations in the continental outer margins.

In conclusion it is held that the established equitable criteria and methods in order to find an equitable solution in delimitations within 200 NM are likely not to apply mutatis mutandis for delimitations beyond 200 NM

This article is designed to provide a critical analysis of the successes and failures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in certain key areas of international trade during its first decade. The WTO, which came into existence on 1 January 1995, celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2005, with the WTO officials claiming that the past ten years had been a success for the organization. Indeed, it has seen an expansion of its activities in recent years and has thus become one of the most important international organizations. Nearly 150 states, developed and developing, small and big, powerful and weaker, have now become members of this organization. Towards the end of 2005 a major WTO agreement, the TRIPS, was amended in favour of public health and full liberalization of trade in textile and clothing also became a reality in 2005.

However, the WTO, established as it was primarily to further liberalize international trade, is supposed to create a level playing field in a number of other key areas, including agriculture, in order for it to enable nations to compete on an equal footing across the board. Has the WTO lived up to its expectations over the past ten years? Has the level playing field become truly level in all major areas over the past decade? After examining these questions in some detail, this article argues that the WTO has limited success in some of the core areas and the playing field has not become as level as it should have been by the time it entered its second decade. The Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, has not made any substantial progress.

The Sixth Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in December 2005, the closing month of the tenth anniversary of the WTO, failed to make a breakthrough. Although the failure in Hong Kong was not as disastrous as was in the third conference in Seattle in 1999 or in the fifth conference in Cancun in 2003, the deadlock witnessed in Hong Kong, especially with regard to the liberalization of trade in agriculture, has put the WTO itself at a crossroads. Since the Hong Kong meeting a series of deadlines for various stages of negotiations for moving the Doha Round negotiations forward have been missed. A formal meeting on 1 July 2006 of the Trade Negotiations Committee, which comprises the entire WTO membership, resulted in a failure. The WTO members could not agree on formulas for reducing tariffs and subsidies, various flexibilities, and other disciplines, especially on the liberalization of trade in agriculture. Achieving a truly level playing field should be about balancing the interests of various groups of states as well as the respective environments and interests of different traders and consumers living in different countries and the WTO has a long way to go to achieve this objective.

On 2 May 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered its decision concerning the EC Insolvency Regulation. In this case the underlying issue was a conflict between an Italian court and an Irish court. Both of them ruled that the centre of main interests was in their own Member State. The facts were as follows.