This article analyses the impact of mobility on sending CEE countries after the biggest EU enlargement of 2004 with some reference to the EU enlargement of 2007. It is presented on the fifteenth anniversary of the biggest historical EU enlargement with a disclaimer that economic and social changes are still enduring. The aim of this article is to explain the interlinked economic and social impacts of EU enlargements on CEE sending countries relating to: GDP, wages, economic remittances, welfare systems and employment, human capital (tangible and intangible), social remittances and social mobility. It is proved here, that exploring and exploiting the complex catalogue of available arguments and findings across CEE countries, EU enlargements can be seen as outcomes of a set of top-down public policies with their regulation (EU law), distribution (four freedoms) and redistribution functions (EU funds) along with bottom-up activities and developments of migrants themselves.

With the ‘gig economy’ moving to the forefront of research on service labour, interest has heightened in the techniques of labour control that reproduce it. Taking tipping as just such a technique, this article explores critically the policy research around ‘tipped’ employment in the United States. In the United States, tipping is a legally recognised form of labour remuneration that informalises the wage relation, incentivises the worker in precarity, and internalises social relations of subordination. Understanding tipped work, its legal status, its operative logic, and the contradictions that arise within its framework, is a priority for relevant social policy analysis. The aims here are: 1) to set out the ‘topography’ of the policy landscape on tipping in the United States; and 2) to problematise the current scope of this policy literature in societal terms. This research will focus on the restaurant industry, but will establish its broader societal significance.

Social care policy-making seeks to address longstanding staff recruitment and retention problems but also to protect vulnerable clients from harm. Internationally many states have policies requiring disclosure of conviction histories by applicants seeking work with vulnerable populations. Policies also seek to encourage rehabilitation of people with offending histories, particularly in countries with high employment. This article presents and discusses the policy implications of a scoping review conducted in 2019 to explore evidence of current practice in employing people with criminal records as care workers in social care and the potential to recruit new staff from this group. The literature contains limited evidence about the effectiveness of policies inhibiting or facilitating social care work by people with criminal records. Further research should clarify policy contradictions, identify barriers and facilitators in different parts of the care sector to employment and protection, while holistic evaluation of initiatives in this area is needed.

This article sheds light on a policy area where the notion of the active citizen has gained prominence as part of the transformation of the welfare state: purchasing private health services and private health insurance for children in Finland. Although the country’s universal health care system offers free primary health care for children, 40 per cent of children now have private insurance. Drawing on interviews with parents who seek private solutions, we examine what they perceive to be good health care. Our analysis reveals that parents are looking for certain practices – in Finland available only in the private sector – that they see as signs of good care. The unavailability of these practices in public health care calls into question the access, quality and efficiency of the public system. Based on these findings, we discuss the possible consequences of the disparity between parents’ expectations and the universal health care system.

In this article, we seek to develop a framework of childcare vulnerabilities experienced by children, parents and providers engaged in the formal, unregulated childcare market. Informed by vulnerability theorists who examine care work within the context of dependency and power relations, we explore the extent to which notions of vulnerability have been considered in childcare research. Five types of vulnerability from the literature – physical, emotional, economic, legal and racial – are mapped onto the experiences of children, parents and providers. We conceptualise an understanding of vulnerability as it relates to unregulated childcare, showing how vulnerability in this sector is compound, interrelated and structural, creating specific challenges.

The aims of this review article are two-fold: (1) to set out the key theoretical trends in the study of religion, populism and social policy as antithetical concepts that also share common concerns; (2) to re-assert the relevance of social policy to the social and political sciences by making the case for studying outlier or indeed rival topics together – in this case populism and religion. Social policy scholars do not necessarily associate these two topics with modern social policy, yet they have a long history of influence on societies all over the world; populism is also especially timely in our current era. The article contributes to the literature by: (a) helping social policy better understand its diverse and at times contradictory constituencies; (b) contributing to a more complex and inclusive understanding of social policy and, therefore, social welfare. In setting out the state-of-the-art, the article also draws upon research on social policy which spans various continents (North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America) and a preceding paper collaboration by the authors on religion and social policy (Pavolini et al., 2017).

The role of populism in mobilising support for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union has been well noted. But a key feature of populist politics – the use of religious discourses – has been largely overlooked. This article addresses this gap by exploring the way in which the Leave campaign framed Brexit in quasi-religious and mythological terms. Three core themes are identified: (1) that the British ‘people’ had a unique role to play in global affairs; (2) that the sanctity of this special status was threatened by elites and migrants; (3) that the referendum gave voice to the sacred ‘will of the people’. These narratives were underpinned by a strategic discourse centring on claims that EU membership was exacerbating a crisis in health and social care. This myth was encapsulated by the so-called ‘Brexit bus’ campaign.

This article examines the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework as a political project in tension with its universal and multilateral aspirations to serve as a counterbalance to narrow populist visions increasingly dominating global politics. Building upon Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism and their notion of ‘radical democracy’, we conceptualise the SDGs as a struggle for hegemony and in competition with other styles of politics, over what counts as ‘development’. This hegemonial struggle plays out in the attempts to form political constituencies behind developmental slogans, and it is here that religious actors come to the fore, given their already established role in organising communities, expressing values and aspirations, and articulating visions of the future. Examining how the SDG process has engaged with faith actors in India and Ethiopia, as well as how the Indian and Ethiopian states have engaged with religion in defining development, we argue that a ‘radical democracy’ of sustainable development requires a more intentional effort at integrating religious actors in the implementation of the SDGs.

This article analyses two cases of populist mobilisation – namely, one against a primary school entry-age reform and another against WHO sexuality education and the concept of gender – that took place in Poland between 2008 and 2019. Both campaigns had a populist character and were oriented towards restoring social justice taken away from ‘the people’ by a morally corrupted ‘elite’. There are differences between the cases that can be analytically delineated by assessing whether a religious mobilisation has an overt or a covert character. While the series of protests against the school-age reform represents a case of mobilisation with covert religious symbolism, the campaigns against sexuality education and the use of the concept of gender are characterised by overt religious populism. To characterise the dynamics of the two campaigns, the study uses the concept of a moral panic, emphasising the importance of moral entrepreneurs waging ideological war against the government and/or liberal experts conceived of as ‘folk devils’.

This article traces the influence of Front National (FN) on the transformation of mainstream French narratives of laïcité since 1989, with particular attention to education policy. It argues that the FN’s right-wing populist rhetoric, particularly the systematic securitisation of Islam as a threat to the ‘people’, facilitated the more widespread reframing of laïcité as a Republican defence mechanism, operating primarily through the school system. Laïcité was increasingly deployed in mainstream discourses and legislative measures to address two interrelated security concerns: the immediate safety of the school by the promotion of neutrality, and the overall wellbeing of the Republic via the prevention of radicalisation. Analysing this process in two specific periods (1989–2004 and 2005–2019), the article demonstrates that the FN’s populist agenda came to be in a symbiotic relationship with the centre-right and centre-left parties. While established parties gradually incorporated the FN’s securitisation narrative in their policymaking, the FN went through a process of ‘normalisation’ by claiming ownership of laïcité as a way to frame its anti-Islam stance in a more acceptable Republican discourse.

Churches’ positions and preferences in social policy are often described in the literature as fixed over time. The article challenges this assumption. In particular, it shows how the Italian Catholic Church (CC) changed over time its position toward social assistance and migration policies. In relation to social assistance, the CC has shifted from an antagonist approach to public intervention to the support of a universal public minimum income scheme. At a time of increasing aversion towards migrants, the Catholic Church has also become one of the few core actors in Italian society advocating explicitly for more welcoming migration policies and criticising national governments, especially the populist ones. Four factors explain these changes: the way institutions have worked in this policy field, CC material interests, how new ideas on social rights and social justice have been re-elaborated within the CC and its moral authority in politics.