Following a large-scale disaster, such as a major earthquake, tsunami or cyclone, tens of thousands of persons are often displaced, suffer from food shortages and in need of medical assistance. In situations in which the State affected by the disaster does not meet the needs of the affected persons itself, humanitarian assistance from outside the State might be required. This article considers the role of consent to external humanitarian assistance on the part of the affected State. As there is no single overarching treaty in the area of humanitarian assistance in situations of disaster, the article explores the role of consent in the various disaster-specific, subject-specific and region-specific treaties as well as in the soft law instruments in the area. Although the instruments take seemingly different approaches to the subject, a common standard is identified, namely that consent on the part of the affected State is required before external assistance can be provided but that consent cannot be arbitrarily withheld. The article then goes on to give content to the arbitrary withholding standard, breaking it down into its substantive and procedural elements. These include the meaning of the term ‘arbitrary’; the requirement to provide a reason for the withholding of consent; legitimate grounds for withholding consent; and the actor that assesses the justification. Regard is had for State practice in the context of disasters as well as other areas of the law in which similar tests are used.

EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta has been the first maritime operation of the European Union and it has certainly been successful given the significant decrease of pirate attacks off the Somali coast. However, various issues have been raised concerning its legal basis under international law and its legal framework, including questions of responsibility. These issues are particularly interesting since the EU has a more integrated legal order than other organizations involved in such operations (eg UN, NATO). The present article attempts to address these issues against the background of international and European law. Even though the legal basis of the Operation is clear from a European law perspective, there have been certain misconceptions concerning the legal basis of the Operation under international law. The delineation of the Operation's legal framework requires a careful analysis of the rules applicable to each of its phases and of its addressees, since each phase is subject to different rules which are binding on different actors. Finally, there is an extensive discussion of questions of responsibility, which were heavily influenced by the applicable Rules of Engagement and of the actual conduct of the Operation. The conclusion is that, at least on the high seas, responsibility should primarily rest with the flag States rather than with the EU. However, in most cases the EU is indirectly responsible for violations of international law, except in cases where suspected pirates are transferred to third States pursuant to EU agreements with such States, in which case it bears primarily responsibility.

This article looks at the origins, purposes and conflicts of national interests and policies that were the primary influences in shaping the substance of the Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force at the end of 2014. It then proceeds to a more legally focussed analysis and, having identified several important issues which have had to remain undiscussed, concentrates on detailed examination and evaluation of the most important provisions of substance. These are firstly the scope of the Treaty—defining the equipment or materiel covered (Article 2). There follows analysis of the provisions which contain the obligations on exporting States, ranging from absolute prohibitions (Article 6) to ‘export assessments’ (Article 7), which in practice will be the most frequently applicable. The paper concludes by identifying several valuable provisions in the Treaty whilst also highlighting several significant weaknesses and omissions. It contends that evaluation of the Treaty's likely contribution to controlling the recognized evils of the arms trade is premature at this stage and, further, that efforts towards that end must focus on the practice and law of domestic administrative implementation, rather than international law.

The phenomenon of child labour is on the rise in Europe in the wake of the economic crisis. Specific action in tackling this practice faces a range of challenges including the often hidden nature of the work, cultural attitudes and gendered constructions of the role of children especially in domestic settings. This article explores the range of international standards and efforts made by numerous human rights tribunals aimed at combating the practice, with particular emphasis on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It concludes that the Court has drawn erratically on its standard methodologies (including the comparative technique) in interpreting Article 4 of the ECHR, thus providing limited guidance to European States in getting to grips with child labour.

Although there is a broadly similar core of human rights law and courts in different jurisdictions face strikingly similar questions, the use of comparative law in the human rights context remains controversial. Reference to foreign human rights materials is regarded as undemocratic, selective and misleading. Rather than searching for a single ‘right answer’, or expecting convergence, this article addresses these challenges from a deliberative perspective. A deliberative approach requires decisions to be taken on the basis of reasons which are thorough and persuasive. Even where outcomes diverge, there need to be good reasons, whether textual, institutional, or cultural. Comparative materials constitute an important contribution to this process. Part I critically assesses various alternative potential functions of comparative law. Part II develops the deliberative model while Part III addresses the main critiques of comparative law. Part IV tests the deliberative approach against a selection of cases dealing with two particularly challenging issues confronted by courts in different jurisdictions, namely the use of substantive principles such as dignity, and the application of justification or limitation clauses in the context of prisoners' right to vote. Case law is drawn from countries which already cite each other and which have broadly similar institutional frameworks: the USA, Canada, South Africa, India, Australia, the UK, New Zealand and the European Court of Human Rights to the extent that it too considers comparative law.

This article explores the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court on the fundamental rights of commercial companies. The rights considered include property, the privilege against self-incrimination, freedom of speech, double jeopardy, the right to make political donations, and the freedom of religion. The article highlights the dangers of taking the fundamental rights of companies too far, as has recently occurred in the US; and it advocates a cautious and coordinated approach to this delicate issue, which has become increasingly important on both sides of the Atlantic.

On 19 February 2013, a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)-administered Court of Arbitration issued a Partial Award on the dispute between Pakistan and India regarding the use of the waters of the Kishenganga/Neelum, a tributary of the Indus system of rivers. This article examines the tribunal's decision, which was mainly limited to interpreting the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT), and its contribution to international environmental law and the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. After briefly discussing the dispute's factual context and procedural history, the article critiques the tribunal's methodology, which was based on an inconsistent application of the principles of treaty interpretation. The Award's contribution is therefore mixed: despite its almost complete disregard for the principle of ‘equality of right’, it has contributed to clarifying the criteria for determining ‘existing uses’ of a watercourse and reaffirmed both the substantive obligation to refrain from causing transboundary harm and the procedural duty to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment under international environmental law.

This article offers a systematic analysis of the plenary Chamber of the French Cour de Cassation's final decision in the Baby Loup case which held that a private nursery had acted lawfully when requiring an employee to remove her jilbab at work, in accordance with the religious neutrality requirements of the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECHR and French domestic legal requirements. First, it is argued that laïcité—rightly held to be irrelevant—still unduly taints the reasoning. As a result, proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions are not properly applied. Secondly, the decision is compared and contrasted with recent ECtHR cases, notably Eweida and Others v UK. It is argued that a Baby Loup-type restriction does not meet ECHR standards. Additionally the margin of appreciation, used by the ECtHR to save the French ban on the full-covering of the face in the SAS case, should not, as will be demonstrated, come into play in a Baby Loup context.