This study models the sub-national pattern of coca cultivation in Colombia following the implementation of Plan Colombia (2001–2005). The results suggest that aerial eradication reduces coca cultivation primarily through creation of significant displacement and that coca cultivation is less intense in areas with a significant state presence. Further, coca cultivation appears to be more common in less developed, agricultural regions where access to legal markets precludes other forms of agriculture. Poverty has a significant, non-linear effect on coca cultivation; cultivation is most intense in regions of moderate poverty. Based on the findings, efforts to reduce coca cultivation should emphasise developing local public infrastructure and market access in conjunction with poverty reduction efforts and investment in alternative development.

While most scientific studies on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants focus on the countryside, the case of the paramilitaries in Medellín, Colombia, provides an exceptional opportunity to study such a process in a metropolitan environment. Analysis reveals how an urban DDR-process may lead to highly contradictory results: a strong decrease in the number of homicides and at the same time a consolidation of networks of criminal groups. Extralegal combatants, especially in an urban environment, are able to form extensive networks with criminal organisations. Although DDR-approaches warn of the risk that ex-combatants may resort to violence, scholars tend to disregard existing networks of groups of combatants and powerful criminal organisations in their analyses. Taking theories on DDR as a starting point and reflecting on earlier local peace initiatives, this article analyses the process with paramilitaries in Medellín. It argues that although, the local peace process has led to some significant results, it has to date failed to address the wider network of criminal organisations within which former paramilitaries were and continue to be involved.

This article considers Juana Manso (1819–1875) as a crucial nation maker in nineteenth-century Argentina. Usually studied as a novelist, Manso was important beyond her literary production. As the first woman to be appointed to a government position and arguably the most radical feminist in nineteenth-century Argentina, Manso's story informs us about Argentine feminism and education, and illustrates how a woman, who lived in Uruguay, Brazil, United States and Cuba, became a crucial transmitter of ideas about emerging nations and a living example of the interconnectedness of the Americas.

This article studies the relationship between electoral processes, popular mobilisation, and revolutionary movements in Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century. Focusing on the revolution of 1880, it is argued that the fraud in favour of General Julio A. Roca, that was perceived to have occurred in the presidential election of that year, resulted in the mobilisation of vast sectors of the Buenos Aires population and the organisation of militias. By analysing the social composition, organisation, and sources of recruitment of these militias, the article claims that although personal allegiance, clientelism and coercion played a role in this mobilisation, these factors are not sufficient to explain the popularity of the movement. The revolution owed its wide and active support to the claims of its leaders, who centred their discourse on defending the purity of suffrage and the rights of citizens to bear arms in order to protect their rights and freedoms.

The inflow of Spanish investment in Latin America after 1989 was the result of a strategy by the managers of seven leading firms to gain access to new markets and to become world leaders in their industry, by applying the know-how that they had developed in Spain during the period of rapid economic modernisation in the 1980s. This article examines the context for these investments in Spain and in Latin America and provides a constructivist theoretical framework to explain them. It analyses seven firms in four industries (BBVA and SCH in banking, Repsol-YPF in oil and natural gas, Endesa, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa in public utilities, and Telefónica in telecommunications). The knowledge and techniques that developed in Spain in the 1980s, it is argued, gave them significant advantages in Latin American markets during the period of liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s. The Spanish government played a significant role in this process, by promoting the growth of large firms in the service industries through mergers and acquisition, protecting their domestic market, and encouraging their investments overseas.

This essay examines three recent historical approaches to the political economy of Latin America's relative economic backwardness. All three locate the origins of contemporary underdevelopment in defective colonial institutions linked to inequality. The contrasting view offered here affirms the significance of institutional constraints, but argues that they did not arise from colonial inequalities, but from the adaptation of Iberian practices to the American colonies under conditions of imperial weakness. Colonial inequality varied across the Americas; while it was not correlated with colonial economic performance, it mattered because it determined the extent of elite resistance to institutional modernisation after independence. The onset of economic growth in the mid to late nineteenth century brought economic elites to political power, but excluding majorities as inequality increased restrained the region's twentieth-century growth rates and prevented convergence.