Growth in the world economy slowed somewhat during 2004 as the US, China and Japan all approached full capacity, and the second and the third quarters of 2004 saw relatively lower growth in these economies. We anticipate that with well managed macroeconomic policies growth should slow as any economy reaches full capacity, but we do not see these developments as signs indicating a sustained and noticeable slowing of the world economy. We expect that world growth will slow from a peak of 4.5 per cent in 2004 to around 4 per cent in 2005 and 2006. Growth appears to be robust in Latin America and in the former Soviet Republics, and domestic demand appears to be strong in the majority of members of OPEC. Growth in the Euro Area slowed noticeably in the third quarter of 2004, partly as a result of the impact of the sharp rise in the oil price, which also affected growth in other regions, but there is mounting evidence that domestic demand is weak. Our estimates of the output gap in the US, the Euro Area, Japan and China suggest that there is only limited spare capacity available in the world economy, and that much of it is located in Europe. Given this, we anticipate that global inflationary pressures will not moderate and that OECD inflation will rise from less than 2 per cent in 2002 and 2003 to above 2 per cent in 2005 and 2006.

In the past three years the US dollar has been declining whilst the US current account deficit has expanded, and these two developments are clearly linked. However, the causes of the decline in the dollar and the solution to the US deficit may not be as closely related as at first may appear. The emergence of a sustained deficit does not automatically necessitate a fall in the exchange rate, and a fall in the exchange rate may not correct such a deficit. Deficits can exist if the currency moves above its sustainable real exchange rate, and a real depreciation can remove such a deficit. Deficits caused by exchange rate movements are likely to be more temporary than those that either emerge for long-term structural reasons or result from structural imbalances in the economy. A structural deficit can be the consequence of low domestic saving or high domestic government borrowing. If domestic investment is very profitable then even high levels of domestic saving may still result in a savings shortfall, and the high returns may induce a structural capital inflow which will produce a sustainable current account deficit as a consequence. All these factors have influenced the increase in the US deficit in the past decade, and it is difficult to see how a correction to the deficit can occur without one of the domestic drivers changing in some way. Here we present a set of simulations using NiGEM to examine the impacts of alternative adjustment scenarios and their global implications. Before adding to the debate about the possible remedies, we will attempt to establish the sources of the current conjuncture, as the alternative adjustment paths for deficits and for the dollar depend on the sources of misalignment.

GDP growth slowed below trend in the second half of last year. At the time of writing, before the initial estimates of GDP growth for the fourth quarter of 2004 are released, we estimate that GDP expanded by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of last year. The weakness in GDP growth reflects in large part the poor performance of industrial production in the second half of last year.

Movements in exchange rates attract much attention, both for the signals they may contain about future inflation prospects and for their implications for the competitiveness of firms. However, movements in bilateral exchange rates, for instance in sterling against the dollar or the euro, do not convey enough information for either policymakers or for firms except in relation to specific bilateral transactions. It is useful to construct summary measures of exchange rate movements, and there are a number of ways of doing this. The choice of measure depends upon the use to which it is to be put. Some measures, such as the effective exchange rate, are summary indicators, whilst others such as export competitive indices are more relevant when evaluating the prospects for export developments. Some indicators weight together nominal exchange rates. Others are measures of real exchange rates, weighting together exchange rate adjusted relative prices. The indicators chosen should be seen in the context in which they are used.

Fiscal discipline is as much needed as monetary discipline. Many countries have attempted to counter the deficit bias by adopting fiscal rules that typically set a limit to their annual budget deficits. The record is not satisfactory; rules are either too lax or too tight and then ignored. This article suggests that the solution is to adopt the approach followed by inflation targeting central banks, with great success. Independent and accountable Fiscal Policy Committees, given the task of achieving debt targets and the authority to decide - or recommend - annual deficits, will be free from the deficit bias. This will allow them to exercise discretion in the short run while delivering debt sustainability in the long run.

We assess the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom from a macroeconomic perspective. We present conditions needed for wealth to grow in line with income and discuss the circumstances in which capital gains can represent a substitute for saving. We show that reference to balance sheets can be misleading because they fail to identify the cost of future consumption. A savings gap of between £16.5 bn and £66 bn is identified before taking account of the effects of demographic change. The outcome depends on whether one regards rising house prices as a consequence of fixed supplies of land or as the outcome of failing to invest enough in housing with the upper figure arising in the latter case. Policy measures to reduce the savings gap are discussed. These include appropriate use of fiscal policy and taxation of credit.

Macroeconomic policy in Europe is now oriented to creating a stable environment in which the scope for output growth is enhanced. However, we maintain that not all dimensions of a stability-oriented policy framework appear to be in place. Fiscal policy rules and arrangements have been much discussed, but their design is not yet settled. The Single Market Programme has transformed competition in Europe, but its full implications for macroeconomic stability, especially its implications for financial market stability in combination with the Single Currency, have not yet been fully appreciated by policymakers. Future pension issues in the context of population ageing will pose a major challenge. We discuss the design of fiscal policy in (a Single Market) Europe, looking at fiscal pacts and the need for Europe-wide financial regulation in an integrated financial market as well as pension reform aspects.

The costs of higher education in the UK have shifted increasingly from the state to the student (and students' families). In 1998, a fee contribution of £1,000 per annum was introduced for new entrants to full-time degree courses. This paper examines its effect on debt, term-time employment and student satisfaction. The analysis uses data from a survey of two cohorts of students and identifies how the impact varied with student and course characteristics. Fees led to an increase in student debt (particularly for disabled students and for students who did not receive financial support from their families) and a decline in student satisfaction. No general impact on term-time employment was identified, but term-time employment increased for students who did not receive financial support from their families. Whilst for these two groups inequality was increased, fees appeared to lead to greater equality, in terms of term-time employment, between children of graduate and non-graduate parents. The paper discusses the implications for the introduction of top-up fees in 2006.