We argue that the appropriate discount rate for pension liabilities depends on the objective. In particular, if the objective is to measure pension under- or overfunding, a default-free discount rate should always be used, even if the liabilities are themselves not default-free. If, instead, the objective is to determine the market value of pension benefits, then it is appropriate that discount rates incorporate default risk. We also discuss the choice of a default-free discount rate. Finally, we show how cost-of-living adjustments that are common in public pensions can be accounted for and valued in this framework.

We explore what happened when the state of Utah moved away from its traditional defined benefit pension. In its place, it offered new hires a choice between a conventional defined contribution plan and a hybrid plan option, where the latter has both a guaranteed benefit component and a defined contribution plan where employees bear investment risk. We show that around 60% of new hires failed to make any active choice and, as a result, were automatically defaulted into the hybrid plan. Slightly more than half of those who made an active choice elected the hybrid plan. Post-reform, employees who failed to actively elect a primary retirement plan were also far less likely to enroll in a supplemental retirement account, compared with new hires who actively selected a plan. We also find that employees hired following the reform were more likely to leave public employment, resulting in higher separation rates. This could reflect a reduction in the desirability of public employment under the new pension design and an improving economic climate in the state. Our results imply that public pension reformers must consider employee responses in addition to potential cost savings, when developing and enacting major pension plan changes.

Although it is often assumed that public workers have greater benefit protections than their private sector counterparts covered by the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, this paper finds that state and local governments – particularly those with generous cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), fewer benefit protections, and financial pressures on the plan and the sponsoring government – cut COLAs for current workers and, often, for retirees. In most instances, these cuts were upheld by the courts. While the pace of COLA cuts has slowed, they are likely to reappear if plans come under renewed financial pressures.

Unlike private sector employers, public school districts generally offer more than one type of supplemental retirement savings plan and allow multiple vendors to offer products. Using individual-level payroll data from over half of the public school districts in North Carolina coupled with data from an employer survey, this study examines how inter-district differences in supplemental plan administration are related to participation in these savings vehicles. We find wide variation in total participation rates and in 403(b) plan participation rates in particular, even among this population of public-sector workers with the same defined benefit pension plan, health plan, and retiree health coverage. Individual and district characteristics explain some, but not all, of the variation observed.