This article addresses the international legal historian C.H. Alexandrowicz's engagement with Kautilya's Arthashastra as part of his revision of the place of India and Southeast Asia in the development of international law. The article locates Alexandrowicz's writing on the Arthashastra against the backdrop of the debates about the Arthashastra that ensued upon its discovery in 1905, including controversies about its date, authorship, and place in the tradition of Indian political thought. The article reviews the Indian nationalist reading of Kautilya, the various attempts to compare Kautilya to Hobbes and Machiavelli, and the values that were particularly important for Alexandrowicz in telling the narrative of the place of Kautilya's Arthashastra, its rationalism, secularism, and the divisibility of sovereignty.

The Nottebohm judgment from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recently come under attack in the context of the European Commission's position on “golden passports” programmes. The judgment has long received intense criticism from a consensus of scholars. This article challenges the conventional wisdom of Nottebohm. The ICJ did not, as critics argue, depart from international law on nationality, nor did it seek to create an international rule based on a “genuine link” requirement. A closer look at the majority's reasoning reveals that the ICJ's conception of nationality as something more than a mere formal classification was prompted by problems that can arise precisely from the phenomenon of globalization, including the instrumentalization of nationality. It further shows that the “substance-over-form” approach adopted by Nottebohm may, or already does, operate in more contemporary contexts.

This article reconceptualizes norm conflict in international law by uncovering the experiential dimension of its definition and the intentional dimension of its resolution that has been missing from traditional accounts. The article locates the basis of recognizing norm conflict in the experienced sense of incompatibility between norms in view of their contexts rather than in the predesignated constellation of norms with contrary or contradictory functions according to their texts. Concomitantly, it argues that the justification for using certain legal techniques to resolve norm conflicts lies in the intended relationship deducible only between those norms that share the same regulatory purpose rather than between norms merely applying to the same factual situation. This reconceptualization generates a new typology of norm conflicts in light of the norms’ end goals and the means they provide to achieve them: “Ends Conflict”, “Means Conflict”, and “Unexperienced Conflict”, and suggests apposite ways to tackle them.

This research explores AI-generated originality's impact on copyright regulations. It meticulously examines legal frameworks such as the Berne Convention, EU Copyright Law, and national legislation. Rigorously analyzing cases, including Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening and Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, illuminates evolving originality and human involvement in AI creativity. The study also contemplates global perspectives, drawing from esteemed organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization and the European Court of Justice and exploring diverse approaches adopted by individual nations. The paper emphasizes the imperative need for legislative updates to address the challenges and opportunities of AI-generated works. It highlights the pivotal role of international collaboration and public awareness in shaping copyright policies for the AI-driven creativity era. It also offers insights and recommendations for policymakers and researchers navigating this complex terrain.

The relationship between international and domestic law in Indonesia is the subject of prolonged debate caused by the silence of the Indonesian Constitution on the choice between monism and dualism, which affects constitutional adjudication. This article discusses how the Constitutional Court engages with international law in its decisions and how the debate between monism and dualism is affected by it. It argues that the practice of the Court falls neither within the traditional scope of monism nor dualism but tends to be eclectic, which can be termed pragmatic monism. Here, the Court considers an international treaty part of domestic law upon ratification. However, its contents are only applicable if they are consistent with the Constitution, the highest law in the country. Nevertheless, such pragmatism is not without consequences where the consistency of the constitutional system as a whole is compromised for the instrumentality of its individual decisions on societal well-being.

The global impacts of COVID-19 have been calamitous, unleashing widespread human suffering and exacerbating health crises, all while worsening pre-existing inequalities and transgressing fundamental human rights. Despite earnest pleas from the United Nations and developing nations for an equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, these appeals were largely unheeded. Instead, major pharmaceutical manufacturers and high-income countries (HICs) had maintained a stranglehold on vaccine technology through the safeguarding of intellectual property rights (IPRs), leading to exorbitant pricing and preferential distribution to affluent regions. This vaccine hoarding has left low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with delayed and insufficient supplies, endangering the lives of the most vulnerable. The stringent enforcement of IPRs mechanisms, rather than aligning with international human rights obligations, has further marginalised the right to life, health, and access to vaccines and medicines, particularly in LMICs. This study ardently advocates for a policy shift that promotes the decolonisation of human rights in the context of IPRs and global health law.

This paper presents a genealogy of the passport in international law. For the most part, the origins of our contemporary mobility order are narrated from the vantage point of the grand principles of sovereignty, hospitality, and liberty. The nuts and bolts through which people access mobility – passports and visas – are generally understood to be the natural, inevitable, and fair by-products of these principles. This paper contributes to existing debates on the coloniality of international migration law by examining the universalization of the passport under the League of Nations. I argue that the universalization of the passport meant abandoning the old idea that the rights of free movement belonged to everyone and, instead, instituted a system that ranks human mobility based on national origins. Theoretically, it is proposed that attention to these “lowly” practices of mobility governance allows us to track the afterlives of race in the international order.

This article explores the terms “BRI dispute” and “BRI jurisprudence”. It undertakes a practical and theoretical analysis that considers whether “BRI disputes” have distinct and visible characteristics and are capable of being identified in a legal sense. This is important since practitioners – arbitration centres and law firms – use the term broadly and without specific criteria. By exploring the customary usage and the approach of legal scholars to the term, presenting examples of “BRI disputes” and examining their unique features, and constructing a theoretical approach (utilizing the concepts of ratione materiae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, and ratione personae; and considering the jurisprudence of the ICSID), this article moves from a broad to a narrow analysis to develop both a definition and a system of registration of “BRI disputes” for use by academics, practitioners, and policymakers.

Much scholarship on customary international law has examined the merits of induction, deduction, and assertion as approaches to custom identification. Save for where international tribunals identify custom by assertion, writers have viewed custom identification that does not rely on evidence of State practice and opinio juris as an example of deductive reasoning. However, writers have stated that, at best, deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular. This article draws on legal philosophy to define the contours of deductive reasoning and argues that pure deduction, namely deduction not combined with other forms of reasoning, is an unsound approach to custom identification. This argument is tested by reference to cases of custom identification by the International Court of Justice, categorised according to three types of deduction: normative, functional, and analogical. This article also explores the authority and utility of custom identification by pure deduction and its impact on content determination.

Through symptomatic reading, we analyze the visible and the invisible – the explicit and the implicit – in the works of Filipino international legal scholar Merlin Magallona (1934–2022). We argue that Magallona's international legal thought was rooted in Marxist theory and practice and honed through the mode of production debates in the Philippine communist movement during the 1960s. Specifically, he developed a critique of the neocolonial division of labour and produced a materialist reading of international legal doctrines through “Postcolonial Self-Determination” – a synthesis of the antinomy of positivism and self-determination. In practice, his Third World Marxism led him to support the NIEO and resist UNCLOS through constitutional litigation based on the imperialist Treaty of Paris of 1898. Magallona's critique and praxis suggest new forms of resistance to the new imperialisms and underscore the imperative of a practice turn in Marxist international legal theory.