This article examines the feasibility of enforcing Singapore money judgments in Cambodia, focusing on the “guarantee of reciprocity” – an ambiguous yet critical condition. It is ambiguous because Cambodian courts have not yet interpreted it. It is critical because it is perceived as the main obstacle to enforcing foreign judgments. Without a treaty-based mutual enforcement mechanism between Cambodia and Singapore, it is unclear whether a Singapore money judgment could be enforced in Cambodia or if a judgment creditor’s application would be dismissed in any event citing lack of reciprocity. Following an analysis of the laws of Cambodia, Singapore, and Japan, the article concludes that there is no legal obstacle before the Cambodian courts to enforce a Singapore money judgment. The flexible interpretation of the guarantee of reciprocity outlined in this article would enhance access to justice, eliminate a trade barrier, and make the investment environment more attractive in Cambodia.

Joining the line of free trade agreements involving civil society in climate change-related commitments, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) installs a public submissions and referral procedure (SRP) under its environmental chapter. China’s application to join the CPTPP and the peripheral role of civil society in its climate decision-making furnish a curious opportunity to contemplate dynamics between the SRP and domestic regimes with historically limited civil society involvement.

The article cites China as an illustrative case to show how a state-centric approach to climate change, lacking civil society engagement, may render mitigation efforts unreliable, unsustainable, and inequitable. It argues that the submissions and referrals procedure (SRP)’s unique procedural features offer potential as a testing ground for building up previously constrained civil society involvement in climate decision-making. It also exposes the design flaws in the SRP that require reform to uphold its identified experimental value, regarding which several proposals are put forward.

Communities of international legal discourse have been increasingly favouring tweets and blogs over traditional media of academic expression. Legal practice communities have likewise been abandoning press releases in favour of tweets and digital newsletters. For discourse communities, this trend can broaden the scope of eligible participants, while encouraging progress through contestation and legal pluralism. At the same time, it may encourage over-contentiousness, sensationalism, “celebritism”, and “click-hunting”, at the expense of genuine dialogue and problem-solving. For communities of practice, the spatial particularities of social media platforms prompt rapid exchanges and reposts with minimal prior reflection, while offering no tangible benefits compared to traditional means of law shaping. The trend, in any event, appears irreversible. We should thus shift to capitalizing on this trend’s benefits while mitigating its various side effects through an organic process of increased awareness.

Hong Kong has recently ratified the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). While Article 7(2) of the CISG acknowledges the potential incompleteness of the convention in addressing all issues it aims to govern and emphasizes the preference for seeking general principles within the CISG before resorting to domestic private international law, the extent of this preference remains unclear. This article highlights that while some scholars argue for private international law as a last resort, it is erroneous to suggest that the general principles embodied in the convention also include those exclusively stem from other international conventions. Such an approach would disregard the inherent international nature and proportionality envisioned by Article 7(1) of the CISG.

The Taliban’s forceful control of Kabul resulted in severe criticism by the world community and has consequently raised a pertinent question about its recognition in international law. Though a few countries publicly denied recognition to the Taliban government, many countries have (re)-started engaging with it by concluding bilateral treaties and (re)-opening embassies without recognition. Besides, countries have put several “conditions”, such as respect for human rights and a promise to form an “inclusive government”, before they will recognize the Taliban government. This note maps out these “conditions”, along with different proposals states have proposed concerning recognizing the Taliban government. It identifies the possible legal consequences of these “proposals” for the institution of recognition of government in international law. The note finally argues that though a recognition decision is largely political, it should nevertheless be regulated by international law to the extent that it would help avoid adverse international legal consequences.