The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that “body” and “soul” name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of “immortality” or of “resurrection”, life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.

Taking a somewhat indirect route that includes some autobiographical reflection, I address three questions. One is what it might mean to say, with Socrates, that philosophy is “studying for death”. The second is why Christians should fear death at all, if the good of Heaven is really what they believe is beyond it. The third is the question what difference it makes to your philosophical view of death if you are a believer.

I (1) outline two accounts the Catholic Church gives of the human soul, calling them the Lateran and the Vienne doctrines, and (2) argue they are inconsistent. (3) I run over several difficulties in the more popular Lateran doctrine. (4) I look at three uses to which Catholics might want to put a theory of the soul, and question whether either of the theories on offer can meet their needs. (5) I distinguish the Biblical idea of resurrection from the Greek idea of immortality. Finally (6) I commend the Vienne doctrine as philosophy but advise supplementing it with a view of creation, salvation and sanctification as forming a continuum rather than a discontinuous series of episodes.

Any killing of the innocent intrinsic to nuclear deterrence strategy (admitted as unavoidable by Michael Quinlan), is often excused as a side effect, not directly intended, of any proposed use of nuclear weapons. As such, he claimed, it can be ‘morally tolerable’. Quite apart from the systematic ambiguity of this phrase, I argue the claim itself is fallacious, depending as it does on the right choice of description of the proposed action. The appropriate description of any action, and hence of any command, to use a nuclear bomb will unavoidably entail intentionally killing innocents along with combatants. I argue thus by analysing the implications of an example of ‘double effect’ suggested by Michael Quinlan himself. If I am right, the injustice of deterrence strategy is stupendous.

In the first of four articles, I argue against Augustine's interpretation of Genesis chapter 3 and his account of the origin of the first sin and its consequences. In the remaining three articles, I offer an alternative interpretation of Genesis 3 within the context of Genesis 1–11, attempting to do more justice than Augustine to the data of scripture and, in particular, placing a strong emphasis on the speech of the Lord God at the end of Genesis 3. My argument is supported by reference to Mary Douglas's Purity and Danger. I do not minimise the amount of sin in the world but account for it on the basis of what I call the basic human situation rather than on the basis of a single cataclysmic act. I present my account as grounded in a more accurate understanding of scripture than Augustine's and in a richer and deeper version of salvation history. One conclusion is that the default setting of humanity is not damnation but that Man still stands in need of salvation.