We identify similarities and differences in the scale and nature of the banking crises in 2008-9 and the Great Depression, and analyse differences in the policy response to the two crises in light of the prevailing international monetary systems. We find that the scale of the banking crisis, as measured by falls in international short-term indebtedness and total bank deposits, was smaller in 2008-9 than in 1931. However, central bank liquidity provision was larger in the flexible exchange rate environment of 2008-9 than in 1931, when it had been constrained in many countries by the gold standard.

In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam and London developed distinctive innovations in finance through both banks and markets that facilitated the growth of trade in each city. In the eighteenth century, a symbiotic relation developed that led to bank-oriented finance in Amsterdam cooperating with market-oriented finance in London. The relationship that emerged allowed each to rise to unprecedented dominance in Europe, while the respective financial innovations in each city provided the means for the continued expansion of European trade, both within Europe and with the rest of the world. The increasing strains of war finance for the competing European powers over the course of the eighteenth century stimulated fresh financial innovations in each city that initially reinforced the symbiosis of the two centers. The external shocks arising from revolutionary movements in America and France, however, interrupted the relationship long enough to leave London as the supreme financial center.

Unlike recent contributions in the field, which discuss the geography of British overseas investments, this article focuses on the growth of capital exports from Great Britain during the period 1870–1913. Using a broader concept of foreign investments, which includes foreign direct investments (FDIs), and refocusing on the push and pull factors emphasised in earlier literature, we propose a framework able to capture the long-run determinants of British capital exports. Moreover, the framework includes elements suggested by early and recent works such as the institutional setup of the international economy and the evolution of world trade. The most relevant result, in an error correction model environment, is that the timing of British overseas investments in the long run seems to be related to the evolution of world trade, domestic growth and to the role of India as a colony. On the other hand, the attraction elements of the borrowing countries, captured by the risk-adjusted realised rates of return abroad, have been proven to matter in the short run.

This article provides a revised account of the development of financial instruments, money and banking in the early penal colony of New South Wales. It is found that private instruments monetised the economy, while the role of state debt, coin and commodities was to finally settle remaining balances. Money originated in the form of small merchant notes. These were created by the need to pay labourers and underpinned a local pound currency standard. A detailed review of colonial court cases and currency legislation reveals that the first bank was founded, contrary to colonial orders, to remove the disruptive impact of exchange rate fluctuations and to achieve a stable private note issue at par with pound sterling bills on London.

The article aims to present an explanation for the complete absence of public municipal banks in the Southern Low Countries, and particularly in its two main principalities Flanders and Brabant, between 1400 and 1800. The reasons were complex, lying in a combination of the presence of adequate substitutes such as money changers, cashiers and town exchange offices (stadswissels) and countervailing factors (adverse economic conditions, insufficient financial resources, special interests of persons and lobbies). It is also argued that strong government control of the Antwerp urban debt prevented the local authorities from experimenting with a municipal bank.