One way of understanding the exile of the Chagos Islanders and their inability to return to their ancestral land is through a reading of the case from a perspective of post-colonial legal scholarship. Chagossians have strong legal rights to land and remedies of compensation and return through a purposive application of the international legal definition of Indigenous, Magna Carta right to abode and international human rights law that could address their dispossession. Yet, the inability of those rights to be meaningfully applied has been constrained because of the post-colonial way they are legally interpreted, creating a legal vacuum in which basic fairness and substantive equality have been routinely compromised. Drawing attention to the continued legal denial of return in the context of decolonisation, ongoing colonialism and the rule of law makes sense of the legal record and explains the expulsion of the islanders despite the moral merits of return.

People with cognitive disabilities face specific forms of discrimination and disadvantage in the criminal justice system, including in legal proceedings. While unfitness-to-stand-trial provisions are intended to assist in avoiding unfair trials, in application, such laws can exacerbate disadvantage. A recent research project sought to increase the participation of accused persons with cognitive disabilities in legal proceedings by developing, implementing and evaluating a model in which disability support workers were embedded in legal services in three Australian jurisdictions. This paper details the findings of a cost–benefit analysis undertaken of that model compared with the common outcomes for accused persons with cognitive disability, including a finding of unfitness to stand trial. The analysis provides evidence of how a tailored programme intervention at a critical point can provide savings in police, courts and custody costs in addition to improving the timeliness and quality of outcomes for people with cognitive disabilities.

Austria's post-World War II transition from two consecutive, abusive regimes (the Austro-fascist and the Nazi regime) to a functioning democracy has not yet been thoroughly assessed through the lens of transitional justice. An evaluation of what could now be dubbed transitional-justice measures shows that Austria was reluctant in accepting its collective responsibility vis-à-vis the victims of World War II. Another defining factor of Austria's transition is that it never encouraged the surviving victims of the Nazi regime to return. An appraisal of Austria's transition in light of the two final ends of transitional justice, namely democracy and reconciliation, culminates in two conclusions: first, Austria attained the goal of democracy but failed with reconciliation; second, the current model of transitional justice is ill-equipped to assess the non-linear course of long-past transitions.

The comprehensible style of legal texts seems to be a predominantly linguistic problem. This is how the plain-legal-language movements present it. But, while plain-language statutes have been on the agenda for decades in every civilised country, laws still become more and more complicated. The paper attempts to explain this controversy. First, it argues that comprehensibility has more aspects beyond the linguistic or stylistic one. Sometimes it is the linguistically simplest texts that raise the most serious comprehensibility problems. The paper refers to two pieces of corpus linguistic research that provide evidence that vocabulary and grammar in themselves do not explain the incomprehensibility of the legal texts. Second, for a more subtle handling of the comprehensibility problem, the paper offers a framework of three typical pragmatic situations – the processual, the problem-solving and the compliance settings – where comprehensibility problems arise in different ways. The conclusion of the paper is that, contrary to the usual explanation that the main reason for incomprehensibility is that, in law, clarity and accuracy can be only employed at each other's expense, it is rather the systemic and interpretive character of law and the growing importance of technical rules that hinder the understanding of legal texts.

In the last decade, several states have increasingly tried to ‘un-sign’ to their humanitarian obligations by seeking ways to circumvent European or international law. Through an analysis of a recently passed act in Australia on the management of asylum seekers, this paper examines how the practice of ‘un-signing’ can be seen as a symptomatic instance of reconfiguring asylum in late modernity. We focus on the proliferation of ‘legal pragmatics’ in the management of refugees. By ‘legal pragmatics’, we refer to the processual ways in which the state attempts to hollow out international refugee law and in which courts respond by reinstating it. Normative consequences are the criminalisation and the juridification of refugees. We argue that the proliferation of ‘legal pragmatics’ illuminates not only the ever-expanding reach of neoliberal changes in domestic legislation, but also the limitations of human rights to adequately respond to the neoliberal vicissitudes of humanitarian government.

Over the last few years, legal scholars, policy-makers, activists and others have generated a vast and rapidly expanding literature concerning the ethical ramifications of using artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data and predictive software in criminal justice contexts. These concerns can be clustered under the headings of fairness, accountability and transparency. First, can we trust technology to be fair, especially given that the data on which the technology is based are biased in various ways? Second, whom can we blame if the technology goes wrong, as it inevitably will on occasion? Finally, does it matter if we do not know how an algorithm works or, relatedly, cannot understand how it reached its decision? I argue that, while these are serious concerns, they are not irresolvable. More importantly, the very same concerns of fairness, accountability and transparency apply, with even greater urgency, to existing modes of decision-making in criminal justice. The question, hence, is comparative: can algorithmic modes of decision-making improve upon the status quo in criminal justice? There is unlikely to be a categorical answer to this question, although there are some reasons for cautious optimism.

This paper examines the impact of body-worn video (BWV) on the police craft skills of close observation, note-taking, investigative analysis, report-writing and preparation of evidence for the courts. It explains how the technology functions and explores its surveillant, investigative, probative and regulatory applications. The evidence shows that policing tasks are being transformed by BWV cameras and analytics such as facial recognition. The paper argues that BWV exemplifies the automation of policing – the replacement of police labour with mechanical devices – and explores the implications of this for transparency, accountability, fairness and police discretion.

This paper discusses the promises and limits of a Peircean semiotic approach to the concept of style in law. It does so in two steps: first (1) by identifying the place of style within the structure of law as a system of signs, then (2) by conceptualising the link between law and style in the thought of C.S. Peirce and highlighting some of the insights from a Peircean take on legal semiotics that may contribute to our understanding of the role of style in making meaning in law. It is argued that, for a Peircean analysis of law, three levels can be distinguished, from the ‘surface structure’ down to the ‘deep structure’. It is at the middle level (that of the ‘basic structure’) that a semiotic approach can yield coherent insights in terms of style, by examining the symbols and metaphors that make for the expressibility of ‘habits’, namely experience-based patterns of action and interpretation.

In its concluding observations for Cyprus, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Committee stated that it ‘is concerned about the insufficiency of legal provisions and accessible mechanisms to detect, report, prevent and combat all forms of violence’.1 This paper focuses on the independent monitoring obligation Article 16(3) CRPD places on states parties, and discusses the implications of the insufficient implementation of Article 16(3) as it affects adults with intellectual disabilities in Cyprus. It examines the existing monitoring frameworks, explains why they do not meet with Article 16(3) CRPD requirements and explores the relationship of the national human rights institutions (NHRIs) with Article 16(3). This paper enables understanding as to how, despite pre-existing monitoring frameworks in place, no independent monitoring action has been taken since the ratification of the CRPD. It argues that there is an immediate need for measures to achieve the implementation of Article 16(3) and makes recommendations for Cyprus and other states parties.

Cultural appropriation is often defined as the ‘taking of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artefacts, history, and ways of knowledge’. Despite this apparent link to intellectual property, legal issues are only rarely mentioned in the current debate. Thus, to start with, this paper aims to fill this gap in identifying the possible bases in existing laws that may, at least in principle, justify claims of unlawful behaviour. As far as ethical considerations are concerned, the paper then notes a deep divide between those who fully endorse the notion of cultural appropriation and those who are resolutely opposed to it. This paper aims to give fair consideration to both sides of the argument, suggesting three categories of potentially unethical conduct. On this basis, the paper finally revisits possible legal responses from a normative perspective.

This paper examines the application of the latest iterations of EU data protection law – in the General Data Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU – to the use of predictive policing technologies. It suggests that the protection offered by this legal framework to those impacted by predictive policing technologies is, at best, precarious. Whether predictive policing technologies fall within the scope of the data protection rules is uncertain, even in light of the expansive interpretation of these rules by the Court of Justice of the EU. Such a determination would require a context-specific assessment that individuals will be ill-placed to conduct. Moreover, even should the rules apply, the substantive protection offered by the prohibition against automated decision-making can be easily sidestepped and is subject to significant caveats. Again, this points to the conclusion that the protection offered by this framework may be more illusory than real. This being so, there are some fundamental questions to be answered – including the question of whether we should be building predictive policing technologies at all.

Children tend to be represented as the quintessential victims of the ‘drug problem’, with drug-using parents, particularly mothers, characterised as vectors of the risks posed. Although evidence of drug use is not per se an impediment to retaining care of, or contact with, children (per Lady Hale in Re B [2013] UKSC 33, at para. 143), it does pose one of the greatest challenges to social and political norms about ‘good parenting’, and often has a powerful impact on decisions about care within UK family courts. While there is a considerable body of scholarship assessing criminal justice responses to drug use, there has been little research into how the family serves as an important site for the constitution of drug harms and the making of ‘drugs’ and ‘addiction’. This paper is informed by qualitative analysis of approximately 150 case reports in which drug use has been cited as relevant in the determination of guardianship/parenting. The purpose will not be to contest the difficult decisions that judges had to make in these cases but, using perspectives rooted in Science and Technology Studies and feminist drug scholarship, to remain attendant to the ontological multiplicity of objects that emerge from attempts to stabilise drug harms in legal narratives.

In this paper, I develop the basis of a normative legal theory of mental health vulnerability. In Section 2, I conceptualise mental health vulnerability by integrating a universal understanding of vulnerability with a subjective-evaluative, psychosocial and dimensional account of mental health. In Section 3, I move on to consider the significance of mental health vulnerability for legal theory through an encounter with perspectives on vulnerability offered by MacIntyre, Fineman and Del Mar. This offers an insight into the normative foundations of mental health vulnerability. In Section 4, I outline a normative framework for mental health vulnerability that involves a synergy of rights and care. This extends Engster's idea of ‘a right to care’ to mental health and highlights the role of care and rights in mitigating power imbalances and inequality in relation to mental health. In concluding, I suggest future directions for research on mental health vulnerability.

The question of legal ‘style’ is a central one in comparative law, as mainstream comparative law tends to downplay its importance. The kinds of comparative law scholarship that have attracted most attention in the last decades – the ‘harmonisation projects’ and the ‘legal origins’ literature (perhaps also the ‘legal formant’ literature) – indeed adopt a functionalistic approach to legal systems, whereby only the outcome of judicial decisions (and the factors causally feeding into them) matters – that is, their style does not. This narrow perspective has led to arguments in favour of harmonisation of law worldwide – the thesis according to which law everywhere does and should converge so as to facilitate transnational commerce and globalisation more generally. I propose to argue that legal style matters, as law is about much more than just resolving disputes. Specifically, it is also, and most importantly, a collective statement of identity. To illustrate, I plan on analysing some of the most striking stylistic differences between French and English law, and outline the different such statements emerging from them.

This paper reframes debates about gender equality in the legal professions by interrogating the practices of men and interconnections between fatherhood, gender and parenting within the specific context of large corporate law firms. Drawing on interviews with male lawyer-fathers, it argues that closer exploration of fatherhood reveals much about the gendered dynamics of identity formation as a legal professional in this sector. A set of ideas about fatherhood, the paper suggests, shape how men's work can define a distinctive gender identity as a ‘family man’ and good lawyer. Political-economic and cultural shifts around fatherhood, however, are reconfiguring and adapting gender relations in law in a number of contradictory ways with implications for understanding the place of men in relation to gender-equality agendas. Ideas about fatherhood, family, work and career, I argue, are mobilised and enmeshed within the reproduction of distinctive law-firm cultures and gendered ideas of organisational commitment. What, in short, might it mean to be both a ‘good father’ and a ‘good lawyer’?

Through a close reading of Konrad Zweigert's 1961 essay and related writings, the paper discusses his use of the term ‘style’ in the classification of legal families, making three arguments. First, Zweigert's use of style is methodologically naive. He uses style as a cluster concept, grouping an eclectic mix of features characteristic for the history, language, techniques, doctrines and values of national laws. His explicit sources seem to have provided associative and superficial inspiration rather than a theoretical basis for this terminological move. Second, Zweigert's methodology could have been improved by using more rigorous style concepts – and he seems to have been aware of the necessary theoretical resources. Third, such a commitment to a humanistic and cultural approach to comparative law is not easily reconciled with the blunt functionalism of Zweigert's programmatic methodological statements. His style doctrine is only compatible with a weak version of functionalism as a ‘methodological metaphor’: the version he actually espoused.

In this paper, I examine the current geographical location of Portuguese courts and the effects this territorial redefinition has had on the relationships between the justice system and the territories/populations in a context in which external and internal political factors, rather than a mere need to improve the justice system, have played a major role. Such an analysis entails three key elements: the geographic impacts on access to justice, in view of the emblematic presence of the state in the territories, both contrasted with the conflict between specialisation and the proximity of jurisdiction.

What will be the consequences for policing as cities become increasingly ‘smarter’? The emerging questions about policing and the smart city have thus far focused primarily on the increased surveillance capacity that a highly networked urban setting provides for law enforcement. More cameras and sensors will mean more watching and less freedom from being watched. The perception of ubiquitous government surveillance might quell dissent and inhibit free expression. As a result, concerns about policing and the smart city echo other responses to surveillance technologies. This essay proposes a different analysis: as cities become ‘smarter’, they increasingly embed policing itself into the urban infrastructure. Policing is inherent to the smart city.