Responding to the death of Victoria Climbié in 2003, the Laming Report stated that cultural differences should never again be a factor in inadequate child protection. Yet since that time there have been further deaths of children involving exorcism and allegations of witchcraft, based in part on particular understandings of Christianity. Situations resulting in forced marriage, cliterodectomy, ‘honour’ killing and corporal punishment are practices often perceived as arising from religious belief, both by those who defend them and by critics. This article explores practices perceived as grounded in religious belief or culture that conflict with current child protection practice and norms about what is harmful to children. The role of religious education, rights to manifest religious belief and different understandings of adoption are also considered as examples of religious difference in understandings about children. Engagement with religious difference through a defence of children's rights and autonomy are proposed as one means to resolve conflicts between religious worldviews and what it means to protect children. The aim is to identify and foster reflection and debate about different understandings of what constitutes harm, in order to enhance consensus over child protection where views of what is harmful differ radically.1

In its recent judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v EEOC, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment precludes the application of anti-discrimination law to the employment relationship between a church and its clergy. In 2005 the House of Lords had reached the opposite conclusion, ruling, in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland, that the decision to dismiss an ordained minister was not a spiritual matter falling outside the scope of anti-discrimination legislation. This article argues that Percy largely neglected important aspects of church autonomy and that the reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor offers an opportunity to rethink whether secular law should be allowed to affect a religious group's decision to appoint or dismiss a minister.

In this article we discuss the recent history of the failed draft Bishops and Priests (Consecration and Ordination of Women) Measure, situating this within the broader context of the ordination of women and debates around the Equality Act exceptions for an organised religion. We aim to provide an account of the ways in which equality rights have been implemented in the relevant law; how the Church of England is responding to these rights; and how broader society understands the importance of gender equality and reacts to Synod's rejection of the draft Measure. We analyse these with reference to theories of heteronormativity and scholarship of human rights. In doing so, we aim to explain what is happening in the Church of England and broader society, and draw some conclusions about the current opportunities open to the Church and the state in matters of rights and equality.1

The Second Vatican Council is recognised by the Roman Catholic Church as the twenty-first ecumenical council. The largest in terms of participants and one of the longest-running, it also covered the widest range of topics and produced the largest volume of documents and decrees. This article, based on the text of the ninth Lyndwood Lecture, examines a number of characteristics of Vatican II in comparison with previous councils, arguing that, while in many ways Vatican II was novel, in its composition, agenda, influence and reception one can discern parallels with past councils back as far as the first ecumenical council at Nicea in 325.1

The biennial Lyndwood Lectures are a significant ecumenical joint commitment by the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland and the Ecclesiastical Law Society. The Canon Law Society, as host, selected Professor Norman Tanner SJ to deliver the 2012 lecture1 and as is customary it fell to me, as chairman of the guest society, to conclude the event with comment and thanks.

This Comment asks whether, in the light of early parliamentary proceedings, the Succession to the Crown Bill risks any untoward, unintended practical consequences, and considers what, if any, may be among the longer-term, less direct implications for Church establishment in England.

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and others v United Kingdom1 related to two pairs of cases.2 The first pair concerned a British Airways check-in clerk and a nurse, each of whom complained that dress codes at their respective places of work prevented them from openly wearing a small cross on a chain around their neck. In the second pair, a registrar of marriages and a relationship counsellor refused to offer their respective services to same-sex couples on the basis that homosexual acts were incompatible with their religious beliefs. Having failed to obtain relief in the domestic courts, all four applicants took their claims to Strasbourg, which heard oral argument last September. Judgment was pronounced on 15 January 2013. This Comment considers the broad thrust of the judgment, particularly the threefold manner by which the Court has clarified and embedded the right to freedom of religion, the practical outcome in the individual cases, and the likely effect of the judgment upon future litigation in the domestic courts of the United Kingdom.

In January the Charity Commission published its annual return form for 2013. It is largely similar to earlier versions but there are additional questions about whether or not the charity is registered for Gift Aid, its property holdings and whether any of its land or buildings is used for the charity's purposes. In addition, for 2013 the questions on overseas activities and numbers of volunteers that were previously optional are mandatory.