It is widely recognised that the process of secularisation takes place differently in different parts of the world. Less often appreciated is the wide variety of ‘secularities’ (and indeed of ‘secularisms’) that emerge as a result. This article will look at this question systematically, and will try to identify at least some of the factors that must be taken into account if we are to understand unbelief as well as belief. In so doing it builds on the author's earlier work relating to patterns of religion in modern Europe.1

Religion law – the law of the state on religion – has been taught for generations in the law schools of continental Europe, though its introduction in those of the United Kingdom is relatively recent. By way of contrast, within the Anglican Communion there is very little teaching about Anglican canon law. The Church of England does not itself formally train clergy or legal officers in the canon and ecclesiastical laws that they administer. There is no requirement that these be studied for clerical formation in theological colleges or in continuing ministerial education. The same applies to Anglicanism globally – though there are some notable exceptions in a small number of provinces. This is in stark contrast to other ecclesiastical traditions: the Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian, Baptist and United churches all provide training for ministry candidates in their own systems of church law, polity or order. However, no study to date has compared the approaches of these traditions to the teaching of church law today. This article seeks to stimulate an ecumenical debate as to the provision, purposes, practices and principles of the teaching of church law across the ecclesiastical traditions of global Christianity. It does so by presenting examples of courses offered (institutions, purposes, subjects, methods and levels), the educative role of church law itself, requirements under church law for church officers to study the subject, and parallels from the secular world in terms of debate in the academy and practice on the nature of legal education, particularly the role played in it by the Critical Legal Studies movement.1

The use of Islamic norms in the determination of arbitration in England and Wales has become a source of great controversy. Concerns are raised for the human rights of vulnerable parties who may be pressured into arbitrations and who may not be treated fairly under the agreed rules of arbitration or by arbitrators themselves. The Arbitration Act 1996 limits the ability to appeal arbitration decisions and as such does not safeguard the rights of these parties. As a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights the UK is under an obligation to uphold human rights standards domestically, and it is argued that the way in which arbitration on religious norms is currently regulated does not comply with this obligation. This article considers some of the possible adaptations or alterations that could rectify the situation, improving parties' experience of religious arbitration and ensuring that the system remains compatible with international human rights obligations.

The issue of whether or not a minister of religion is an employee or an office-holder came before the Supreme Court in an action for unfair constructive dismissal against the Methodist Church. The Court held by a majority of four to one that, on the basis of the Church's Deed of Union and Standing Orders, the terms of engagement of ministers were not contractual for the purposes of employment law and that a minister's duties were not consensual. The judgment moderates somewhat the impact of the earlier judgment of the House of Lords in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland – and makes the employment status of ministers even more sensitive to the facts of the individual case than it was before.1

The implementation of Article 17(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has always been one of the central topics of discussion for legal scholars analysing the relationships between religious groups and European institutions. According to Article 17, the European Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with churches, religious associations or communities, philosophical organisations and non-confessional organisations. In the case in hand, the complainant, the European Humanist Federation (EHF) decided to lodge a complaint before the European Ombudsman when the European Commission rejected the proposal for a dialogue seminar.

Bob Morris' comment on the Succession to the Crown Bill invites the Church of England to ‘fresh, bound-breaking’ thinking about Church of England establishment in light of the role of the Supreme Governor of the Church of England and the statutory obligation for the Sovereign to maintain communion with the Church of England. Along with other writers he argues that, in effect, this leaves us with religious freedom in the UK but not religious equality. I hope that Morris' challenge will stimulate such fresh thought – my response is not yet this but concerns another matter that he raises in relation to Roman Catholic marriages. He repeats concern in both Houses of Parliament that children of ‘mixed marriages’ are obliged to be brought up as Roman Catholics, and he correctly questions the extent of such an absolute obligation contra an article in the Catholic Herald.

In R v NS the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was asked to consider a straightforward question: must a Muslim woman remove a niqab (face covering leaving only the eyes showing) when giving evidence in a sexual assault case in which she is the complainant. Two justices said ‘yes’; one said ‘almost always, no’; and the majority said ‘maybe yes, maybe no – it depends’. The matter was then returned to the preliminary inquiry judge to make the actual decision, which could still be subject again to appeal to the SCC. The court divided on the three available answers to the question: yes, no and maybe. The division, however, leaned in favour of requiring removal of the niqab because the reasons for judgment favouring ‘maybe’ were concurred in in the result by those favouring removal. In the end, the court did not give a clear answer to the question, but rather provided a four-part test for trial judges who must continue to make the decision, subject to appeal. The practical utility of this response may be doubted.

In addition to a series of minor, technical changes to the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 the Clergy Discipline (Amendment) Measure 2013 amends the 2003 Measure in three main respects.