Since, at least, the Persian Gulf War, states have behaved “as
if” it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy the
UN Security Council confers on uses of force. This observation is puzzling
for theories that seek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy in
legalities or moral values. I argue that when governments and citizens
look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do
not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention
but political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military
adventures. Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in
the sense that they form widely accepted political judgments on whether
uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended. These judgments
become focal points in the collaboration and coordination dilemmas states
face in enforcing limits to U.S. power while preserving mutually
beneficial cooperation. In this article, I discuss the implications for
the Council's legitimacy and theories of international
legitimacy.Earlier versions of this article
were presented at the 2003 International Studies Association Conference,
Portland, Ore., 1 March; the 2003 Annual Meetings of the American
Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 29 August; Columbia
University International Politics Series, New York, 29 September 2003; and
the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, Cambridge,
6 October 2003. I thank the participants in these seminars, the editor,
and anonymous referees of International Organization; and I also
thank Bob Axelrod, Bruce Cronin, Michael Dark, Monica Duffy Toft, Nisha
Fazal, Jim Fearon, Martha Finnemore, Page Fortna, Stacy Goddard, Macartan
Humphries, Ian Hurd, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Andrew Kydd, Edward Miller,
Katia Papagianni, Rita Parhad, Holger Schmidt, Arturo Sotomayor, and Joel
Westra for useful comments, suggestions, and corrections. As usual,
remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.