The international investment agreement regime (IIA Regime) is composed of thousands of IIAs and a system of investor–state dispute settlement. Historically, high-income developing countries (HIDCs) were part of the global South and thus ‘hosts’ of foreign direct investment (FDI). Increasingly, however, these countries have become ‘home’ to investors who are hosted and exposed to political risk abroad. Representing both home and host country interests simultaneously, how do HIDCs balance these crosscutting pressures? We argue that as the position of an HIDC shifts from mostly a recipient towards a sender of significant amounts of FDI, it will be more willing to provide protection to foreign investors at the expense of state regulatory space in its IIAs, thereby increasing its exposure to the IIA Regime. Employing an original data set that measures this exposure for sixty-four HIDCs over six decades, we first show that the degree of HIDC exposure to the IIA Regime varies a great deal. Using a general method of moments (GMM) analysis and controlling for a host of confounding factors, we demonstrate that, indeed, higher levels of FDI outflows as a share of the national economy result in greater exposure to the IIA Regime.

Data localization hurts foreign investment and brings potential economic advantages to domestic corporations relative to foreign corporations. This leads to the argument that data localization violates the national treatment principle in international investment treaties. By applying the ‘three-step’ approach to assess the legality of data localization with respect to the national treatment principle, this article finds that the legality of data localization depends on certain circumstances, including the domestic catalogues of foreign investment, the definition of data localization in domestic legislation, and whether international investment treaties explicitly or implicitly incorporate data protection through exceptions for the protection of the state's essential security interests, public order, or public morals. China's acceleration of its legislation processes to regulate cross-border data transfer has significant implications for the negotiations and modifications of Chinese international investment treaties.

Since its formation, the GATT/WTO system has facilitated a worldwide reduction of trade barriers. We return to a founding moment of the regime, the GATT 1947 (GATT47), and look closely at the liberalization process, analyzing exactly what concessions were granted to whom and in return for what. With these data, we evaluate three prominent explanations for the operation of the early GATT. First, we ask whether or not US negotiators granted asymmetric access to the US market to spur post-war recovery. Second, we look at how the rules adopted in GATT47 balanced the interests of import sensitive producers with those of the more nascent exporter interests. Third, we examine specific US concessions and ask whether or not the US used the domestic market to either increase the productive capacity of nations damaged during the war and/or to bolster unstable regimes. Our most general finding is that the US, at least in this first Round of the trade regime, was less a liberal warrior and more a seeker of stability, and that tariff setting was significantly constrained by the institutions governing global tariff negotiations.

Did trade patterns in services change into activities that were more digital-intense after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, and was this shift structural? This paper uses a Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach to investigate whether services trade became more digital-based after the GFC in 2008. It finds support that the GFC formed a break from the previous period that caused services trade to become more digital – although there are signs that this had already started before 2008. Countries with high internet usage and a comparative advantage in digital-intense services, such as R&D, information exchange, computer services, and charges for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), on average saw post-GFC a 6% increase in global exports compared to other non-digital sectors. More striking is that upper-middle income countries and countries with medium levels of skills also witnessed a sharp increase. These significant outcomes may indicate the direction into which patterns of services trade are likely to turn after the current economic crisis resulting from COVID-19.

The World Trade Organization (WTO), a unique multilateral trading regime, has failed to establish its relevance to the digital nature of trade. This article revisits the ‘principle of technological neutrality’ to make the cross-border supply of services by electronic means subject to the current rules-based trading regime. I argue that the principle of technological neutrality could help resolve a number of thorny legal issues: confirming the applicability of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) rules to the delivery of services by electronic means; providing a guideline to determine the likeness of services in the era of digital trade; and backing up an evolutionary approach to interpreting the GATS schedules of commitments. However, the WTO adjudicatory bodies have been reluctant to rely on the principle of technological neutrality, which is referred to as strategic neutrality in this article. This article urges the WTO adjudicatory bodies to abandon their strategically neutral position on technological neutrality immediately. It also explores ways to incorporate the principle of technological neutrality into the world trading system at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels.

This study aims to assess the effect of the 2013 trademark law revision (2013 law revision) on judicial remedies in China. The 2013 law revision increased the remedies Chinese courts can grant to plaintiffs, including small and medium enterprise (SME) plaintiffs, thus leading to higher remedies granted to plaintiffs compared to the past years in prevailing cases. This study finds that right after the law revision, the average amount of judicial remedies granted to plaintiffs increased temporarily. Meanwhile, the detailed judicial reasonings, foreign plaintiffs, and company defendants have stronger positive effects than product types and the year of decisions on the amount of monetary relief. These findings suggest that certain factors in cases may increase the remedies in trademark civil litigation. Therefore, SME plaintiffs should pay attention to core factors for litigation strategies, including preliminary injunctions, choice of defendant, choice of venue, and evidence in remedy collection.

The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.

The multilateral trading system faces numerous challenges that are more profound than at any time in its seven-decade history. It has become commonplace to ask whether the system is in terminal decline. More than a dozen issues facing the WTO are identified in the paper, eight of which are defined as systemic. That is because they permeate and debilitate multiple facets of the workings of the WTO, including the capacity to negotiate, enforce disciplines, monitor policies, and ensure transparency. In no prioritized order, systemic issues arise in the areas of dispute settlement, development, decision-making, transparency, relations between states and markets, subsidies, emerging issues including climate change and digitalization, and trade and health. Other outstanding issues may not be as pervasive in impact, but can nevertheless undermine WTO relevance and effectiveness. All WTO members stand to lose in the absence of predictable multilateral trade rules that pre-commit parties to certain policies and processes. But in today's world, full convergence of all trade rules is a pipe dream. The system needs to balance convergence with managed divergence. Does the non-discrimination principle need to be layered by prior agreement in ways that ensure mutual gains from exchange?

The existing literature shows that transparency and monitoring reduce trade costs, improve regulatory practices and build and sustain trust. In this paper, using 555 specific trade concerns (STCs) raised by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee in the period 1995–2018, we develop a novel classification of STCs. We distinguish between STCs aiming to exchange information (transparency STCs) and those aiming to monitor compliance with the TBT agreement (monitoring STCs). We show that: (i) when STCs intend to foster transparency, they are mainly used in relation to notified measures, thus suggesting that they are used to acquire not only new but also higher quality information than that provided merely by notifications; (ii) when STCs intend to challenge the compliance of WTO members with the TBT Agreement, they primarily address draft measures, thus suggesting that they are used to promote accountability and improve good regulatory practices; and (iii) STCs raised at the draft stage are less likely to escalate to a dispute than those raised on adopted measures. Guided by these findings, we suggest the potential for some reforms to improve the efficiency of the system. These include: introducing a reporting system on the outcome of STCs; using STCs raised in committees to fill the gap of missing notifications; systematically using the STC mechanism at the stage of draft measures; and building in the dispute settlement system the requirement to raise the matter and discuss it within the relevant committee before filing a formal dispute settlement case.

The article explains that the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement by WTO dispute-settlement panels and the Appellate Body has palpably shifted since the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Some of this shift is also arguably present in disputes concerning other WTO instruments. This progressive shift comes at a time when key debates about TRIPS waivers are taking place on the rue de Lausanne, namely a first for the COVID-19 pandemic and a second possible one for environmental protection measures related to climate change. According to the proposed pluralist analysis of TRIPS, it was less likely as of 2020 that the WTO dispute-settlement system would find unjustifiable inconsistencies between WTO commitments, on the one hand, and measures to protect public health or mitigate climate change, on the other hand. Whether future Appellate Body will follow that jurisprudence is an open question. Though the analysis contained in the article may make the COVID-related TRIPS waivers doctrinally unnecessary and allow Members to take measures now, its main aim is to inform the debates about the waivers and the future interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, including the three-step test.

The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) knew considerable success in its early years, being described as the WTO's crown jewel. In recent years, the jewel has become tarnished. Its principal actor – the Appellate Body – is no longer functioning, and the practice of the membership has been to appeal almost all new panel reports, thereby consigning them to a legal limbo from which they seem unlikely to ever emerge. This paper briefly reviews the record of the WTO dispute settlement system, considers the problems that led to its current state and evaluates various proposals that have been made to reinvigorate the system.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 to encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It provides eligible countries with duty free access to the US market for over 1800 products in addition to those available under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The benefits extend through 2025. This study explores the link between US trade preferences under AGOA and beneficiary country exports. Using a large US import database, the study examines the extent to which AGOA influences export performance. It also examines the moderating roles of rule of law and foreign direct investment. The results largely indicate that AGOA has a positive and significant effect on beneficiary country exports. It also shows that rule of law moderates the relationship between AGOA and export performance. We believe that AGOA will target foreign direct investment (FDI) to SSA from other advanced regions such as the EU to take advantage of the US market. However, the role of FDI appears to be weak in moderating the relationship between trade preferences (tariff concessions) and exports from beneficiary countries to the US market.

The European Union (EU) has been using economic sanctions both as a foreign policy tool and as a liberal alternative to military action. Since 2006, it has been implementing general sanctions against the whole economy of Iran, affecting their trade relations, and since 2007, following the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council, it has also been using smart sanctions targeting Iranian entities and natural persons associated with the country's military activities. In a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model, this paper investigates the impact of general and targeted EU sanctions against Iran on quarterly bilateral trade values between the 19 members of the euro area (EA19) and Iran between the first quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2018. In a robustness NARDL specification, trade between Iran and the 28 members of the EU is analysed. In addition, a gravity model of bilateral trade between Iran and the EU member states is run in a robustness check. The results indicate that the EU's general sanctions have strongly hampered trade flows between the two trading partners in almost all sectors, except for the primary sectors. Furthermore, our study finds that the impact of smart sanctions targeting Iranian entities and natural persons is much smaller than the impact of general sanctions on total trade values and the trade values of many sectors. Smart sanctions affect the exports of most sectors from the EA19 and the EU28 to Iran, while they are statistically insignificant for the imports of many sectors from Iran. Thus, this paper provides evidence of the motivations behind smart sanctions, which target specific individuals and entities rather than the whole economy, unlike general sanctions, which have a negative impact on ordinary people.

During the first wave of globalization, Argentina was among the most internationally integrated economies, experiencing a rising trend in trade openness and a tremendous increase in labor due to migration. In this paper, we empirically show the central role immigration had in boosting exports and imports in the years 1870–1913 by considering Argentine bilateral trade and migration from eight European countries (Austro-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). We use a migration-augmented gravity model to estimate the contribution of the massive inflows of Europeans, and we find that the main pro-trade effect was on imports: a percent 10% increase in migrants from a particular country would increase imports by up to 8% from that same country. We do not find the same effect on exports. The disproportionate decrease in transportation rather than communication costs may explain why the latter are relatively more decisive for exports than for imports. To overcome the problem of reverse causality and endogeneity, we use migration flows to the US from the eight European countries as an instrumental variable. In so doing, we aim at capturing the same push (but not Argentine pull) factors inducing European out-migration.

With the benefit of hindsight, much scholarship across political science, law, and economics has told the story of the international trade regime as if it had been pulled all along by a definite aim. By contrast, this article emphasizes the contingent aspects of the trade regime's development, looking especially to its dispute settlement mechanism. The very creation of the Appellate Body had by no means a certain outcome, and once created, the tribunal's evolution was largely unanticipated by states. An often-overlooked actor played a key role in that development: the WTO Secretariat. Drawing on recent findings, this article lays out the full extent of the Secretariat's role in dispute settlement, which remains largely hidden from view, and deliberately so. From appointing adjudicators and managing their remuneration, to providing them with legal arguments and drafting final rulings, the Secretariat of the WTO looms larger than in any comparable tribunal. Making its influence more transparent, I argue, would go a long way to returning the system to the shape it was designed to have at its outset.

The Common External Tariff (CET) of the East African Community (EAC) customs union has long been considered the cornerstone of the most successful example of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, we assess the implementation of the EAC-CET using a novel dataset of country- and firm-level deviations from the common tariff regime constructed by digitizing information in gazettes published by the Secretariat of the EAC between 2009 and 2019. Employing these data, we present five patterns on EAC tariff policy: (i) increased usage of country-level deviations from the common tariff regime render the EAC-CET less and less ‘common’; (ii) Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda predominantly use unilateral deviations to increase external protection while Rwanda mostly decreases tariffs; (iii) Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda increase tariffs for the same classes of products, but target different industries; (iv) unilateral tariff reductions at the country level are mostly used to facilitate access to inputs; (v) data on firm-level exemptions suggest that private sector development in the EAC would benefit from lower tariffs on intermediate inputs. Our findings demonstrate an incipient but clear trend in the EAC away from a communal tariff regime and towards national and more protectionist trade policies.

Domestic support disciplines under the Agreement on Agriculture are controversial, to say the least. The aggregate measurement of support (AMS) restricts Members’ policy space to provide product-specific support. The structural flaws in the determination of AMS further compel Members to explore alternatives. In contrast to the Amber Box, the Blue Box offers certain flexibilities for Members to exempt product-specific support from AMS calculation. The Blue Box reflects several elements which are seemingly typical to the Amber Box, except that it has certain production-limiting features. This article explores the legal bounds of the Blue Box measures, and its similarities and dissimilarities with the Amber Box. Towards this end, the article builds on a fresh legal understanding of the Blue Box based on its negotiating history and interpretative bounds, and also offers a fuller appreciation of market price support (MPS) and non-exempt direct payments under the Amber Box. While the calculation methodology for non-exempt direct payments bears a close resemblance to the calculation of MPS, the article argues that direct payment and MPS measures are fundamentally distinct types of product-specific support which makes the interchangeability of Blue and Amber Boxes seemingly difficult.

One of the most contested issues in international trade negotiations is the level of protection granted to geographical indications (GIs). WTO Members are divided between the ‘Old World’ represented by the European Union and the ‘New World’ headed by the United States. For decades, conventional wisdom has suggested that the debate is indeed a disagreement over the terroir idea. This article tackles the debate from a largely unexplored perspective, namely, fair use exceptions, which allows us to find the opposite: even if countries embraced the terroir idea equally, the divide on protection level would persist because of divergent approaches to the fair use of GIs. This divergence derives from countries’ different preferences for balancing conflicting interests, different policy goals, and different understandings of what is ‘fair’. Other countries should take these considerations into account when choosing a protection level suitable for their national conditions and goals.

The last decade has witnessed the emergence and rise of trade disputes over renewable energy support measures. By pitting trade against the environment, these disputes ignited a considerable debate over the adequacy of the green policy space available under WTO law. This article examines whether and to what extent the first ten years of litigation settled the key issues in this debate by undertaking a systematic analysis of the developments in the case law and in the renewable energy policy landscape. The analysis reveals that the case law has raised more questions than answers and much uncertainty remains as to the scope of the policy space available for the subsidization of renewables. It also highlights how these disputes steered the debate away from the most contentious issue of subsidy regulation to the slam-dunk issue of non-discrimination. In doing so, they helped conceal rather than resolve the green policy space deficit in multilateral renewable energy subsidy governance.