Constitutions are social and historical artefacts that take part in the government of humans. Based on a comparison of how contemporary ‘global’ and historical ‘local’ constitutional documents establish power relations between ‘humans’ and their ‘government’, this article suggests that both types of documents involve different constitutive logics. Global constitutional documents create a ‘new normativity’ – a reversed constitution – that turns the historical relationship between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué on its head. Such documents shift the primary responsibility for human rights from governments to humans. Research in the academic field of global constitutionalism omits this constitutional reconfiguration. By offering a more historically sensitive and reflexive account of constitutionalization, the field of global constitutionalism can realize an as yet unexplored critical potential.

Owing to the vagaries of the ‘constitutionalization’ of the European Union, legal scholarship has disregarded the momentous constitutional transformation brought about by the European Convention System. This is regrettable, not least because the Convention has reconfigured national constitutional authority in a cosmopolitan context. The emerging cosmopolitan constitutionalism is based upon three ideas: first, the exercise of state authority must also be legitimate from the perspective of those who are not citizens; second, a constitution must embrace fundamental rights and the representation of insiders in order to facilitate the representation of all, including outsiders; third, the authority of the constitution doesn’t just depend on endorsement by an independent people but also on recognition by other peoples who pursue the same type of political project. At the same time, any cosmopolitan constitutional system needs to leave space for particularity. It is therefore not accidental that the idea of a ‘margin of appreciation’ is of pivotal significance.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice and the European Convention on Human Rights, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan argue that there has been the emergence of, and increasing prospects for, a cosmopolitan legal order based on the Convention. This symposium aims to engage with, and to better explore, the theoretical implications and practical legal ramifications of their argument. In doing so, this first article acts as a general introduction to the symposium, laying out the major arguments of the book as well as arguments presented by the symposium contributors. Moving beyond the summative, this introduction also situates A Cosmopolitan Legal Oder within broader debates in global constitutionalism, while defending its use of Kant’s cosmopolitan theory. Lastly, it explores some of the key implications and challenges that arise from the symposium itself, rooting these insights within the current context of anti-globalism, nationalism, populism and neo-sovereigntism, and the corresponding necessity for a more transitional and pluralistic response as offered in A Cosmopolitan Legal Order.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice and the European Convention on Human Rights, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan reconstruct Kant’s legal philosophy as a program of cosmopolitan legal order (CLO). A CLO is defined as a multi-level, judicialized, transnational system of rights protection that confers on all persons, by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement to challenge the rights-regarding decisions of public officials, who are under an obligation to assure the equal juridical status of all. The authors illustrate this claim with respect to the development of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union. While generally agreeing with their argument, I claim that they minimize the republican aspects of Kant’s political philosophy in favour of strong judicial review. After outlining republican and democratic objections, I claim that their book illustrates a model that I call ‘dialogic constitutionalism’. Dialogic constitutionalism does not neglect legislative authority, but places it in a conversation with judicial authority, whether domestic or transnational; such conversations can serve to upgrade standards of rights protection over time and are not frozen precommitments. Constitutions also have a representative function of standing for the intergenerational continuity of the people, whereas legislatures are bound by electoral cycles.

In my short comment on the new book by Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, I claim that the European Court of Human Rights does not take the ‘legitimacy of state goals’ step in its proportionality analysis seriously enough, relegating all its hard intellectual work to the next step: necessity scrutiny. What is puzzling about Stone Sweet and Ryan’s book is that this observation about the ECtHR hardly registered in the book’s argument, even though a Kantian perspective seems to be quite hospitable to a consideration of the scarcity of goal scrutiny in ECtHR case law.

In this contribution I provide an interpretation of Stone Sweet’s and Ryan’s cosmopolitan legal order in conjunction with a certain reconstruction of the Kantian cosmopolitan rationale. Accordingly, I draw attention to the connection between the notion of a general (cosmopolitan) will in Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau and the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as an ‘interpreter’ of such will. I conclude by suggesting that the opportunity of extending the CLO also accounts for a variety of other poliarchical regimes that, taken as a whole, illustrate the landscapes of contemporary global constitutionalism.

While proportionality analysis (PA) may have originated from Germany, it has not remained a European product. PA has been locally transplanted across Anglophone nations, found in mixed legal systems that are rooted in the common law and even adapted in parts of Latin America and Asia. This article explains why PA is flourishing in parts of Asia – for example, South Korea and Taiwan – and why it is faltering in other countries, such as Singapore and China, where the absence of PA can be attributed to the non-fulfilment of Kant’s first prerequisite for perpetual peace: a republican government (liberal democracy).

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order, Stone Sweet and Ryan suggest that ‘from the standpoint of global law, we see that the [European Court of Human Rights] has taken its place in a pluralist, rights-based international order, as one trustee of this global order’. This article is a preliminary attempt to evaluate signs of movement toward global rights review. A multi-level charter of rights exists in the network of international and regional human rights treaties and in national constitutions. An incipient structure of global rights review exists in the form of the regional human rights courts, which see themselves as trustees of the larger global human rights system. Judicial dialogue among the regional courts allows for informal, decentralized coordination among them. The European Court of Human Rights serves as a point of reference for the African and Inter-American systems, though these also cite each other. Transregional judicial dialogue establishes a rudimentary, informal and decentralized mechanism of coordination among bodies that exercise a review function in the multi-level system of international human rights.

This article concerns two aspects of Stone Sweet and Ryan’s theory of legal cosmopolitanism: (1) what the Kantian cosmopolitan legal order means for an international court; and (2) what it means for the holders of the rights that flow from the cosmopolitan legal order. The article interrogates the extent to which, in order to be considered a truly cosmopolitan legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights needs at times not only to make non-citizens free of rights equal to those of citizens, but also to give them stronger rights than those enjoyed by citizens. The article concludes by turning to the meaning of the European Convention beyond its European context. The European system for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms may fail or succeed, yet the enthusiasm that the most successful rights-protecting body in the world has created in bystanders, and the very fact that it came into being at all, prove that real progress is possible. From a Kantian perspective, this may well be its greatest accomplishment.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the ECHR, we sought to demonstrate the power of Kantian theory to explain – or at least meaningfully illuminate – (1) the defining characteristics of modern, rights-based constitutionalism; (2) the evolving law, politics and constitutional architecture of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); and (3) the emergence of a global, cosmopolitan commons, featuring inter-judicial dialogue at its core. This article responds to contributors to the special symposium on the book. In Part I, we defend our account of a Kantian-congruent, domestic system of constitutional justice. Part II reflects on the ECHR as an instantiation of a cosmopolitan legal order, and on the European Court’s case law – particularly its enforcement of the proportionality principle. In Part III, we assess the evidence in support of a broader ‘constitutionalization’ of international human rights law.