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The chronometrics of confirmation bias: Evidence for the inhibition of intuitive judgements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Edward J. N. Stupple  and
Linden J. Ball
Edward J. N. Stupple
Affiliation:
Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby, Derby DE22 1GB, United Kingdom. e.j.n.stupple@derby.ac.ukhttp://psychology.derby.ac.uk/staff/Ed_Stupple.html
Linden J. Ball
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YF, United Kingdom. l.ball@lancaster.ac.ukhttp://www.psych.lancs.ac.uk/people/LindenBall.html
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Abstract

Mercier & Sperber (M&S) claim that the phenomenon of belief bias – which they consider to be an archetypal manifestation of a general confirmation bias in human reasoning – provides fundamental support for their argumentative theory and its basis in intuitive judgement. We propose that chronometric evidence necessitates a more nuanced account of belief bias that is not readily captured by argumentative theory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 89 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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