This paper is a revised version of a plenary lecture delivered at the SLS Annual Conference held at Oxford Brookes University in June 2023. It adopts an auto-ethnographic approach, drawing on the author's long experience of participating in the UK Research Excellence Framework (REF), to assess the current state of legal research in the UK and consider the implications of the increasing importance in the research landscape of engaging in research that serves the public good. The paper explores what falls within the scope of ‘legal research’, particularly for REF purposes, and reflects on how REF-focused research sits within the broader scope of legal scholarly activities. Ideas of the public good are examined and their relation to measures of research impact probed. The paper concludes by painting a broad-brush picture of the current research landscape, identifying key elements and engines of change, and speculating on the direction in which things are going and what should most concern legal scholars going forward. Although primarily focused on legal research in the UK, the paper should be of interest to legal scholars beyond the UK, particularly those in jurisdictions where research assessment exercises are a feature of academic life.

It is conventionally argued that because an artificially-intelligent (AI) system acts autonomously, its makers cannot easily be held liable should the system's actions harm. Since the system cannot be liable on its own account either, existing laws expose victims to accountability gaps and need to be reformed. Recent legal instruments have nonetheless established obligations against AI developers and providers. Drawing on attribution theory, this paper examines how these seemingly opposing positions are shaped by the ways in which AI systems are conceptualised. Specifically, folk dispositionism underpins conventional legal discourse on AI liability, personality, publications, and inventions and leads us towards problematic legal outcomes. Examining the technology and terminology driving contemporary AI systems, the paper contends that AI systems are better conceptualised instead as situational characters whose actions remain constrained by their programming. Properly viewing AI systems as such illuminates how existing legal doctrines could be sensibly applied to AI and reinforces emerging calls for placing greater scrutiny on the broader AI ecosystem.

It is recognised that civil litigation has a place within the police accountability infrastructure. However, the role of actions against the police for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault, and malicious prosecution (hereafter police actions) is underexplored. Taking citizenship as its analytical frame, this paper probes the relationship between police actions and the police complaints and discipline system over the last 60 years. Its primary focus is the Court of Appeal decision Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Hsu v Same [1998] QB 498 (Thompson). Here the potential for police actions to expose questionable police responses to officer misconduct, and failings in external oversight mechanisms, came into conflict with the drive towards proportionate civil justice. In prioritising the latter, Thompson increased police autonomy over settlement of police actions, thereby deprioritising the role of the courts in demarcating the limits of state interference with citizens’ rights. It is not suggested that Thompson should be overruled. Instead, it is contended that recognising the impact of the decision on subsequent reforms to police accountability processes and contemporary conceptions of the police-citizen relationship is crucial to understanding the roots of current disquiet concerning police accountability (and therefore to the development of meaningful reforms).

Third parties who receive trust property with knowledge that the transfer to them was a breach of trust will be liable in knowing receipt. Knowing receipt has grown quickly in importance in recent years and many of the finer points of the doctrine are still being worked out. This paper discusses one such issue: whether liability can exist when the third party acquires a security interest in trust property, rather than the underlying trust property itself. This point has not yet been considered by English courts, although it has been examined in cases from Australia, Canada and Hong Kong. The paper analyses the existing authorities in the context of the wider law relating to knowing receipt and explains the conceptual difficulties and practical problems with allowing liability to be grounded on the receipt of a mere security interest in trust property.

Whereas legal comparisons tend to be concerned with legal systems, structures or rules, this paper focuses on a more fundamental element of law: a legal concept. From the semiotic point of view, a concept is an element of the tripartite construct of meaning, which – in the legal context – is derived from a particular legal system. Since effective communication in legal practice is predicated on the unity of meaning, issues are likely to arise when an act of communication spans disparate legal cultures. When the epistemic embedding of legal concepts fundamentally differs between the respective legal systems with which the participants to a communicative event are familiar, conceptual incommensurability will arise, impeding the communication process and, potentially, also having an impact on associated court proceedings.

Against this theoretical backdrop, the paper shifts its focus to globalised legal practice, which requires a broader legal skillset and comparative perspectives. As an illustration, the equivalence of selected substantive law concepts is explored across the common law/civil law divide, accurate comprehension of which is essential to intercultural provision of legal services. Drawing parallels between the functional method in comparative law and the functional approach recommended in legal translation, an overview is provided of techniques for remedying terminological incongruence and conveying intended meaning across legal cultures. The paper concludes by querying whether the law curriculum would be enhanced by inclusion of comparative and linguistic perspectives, with a view to equipping graduates with interdisciplinary tools for effective legal communication and global law practice.

This paper connects two trends in contemporary legal scholarship that do not often intersect, namely commentary on the increasingly diverse nature of family law advice and support services, and calls for a refresh of the regulatory environment in which legal services in general are provided. Focusing on the law and landscape in England and Wales, we argue that regulatory challenges are particularly acute in the field of family law, where the range and reach of services provided by non-lawyers is extraordinary. We illustrate how particular aspects of debates over regulating and diversifying legal services apply to the family law context, noting that such concerns as there are have not always been well targeted. Finally, we identify a sub-set of innovative ‘extra-legal’ services that set private family law even further apart from other sub-fields of law when it comes to regulatory and professional challenge. These services clearly sit inside the landscape of family dispute resolution but equally clearly fall outside the boundaries of what is usually considered ‘legal’. This, we suggest, highlights the need for a concerted effort to define the contours of family law and family legal services so that a holistic approach might be taken to understanding and managing the standards and effectiveness of different service and support types.

The principle of self-determination has gained significant judicial support over the last three decades, and the choice to procreate using assisted reproductive technology is a clear example of our right to choose a treatment that enhances our personal lives. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended in 2008) stipulates that each party must give written, informed consent to ensure that our reproductive materials are used within strict parameters. However, the growing number of posthumous conception cases in several jurisdictions has raised concerns, particularly in situations where gametes are extracted from incapacitous patients without their consent, leading to posthumous parenthood. The landmark case of Y v A Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWCOP 18 caused significant concern when it authorised the retrieval, storage and use of sperm from a suspected brain stem dead man for procreative purposes under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It has never been known to be in the ‘best interests’ of a patient who lacks capacity to procreate in English law, and the consequences of this decision could be highly significant, raising questions about the exploitation of incapacitous patients and the misuse of genetic material. The decision has since been confirmed as the correct approach by the Court of Protection in Re X (Catastrophic Injury: Collection and Storage of Sperm) [2022] EWCOP 48, and a public consultation has now been opened by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. This paper examines the rigorous consent regime of the 1990 Act and the ethical complexities of retrieving gametes from incapacitous patients for procreative purposes. It will be determined that the 1990 Act's preference for a rigorous consent regime for public policy reasons is appropriate, and any alternative forms of consent could open a slippery slope to the unethical use of vulnerable individuals for their reproductive materials.

The challenge that delegated legislation poses to parliamentary sovereignty and associated supremacy in the UK is purportedly addressed through what we term the ‘constitutional bargain of delegated law-making’. This has three elements: the proper limitation of delegation by Parliament through well-designed parent legislation; the exercise of self-restraint by the Executive in the use of delegated authority; and the enablement of meaningful scrutiny by Parliament. As a paradigm situation in which delegated law-making might be said to be necessary, the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic is an apposite context in which to assess the robustness of that bargain. Our analysis uses a sample of Westminster-generated pandemic-related secondary instruments as a peephole into the broader dynamics of this constitutional bargain and further reveals its significant frailties; frailties that are exposed, but not created, by the pandemic.

To address the issue of persistent unemployment, the UK Government implemented a conditional welfare scheme. Prompted by Mantouvalou's argument that the scheme forces people into exploitative work, this paper addresses the ‘pressing’ question of whether the scheme is compatible with the prohibition on ‘forced or compulsory labour’ under Article 4(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is argued that, whether the scheme imposes the menace of a penalty, is involuntary, seriously exploitative or a normal civic obligation, ultimately depends on different understandings of the demands of distributive justice. Given the politically contested nature of those demands, Article 4(2) is a poor weapon to use when challenging the UK's conditional welfare scheme.

In this short piece we focus on two of the main changes brought in by the recent Nationality and Borders Act 2022 with a focus on sexually diverse claimants: inadmissibility and the increased standard of proof. The recent changes have a negative impact on all asylum seekers but we highlight that they have a particularly adverse impact on sexually diverse claimants because their diverse backgrounds have not been appropriately considered. The problematic provisions on inadmissibility on the basis of mode of entry and removal to a ‘third safe country’ pose particular risks for sexual minorities. Additionally, the increased standard of proof exaggerates issues already faced by sexually diverse claimants in relation to objective evidence gathering and decision-makers using guidance riddled with stereotypical understandings about sexual minorities.