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15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 190 of 760

  • 9 - The Use of Chinese Transnationalism: The Sichuan Earthquake and the Beijing Olympic Games

  • from PART III - RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    25 January 2017, pp 143-153

  • Summary

    This chapter deals with China's response to two major domestic events in 2008, in which the Chinese overseas were mobilized, namely, the Sichuan earthquake and the Beijing Olympic Games. Both these events show Beijing's changing policy towards the Chinese overseas. In order to achieve certain objectives, Beijing has begun to treat the Chinese overseas as a single entity, regardless of their citizenship. By appealing to their primordial Chinese sentiments Beijing hopes to use the Chinese overseas as a form of social capital.

    THE SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE: THE USE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL?

    An earthquake struck Sichuan province on 12 May 2008, resulting in 62,000 dead, 23,000 missing, and 350,000 injured. The earthquake left about 5 million homeless, although the actual number could have been as high as 11 million. The disaster immediately attracted the attention of the world. Many countries expressed their sympathies and offered aid. After a two–day hesitation, Beijing abandoned its self–reliance policy and accepted the help of foreign countries, allowing their personnel to enter the disaster area.

    While accepting the aid of foreign countries, China did not go out of its way to solicit their help. However, its attitude towards the Chinese overseas was vastly different. Many Chinese overseas, regardless of their citizenship, voluntarily staged campaigns to collect funds for the earthquake victims, showing their sympathy for their ethnic kin. But Beijing, for its part, had a conscious policy to get the Chinese overseas involved.

    With the PRC's healthy foreign reserves position, China, in fact, did not need the financial contribution of the Chinese overseas. Nevertheless, China was not only happy that the Chinese overseas were paying attention to the earthquake victims, but also intentionally appealed to them to continue to give donations for the victims. Beijing acknowledged the role of the Chinese overseas in rebuilding the disaster area in subsequent years. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) in the State Council declared in June 2008 that it would use the donations of the Chinese overseas (huaqiao huaren) to build 100 Qiao Ai Schools and 100 Qiao Ai health clinics in the following three to five years. The term qiao ai means “love of Chinese compatriots overseas”.

    Donations by the Chinese overseas can be divided into a few categories. The top category comprised donations made by Chinese entrepreneurs.

  • 7 - From Non–Intervention to Intervention? The “Nude Squat” Episode and Chinese Ambassador Saga in Malaysia

  • from PART II - RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    25 January 2017, pp 107-125

  • Summary

    The fifth example revolves around China's attitude towards the Chinese in Malaysia during two different periods: (i) a low ethnic tension period in 2005 involving the so–called “Nude Squat” (also known as “the lock up girl”) episode, and (ii) a high ethnic tension period in 2015 involving the Chinese ambassador's behaviour and speech. In the latter case, the Malaysian authorities considered the ambassador's actions to be an intervention in their domestic affairs but it did not develop into a diplomatic uproar. Does this case represent a shift in Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas and in China's foreign policy principles in general?

    BACKGROUND

    Malaya was a British colony that became independent only in 1957. Owing to its long struggle against a domestic communist insurgency, which was dominated by ethnic Chinese and also perceived to be supported by the PRC, the Malayan government adopted an anti–PRC attitude. The anti–communist and anti–PRC policy continued after 1963, when Malaya, together with three other British colonies, formed Malaysia. It was only in 1974 that Malaysia established relations with the PRC, when the then prime minister, Tun Razak, sought to woo ethnic Chinese votes during the general election. Nevertheless, even after diplomatic ties were established, the Malaysian government imposed restrictions on interactions between Chinese Malaysians and mainland Chinese. The bilateral relationship improved only after the end of the Cold War, long after Deng Xiaoping had introduced market reforms in China.

    Malaysia is a multi–ethnic country. It has a large number of ethnic Chinese, but the Malays are the dominant ethnic group. There has long been some degree of tension between the Malays and the Chinese, which erupted in 1969 in a major racial riot. This resulted in the entrenchment of Malay preeminence, encapsulated in the political doctrine of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy), to which the Malay elite, especially the Malay–based ruling party the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is strongly committed until this day. Although no anti–Chinese riots have taken place since the events of 1969, the relationship between the two ethnic groups remains fragile.

    Notwithstanding the uneasy relationship between the Malays and Chinese Malaysians, state–to–state relations between China and Malaysia improved, especially after China'sphenomenal economic growth.

  • Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua

  • Norshahril Saat
  • Book:
    Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    17 January 2017, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Many scholars on Malaysia have recognized that Salafism-Wahhabism has penetrated substantially into the country's political and social life.

  • • The southern state of Johor has always been considered, and remains, the bastion of kaum tua, with its religious institutions dominated by ulama (religious scholars) who are traditionalist in character but tolerant of religious practices that are infused with local culture and mysticism. These scholars have also tended to maintain conservative attitudes on gender issues, inter-religious relations, and intra-faith differences.

  • • The Sultan of Johor appoints the Mufti whose primary role is to issue fatwas (religious rulings) and be the ex-officio of the Johor Islamic Religious Council, the highest Islamic body in the state. Johor's Muftis are dominantly political quietists, and loyal to the ruling family.

  • • Occasional interventions by the Sultan of Johor in the religious sphere have proved crucial in ensuring that the state maintains its Malay character. The Sultan also acts to protect the state's religious institutions from encroachment by the federal government.

  • Foreword

  • Norshahril Saat
  • Book:
    Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    17 January 2017, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua

  • Norshahril Saat
  • Book:
    Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    17 January 2017, pp 1-22

  • Summary

    In 1916, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, an Islamic religious scholar (ulama) from Sumatra, made a sneering remark about the Mufti of Johor. “To become a Government Mufti in Malaya is a great glory,” he said. “You have an official uniform, with a whole banana-comb of epaulettes on the shoulder, a jubbah [Arabic-style garment] embroidered with gold thread, a silk turban, and your own car. The ra'ayat [people] fear and obey you, eat the scraps from your table, your spat of sireh [betel leaf]. And if you want to get married…Bismillah [anytime with God's consent].”

    Muftis are religious scholars (ulama) whose role is to provide guidance to the Muslim community and issue fatwa (religious rulings). In Malaysia, Muftis are appointed by the Malay Rulers. Ideally, an alim (singular for ulama) must not blindly serve the interest of ruling elites; instead, they must be pious individuals who protect the interests of the religious community. Haji Abdul Karim's harsh words showed that he must have felt strongly that the Johor Mufti of his time had been falling far short of those ideals.

    To be sure, Haji Abdul Karim and the then-Johor Mufti came from rival schools of thought. Haji Abdul Karim was a key player in the reformist/modernist movement in Sumatra, which called for Indonesian Muslims to return to the fundamentals of the Quran and the Hadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). The movement appealed for “pure” Islam in Indonesia, one that was erased of local beliefs coloured with mysticism and irrationalism. The reformists’ position on theology, rituals and cultural practices was in fact quite similar to that held by Salafi-Wahhabi scholars. Salafism is a Sunni orientation that can be traced back to the theologian Ibn

    Taimiyyah (b.1263–d.1328). It urges Muslims to return to Islam's pristine past, and considers the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad's death as the ideal period for Islamic societies to copy. Salafis believe that ideas and scholarship generated by savants of these three generations should therefore be applied in contemporary social and political life. One of the main tenets of Salafism is its rejection of Islamic innovations. Its followers can however be either progressive or regressive in their religious outlook. For progressive Salafis, reliving the system of the first three generations after the Prophet means the upholding of its values and principles.

  • Chapter 5 - Ba’ Kelalan: Sustaining the Crack in the BN's Rural Dominance

  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Book:
    Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017, pp 99-120

  • Summary

    Ba’ Kelalan is one of the most competitive seats contested in the Sarawak state election. The last three state elections – in 2006, 2011, and now 2016 – have seen either Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) or opposition candidates win the seat with only slight majorities (Table 1). This election was no different: Baru Bian, the incumbent candidate from the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People's Justice Party) faced a stiff challenge from his opponent from 2011, Willie Liau of the BN-component Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP). How Baru retained his seat, despite the opposition's poor performance overall in rural Sarawak, offers insight into how voters balance potentially conflicting priorities and ties in defining their interests.

    Ba’ Kelalan has 7,375 voters, 87.8 per cent of whom are Lun Bawang/Kelabit, followed by Chinese at 4.4 per cent, Malay/Melanau at 3.9 per cent, Iban at 2.6 per cent, and 1.3 per cent Others. As is the case in many rural areas in Sarawak, Ba’ Kelalan still lags behind urban areas in terms of development of infrastructure such as a secondary school, electricity, piped water supply, clinics, and so on. The lack of proper electricity and water supply has left many Lun Bawang to rely on gravity-fed water and solar energy.

    Given the importance of development in Ba’ Kelalan, it is understandable that the BN once again resorted to the ‘politics of development’ (see Jitab and Ritchie, 1992; Weiss and Puyok, this volume), hoping to recapture Ba’ Kelalan from PKR's Baru Bian, who has held the seat since 2011. The BN's politics of development approach came with the announcement of millions of ringgit in allocations to fulfil Ba’ Kelalan's development needs (more on this below) and reminders to Lun Bawang voters that it is only through the ruling coalition that Ba’ Kelalan can be developed.

    Despite the BN's well-oiled campaign machinery and promotion of the politics of development, the ruling party failed for the second time to wrest Ba’ Kelalan from the opposition. That loss means the BN failed to make a clean sweep across Sarawak's rural areas. This chapter is an attempt to understand the dynamics of electoral politics in Ba’ Kelalan by looking at salient issues affecting the Lun Bawang voters’ decisions. The chapter also explores the role of faith-based organisations, their networks, and their influence among Lun Bawang voters.

  • Chapter 3 - Stakan: Much Ado About Postal Votes?

  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Book:
    Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017, pp 45-68

  • Summary

    Stakan is one of eleven new constituencies1 created in a 2015 redelineation of Sarawak's legislative districts. It was carved out of Muara Tuang, which is under the Kota Samarahan parliamentary constituency and has always been a stronghold for the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front). Of the eleven new state constituencies, Stakan was especially controversial due to its huge number of postal votes – votes cast under special circumstances, particularly by members of the armed forces and police. Postal voters in Stakan account for 47.8 per cent of registered voters in Stakan and represent 28.1 per cent of total postal voters in Sarawak.

    As described below, it is generally presumed in Malaysia that postal votes will fall overwhelmingly to the BN. The demographics of Stakan thus entailed huge odds against the opposition. Nevertheless, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) took a gamble and fielded a candidate to deny the BN a walkover victory. As predicted, the BN won, gaining 8,820 votes (59.4 per cent of eligible voters), for a 7,042 majority over the DAP, which secured only 1,778 votes. Voter turnout was 73 per cent.

    The election result in Stakan was most likely determined by postal votes, and the prevalence of these voters also shaped the campaign and its messages. This chapter attempts to determine the extent to which postal voters affected the electoral outcome in Stakan and, given the nature of the contest, whether the issues raised by the candidates in Stakan matched the issues of concern to local voters.

    Background to the contest in Stakan

    Stakan (see Map 1) has a total of 14,846 registered voters, comprised of 7,788 ordinary voters and 7,050 postal voters. A semi-rural seat, Stakan has an ethnic composition of 41.9 per cent Malay/Melanau, 21 per cent Iban, 18 per cent Chinese, 14.1 per cent Bidayuh, 1 per cent Orang Ulu and 3.1 per cent Others. (These ‘Others’ include Javanese who reside in a few villages in the area, such as Kampung Jawa Batu 12 and Kampung Sri Arjuna.)

    The BN candidate, businessman Mohammad Ali Mahmud, was the two-term incumbent state assemblyman for Muara Tuang and is also the younger brother of former Sarawak chief minister Abdul Taib Mahmud. Ali's previous victories in Muara Tuang were said to owe more to his kinship to his brother than to his own credibility as a candidate.

  • Chapter 2 - Tupong: If It Ain‘t Broke, Don't Fix It!

  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Book:
    Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017, pp 23-44

  • Summary

    The most recent, eleventh Sarawak State Election (SSE11) demonstrates yet again the domination of PBB (United Bumiputera Heritage Party), part of the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) coalition, in Malay-majority areas. Tupong is one such area. The election in Tupong saw a two-pronged contest between the incumbent government party, represented by Fazzrudin Abdul Rahman of PBB, and Nurhanim Hanna Mokhsen of the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People's Justice Party). The former won with 79.1 per cent of the popular vote against 20.9 per cent; 8,055 votes set the candidates apart. This chapter examines Tupong as one of BN's strongest urban bastions.

    Tupong is notable because it defies the assumption that election outcomes in the urban areas lean more toward the opposition – unlike in other Sarawak urban seats such as Padungan (a Chinesemajority seat) and Batu Kawa (a mixed seat). A possible explanation is that Tupong houses among the highest concentration of voters from Sarawak's newly emergent, urban, Malay-Muslim middle class, who are among the prime beneficiaries of state and federal BN affirmative action. As a political community, the Malays also have a close historical and social affiliation with PBB, the state BN majority component party. The community's mix of feelings of gratitude and affinity with PBB translates into the mass of voters supporting BN in Tupong. In this chapter, I argue that Tupong is an example of the pull of patronage politics, based on a variant of the politics of development often associated with more rural areas in Sarawak, by looking at campaign strategies and issues raised by BN and PKR during the SSE11 campaign period.

    First, I outline the basic demography of Tupong, which is a rapidly developing, privileged, Malay-majority, urban area. Second, I discuss ‘the Adenan Factor’, which is a strong feel-good sentiment towards Sarawak's newly elected chief minister, Adenan Satem. The extent to which Fazzrudin's victory depended on Adenan's popularity hints at the prevalence of personalised, clientelist politics in the area. Third, I discuss PKR's ceramah (political speeches or rallies). Like Fazzrudin, Nurhanim also relied on her party seniors for boosting support, suggesting the pervasiveness of personality politics, whether rooted in charisma or in patron–client ties. This reliance on personal ‘pull’ was evident when PKR lost much of its audience for ceramah sessions due to the absence of PKR (and other opposition) national superstars.

  • Chapter 4 - Repok and Meradong: Challenges in Courting Rural Votes

  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Book:
    Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017, pp 69-98

  • Summary

    The losses of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in five Chinesemajority seats in the 11th Sarawak state election shocked political observers who had been convinced the party had solid support in most Chinese-majority seats. These five seats share interesting characteristics – their ethnic composition, semi-urban character, agriculture-based economy, and political history as Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) or SUPP (Sarawak United People's Party) strongholds for decades until recently. The instability of DAP electoral performance in those seats, in contrast to its persistent victory in urban Chinese-majority areas, gives some indication that degree of urbanisation or local context may take precedence over factors such as ethnicity and national politics when it comes to voting. This study uses a comparative examination of contests in two of those seats, Repok and Meradong, to explore an explanation for the BN's victory, whether there might be a distinctive ‘rural Chinese’ voting pattern, and how political developments deviated from those of previous elections. Comparison of these two areas, selected for their highly similar socio-economic characteristics, intends to measure the effects on voting of factors other than the choice of candidates.

    The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section gives a general description of each candidate and constituency, then the second part provides in-depth, descriptive accounts of the campaign issues raised and strategies used by both parties. The third explores the social and political implications of the campaigns and polling results. The last section offers concluding remarks.

    Political profiles of Repok and Meradong

    The total population of Sarikei District is 56,228 (as of 2010), of which ethnic Chinese comprise about 40 per cent, followed by 33 per cent Iban, 16 per cent Malay, and 7 per cent Melanau. The economy of Sarikei is primarily agricultural. A sizeable proportion of Chinese in Sarikei are involved in farming and farming-related business. The local authority of Sarikei has yet to meet the criteria of a municipal council, which include covering an area with a population of over 150,000 and having an annual revenue of more than RM20 million. There are two state constituencies, Repok and Meradong, under the parliamentary seat of Sarikei. Both Repok and Meradong are Chinese-majority seats.

  • Chapter 1 - The 2016 Sarawak State Elections: Old Stories and New Punch Lines

  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Book:
    Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017, pp 1-22

  • Summary

    Studies of Malaysian politics are all too often studies of West Malaysian politics: they give short shrift to the distinctly different patterns in Sabah and Sarawak. As a result, prevailing analytical frameworks for understanding Malaysian political dynamics tend to be premised on what happens on the peninsula. This book aims to complement relatively few other state-level studies (for instance, Faisal, 2011; Lim, 2008; Loh, 1997a; Chin, 1996) to help redress that bias, through a grassroots-based exploration of politics in Sarawak. In doing so, we aim both to add to closely contextualised knowledge of a distinctive state's politics and to put wider theories of what drives electoral behaviour and shapes electoral outcomes to the test.

    Of Malaysia's thirteen states and two federal territories, the only state that currently holds its state elections separately from the general election is Sarawak. Just as Malaysian political parties see in that timing an opportunity to test the waters in advance of their nationwide effort, it allows social scientists the chance for a focused study on a single state, isolating local issues and processes. Importantly, mainstream peninsular political discourse tends to frame the Sarawak state election (hereafter, SSE) as a bellwether for the general election; however, that equation is misleading. At the most basic level, Sarawak's demographic profile makes clear how unrepresentative the state is, particularly given the overwhelmingly communal tinge to Malaysian politics and political economy (among many others, von Vorys, 1975; Lim, 1980; Cheah, 2002; Lian and Jayanath, 2011; Weiss, 2013; Segawa, 2015).

    Nationally, the Malaysian population is 61.5 per cent Bumiputera (Malay and indigenous), 21.0 per cent Chinese, 6.3 per cent Indian, 0.09 per cent ‘Others’, and 10.3 per cent non-citizens (Department of Statistics, 2016). For Sarawak, the comparable figures are 70.5 per cent Bumiputera, 22.5 per cent Chinese, 0.003 per cent each Indian and ‘Others’, and 6.5 per cent non-citizens. At least as important politically is the breakdown of the category, Bumiputera. (The Malaysian government glosses this distinction; official statistics focus on the catch-all term, aggressively promoted as of the 1970s with the launch of the New Economic Policy; c.f. Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981/82). In Sarawak, the Iban share of the population is the largest: approximately 30.3 per cent of citizens; on the peninsula, 63.1 per cent of citizens are Malay and only about 4 per cent other Bumiputera (Department of Statistics, 2011).

  • 8 - The Prospects of Democratization in Vietnam and China and Implications for Bilateral Relations

  • Le Hong Hiep
  • Book:
    Living Next to the Giant
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    06 January 2018
    Print publication:
    23 December 2016, pp 183-209

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Thirty years of development under Doi Moi have not only transformed Vietnam economically, but also generated important political implications for the country. Significant socio-economic development achieved under Doi Moi, according to modernization theory, will contribute to the prospect of Vietnam transitioning itself into a liberal democracy in the long run. Such a prospect is not only consequential for Vietnam's domestic politics, but also carries important implications for Vietnam's foreign relations, including those with China. As China itself may ultimately undertake democratic transition as well, internal political developments in each country will open up a number of different possible directions in which future bilateral relations could evolve.

    In effect, there are four major scenarios in which domestic conditions in both Vietnam and China could shape the future trajectory of bilateral relations. The first is more or less the same as the current situation in which both Vietnam and China remain authoritarian states with the CPV and CCP maintaining their firm grip on power. The second and third scenarios involve the possibility of one of the two countries democratizing while the other remains authoritarian. Finally, under the fourth scenario, both Vietnam and China transform themselves into liberal democracies. As such, the domestic political transformations of each of the above scenarios will inevitably add further nuances to the already complicated relationship. The prospects of democratization in both countries and their implications for bilateral relations therefore merit serious examination.

    The current chapter looks into future political prospects of Vietnam and China and investigate their implications for bilateral relations. Accordingly, the chapter adopts the theoretical tenets of modernization theory to argue that as both Vietnam and China achieve further progress in their socio-economic development, they will move closer towards political democratization. However, the exact timing of such a transformation in each country is unknown, making it necessary to consider all four possible scenarios mentioned above. By analysing these scenarios and taking into account other independent variables, most notably the ongoing South China Sea disputes and the regional strategic environment, this chapter argues that contrary to expectations of liberal peace theorists, the first scenario in which both countries remain authoritarian tends to be more favourable for a stable bilateral relationship than the other three scenarios.

Page 190 of 760