This chapter deals with the sixth example of China's approach to Chinese overseas issues. It involves China's response to the 2015 Kokang Chinese rebellion in Myanmar (formerly Burma), in which Beijing appeared to have adopted a pragmatic attitude. It should be pointed out here that when we speak of the Chinese overseas we usually refer to “non–homeland minority groups”, i.e., groups of Chinese who do not have their original “homeland” within their respective countries of residence. The only exception to this general characteristic are perhaps the Kokang Chinese in Myanmar, who are a “homeland minority group”, i.e., their original homeland is within Myanmar. It should also be noted that the homeland of the Kokang Chinese is an area that borders China. Hence, there has been a lot of interaction between the Kokang Chinese and the Chinese of mainland China. Owing to these unique characteristics, the Kokang Chinese issue needs to be treated differently from other Chinese overseas issues. Although this study treats the Kokang Chinese case alongside other “overseas Chinese” cases, China's treatment of this special category of Chinese overseas differs from its approach to other groups of Chinese overseas.

INTRODUCTION

On 9 February 2015, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), led by Peng Jiasheng (also known as Phone Kyar Shin or Pheung Kya–shin), suddenly returned to Laukkai, the Kokang capital, from an unknown hideout and attacked the security forces of the Myanmar government. Serious fighting took place, which resulted in the exodus of many of the Kokang Chinese people, mainly to Chinese territory. The fighting lasted several days and there were many casualties on both sides but the MNDAA failed to capture Laukkai, fled to the border, and allegedly entered Chinese territory. The Myanmar army pursued the rebels and fired shells at areas believed to be the hiding place of the MNDAA. The Myanmar air force joined the fighting and on 13 March a Myanmar fighter plane bombed the Chinese side of the border, killing five Chinese villagers and wounding another eight. Beijing protested against this incursion, and Nay Pyi Taw (Naypyitaw) apologized. High–level meetings were then conducted between the two countries to look for a solution.

Nevertheless, fighting continued for more than three months. On 2 June, China conducted live firing exercises in Chinese territory along the Sino–Myanmar border. Tensions immediately rose between the two countries.

As the Chinese overseas are not a homogeneous group, and their situation differs from country to country, it is difficult to make generalizations regarding the impact of Beijing's changing policies on them. Nevertheless, this chapter discusses some broad and general impacts of China's changing policies on the Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia, with special reference to three countries: Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It concludes with a brief comment on the responses of some governments in the region.

GENERAL IMPACT ON THE CHINESE OVERSEAS

For ethnic Chinese businessmen who have business links with mainland China, the rise of China and the opportunities it allows them are a welcome development. Some are proud that China considers them a part of the great Chinese nation, probably unaware of the political implications of being grouped as such.

However, many are uncomfortable to be called huaqiao again as they are no longer citizens of the PRC. They are aware that they live in Southeast Asia, where local nationalism is at its height. They know that their political loyalties might be questioned by the indigenous people and governments of their adopted countries. This is particularly the case as China becomes more assertive in the South China Sea, which may affect ethnic relations in the Southeast Asian states that have territorial dispute with Beijing.

Most of the Chinese who moved to Southeast Asia before the new waves of Chinese migration have become local citizens, but many new migrants may not have qualified for citizenship or become citizens yet. New migrants who have been naturalized may still have strong links with China and may welcome having dual nationality status, but the majority of local–born Chinese and earlier migrants do not want dual nationality, fearing that their loyalties would be questioned by the governments and peoples of their adopted lands. This is the case not only in Southeast Asia, but also in many other countries.

Moreover, China's recent tendency to blur the distinction between huaqiao and huaren and its appeals to Chinse transnationalism are likely to have a negative impact on nation–building, especially in Southeast Asia, where the process is relatively new. The impact would be more serious for those new Chinese migrants who have been naturalized and expect to be accepted as loyal citizens of their adopted countries.

Appendix

The first example illustrating how a rising China has conducted its foreign policy on issues involving the Chinese overseas is the May 1998 anti–Chinese violence in Indonesia, which precipitated the downfall of then President Suharto. China's response to this episode shows the level of priority accorded to the interests of the Chinese overseas in China's overall foreign policy objectives. To put the episode in wider perspective, this chapter also deals with the factors that contributed to the violence and how the events unfolded. The question that arises from this episode is whether China's “hands off” position in this instance was an exceptional case during the early period of China's rise.

BACKGROUND

Although Indonesia proclaimed independence in August 1945, it gained full independence only in December 1949, when a Roundtable Agreement was signed between Jakarta and The Hague. The PRC, founded in October 1949, established diplomatic ties with the Republic of Indonesia soon afterwards, in 1950. Sino–Indonesian relations have fluctuated since then until 2015. Various factors have determined the nature of these relations, of which the most important has been the national interest of China. Thus, in some instances of anti– Chinese riots in Indonesia, Beijing sent ships to evacuate the Chinese in the country, but it stopped doing so when such action conflicted with higher priorities in China's national interest (see chapter 3).

Anti–Chinese violence occurred more frequently during the Indonesian struggle for independence and soon after independence. What were the factors contributing to ethnic conflict, especially anti–Chinese violence? The wealth of the ethnic Chinese relative to the pribumis or indigenous Indonesians is often cited as a major factor. Some among the indigenous elite even argued that the Chinese Indonesians “controlled” the Indonesian economy. Many indigenous Indonesians wanted to undermine the economic position of the Chinese. Another factor behind anti–Chinese sentiments was the prejudice of the indigenous Indonesians deriving from the perception that Chinese Indonesians were not loyal towards their adopted land.

Domestic politics also played an important role in the outbreak of anti–Chinese violence. Some among the indigenous elite wanted to foment and use ethnic conflict to achieve their political objectives. There has been a recurring pattern in the occurrence of ethnic violence, with the Chinese being made scapegoats for expedient reasons.

The usefulness of the Chinese overseas to the PRC became apparent when Beijing's top leadership began mentioning in their speeches that the Chinese overseas were crucial for their “One Belt One Road” Strategy. This belief in the usefulness of the Chinese overseas, which was also shared by many Chinese scholars in China, resulted in the further blurring of the distinction between Chinese citizens and foreign citizens of Chinese descent. This chapter addresses briefly the concept of “One Belt One Road”, its ambiguity, and the misperceived role of the Chinese overseas in this strategy. It also discusses its possible impact on China's relations with Southeast Asia.

THE ORIGINS

The “One Belt One Road” Strategy was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in his speech in Kazakhstan in September 2013 and in another speech a month later in Indonesia. In his Kazakhstan speech, Xi mentioned the economic belt of the overland Silk Road, which linked China with Central Asia and Europe, while in the Indonesian speech he proposed a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which would link China to Southeast Asia and beyond.

Soon after the two speeches, Xi's proposal became known as the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) Strategy or Yidai Yilu Zhanlue in Mandarin. There are many explanations for why the OBOR Strategy was proposed. Some believe that the existing global economic institutional framework limits the economic and political role of China. As China becomes developed and stronger, it wants to play a major role in the world arena, freeing itself from the domination of the United States, Europe, and Japan. OBOR and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are being used to achieve this objective.

President Xi himself links the OBOR Strategy to his “China Dream”. He would like to lead the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in order to make China strong again, as in ancient times. In fact, the rapid economic development of China has resulted in three requirements — the need for raw materials, the need to export surplus products, and the need to channel surplus capital — that pit China against Western capitalist countries, which are in a scramble to fulfill similar needs. The proposed OBOR Strategy would be able to meet these requirements.

Nevertheless, reviving the historical concept of the silk road is not without problems.

China and India, the world's most populous countries, have huge overseas populations. Nevertheless, it is the Chinese overseas who have long been a focus of attention owing to the important role they have played, their links to China, and China's policies towards them. And, that focus has become sharper since China'srise and its efforts to use the Chinese overseas as social, political, and economic capital. Moreover, Beijing's leaders perceive that the Chinese overseas are crucial for the realization of the “China Dream”. This chapter will deal briefly with two important developments linked to China's changing policy towards the Chinese overseas: the rise of China and the recent massive waves of Chinese migration to both the developed and developing countries.

This study attempts to address the following questions: Why and when did Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas change? What are the factors that contributed to this change? Which are the countries in Southeast Asia that still have strong anti–Chinese feelings and where major anti–Chinese violence has continued to occur? What are the factors that contribute to anti–Chinese feelings and violence? Did Beijing go out of its way to protect the Chinese overseas who were affected by past outbreaks of violence? Why has Beijing adopted a differentiated approach in dealing with the Chinese domiciled in different countries? Does Beijing still differentiate between Chinese nationals and foreign citizens of Chinese descent? How have the Chinese overseas reacted to China's new policy? What have been the responses of the countries that host these Chinese?

Beijing's responses to anti–Chinese violence and anti– Chinese sentiments in selected countries in Southeast Asia and beyond since the end of the twentieth century would give us a clear understanding of Beijing's policy towards the countries in question. This study presents examples from four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Myanmar), two Pacific Island countries (Solomon Islands and Tonga) and three countries in Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Libya, and Yemen).

As Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas has also been the product of its responses to internal events and needs, six internal developments have been selected for this study: the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, the Beijing–initiated World Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference, Beijing's so–called Huayi Card, its “One Belt One Road” Strategy, and the development of Chinese soft power.

Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas began to change at the end of the twentieth century, when there was a sudden surge in Chinese migration to the West, mainly Canada and the United States. It was reported that some of these new migrants who hold foreign citizenship started urging China to amend its 1980 single citizenship law so that they could have dual citizenship status. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), also known as Qiaowu bangongshi or Qiaoban in Mandarin, which had been inactive for some years, started to strive for their cause then. OCAO officials began exercising their influence on Chinese overseas affairs and having some bearing on China's foreign policy. This chapter deals briefly with the organization of OCAO, its increasingly important role in Chinese overseas affairs, its initiative in blurring the distinction between Chinese nationals and foreign Chinese, its attempts at reviving a dual nationality law, and its links to the “One Belt One Road” Strategy.

THE CHINESE OVERSEAS

In 2015, China's OCAO estimated that there were 60 million Chinese overseas. This is also the figure that Beijing's top leaders, including Premier Li Keqiang, cite. In contrast, the Taiwan Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission estimated the number to be 42 million as at end 2014. This is a conservative estimate, lower even than the estimate the Chinese OCAO used in 2010, i.e., 45.4 million. Scholars Dudley L. Poston, Jr., and Mei–Yu Yu assess the Taiwan Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission's statistics to be more valuable because they are “systematic and comparable overtime”.

If we use the Taiwanese estimates, there were 39,568,000 Chinese overseas in 2010 (see Table 2.1), of which the largest concentration was in Asia, constituting about 76 per cent. Of the Chinese overseas in Asia, the largest numbers were in Southeast Asia, accounting for about 91 per cent in 2010 (see Table 2.2).

It should be noted that the percentage of the Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia has significantly declined in the past fifty years owing to the new wave of Chinese migration to the developed countries. In the mid–1950s, for instance, 96.7 per cent of the Chinese overseas were found in Asia, compared to 2.4 per cent in America. But, by 2010, the Chinese in America had increased to 18.6 per cent (7,255,000) of the population.

Since China's arrival as an economic and political power, Beijing has started efforts to project soft power. Its main mode of developing soft power is the setting up of schools known as “Confucius Institutes” to spread knowledge of the Chinese language and culture across the world, including Southeast Asia. The idea is that grassroots appreciation of the Chinese language and culture would advance China's traditional diplomacy and foreign policy interests.

China's soft power projection, in fact, is not targeted at the Chinese overseas but at the non–Chinese. However, in the process, China has realized that it can also make use of the Chinese overseas to spread the Chinese language and culture. Moreover, it can “re–sinicize” the Chinese overseas and strengthen their cultural ties with China in the hope that they would serve China'snational interests.

China's promotion of the Chinese language and the establishment of Confucius Institutes/Confucius Classrooms are done through Hanban, or the executive body of the Chinese Language Council International, which is under China's Ministry of Education.

This chapter attempts to briefly examine the revival of the Chinese language (known in China as the Han Language or Hanyu) and Chinese education in Southeast Asia. The questions it will examine are: What is the current state of Chinese language learning in Southeast Asia? Is there a revival of Chinese–medium schools in these states? How have local Chinese communities and governments reacted to the teaching of the Chinese language, especially the establishment of Confucius Institutes/Confucius Classrooms? Have the local Chinese been re–sinicized, thus hindering or slowing down the “nation–building” process in these young nations?

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

During the Cold War, while communism as well as Chinese influence was perceived to be a threat, many Southeast Asian countries implemented assimilationist policies. They restricted or even prohibited Chinese schools and the use of the Chinese language. The most extreme cases could be found in Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia, where the three pillars of Chinese culture (Chinese organizations, Chinese newspapers, and Chinese schools) were eliminated. These restrictions contributed to the further indigenization of the ethnic Chinese in the region.

ANTI–CHINESE VIOLENCE IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND TONGA

The second example of China's behaviour on Chinese overseas issue involves Beijing's direct intervention in 2006 during anti– Chinese riots in the South Pacific island states of Solomon Islands and Tonga. These incidents took place about eight years after the May 1998 anti–Chinese riots in Indonesia. In the interim period, China had developed further and become more confident in the international arena. Its policy towards the Chinese in these South Pacific countries had clearly shifted from its stance towards the Chinese in Indonesia earlier. However, was this really a major change in Beijing's wider foreign policy's objectives? Had the interests of the Chinese overseas become paramount by 2006? That is, would China protect the interests of the Chinese overseas at all cost? Or was this behaviour in the trajectory of its traditional foreign policy behaviour?

BACKGROUND

The South Pacific islands, which consist of fourteen small independent states, used to be considered an “American Lake”. The United States was the biggest aid donor in the region, which is strategically important as a gateway to the Pacific Ocean. However, after the end of the Cold War, the United States began to downgrade its involvement in the region and its pre–eminent role has been taken over by Australia, followed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The PRC moved in late 1990s and began to compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition in these small islands states.

Initially, in the mid–1970s, soon after it had won a seat at the United Nations, Beijing managed to establish diplomatic ties with the larger Pacific Island states, such as Fiji, Western Samoa, and Papua New Guinea (PNG), ignoring the smaller states, which it considered insignificant. Later, however, Beijing realized the strategic importance of the smaller states and the presence of Chinese new migrants there. More attention was then paid to the South Pacific. Currently, Beijing has ties with eight Pacific Island states, including the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu, while Taiwan continues to have ties with six countries. including the Solomon Islands, which will be discussed in this chapter. Tonga, which recognizes Beijing, will also be examined.

The importance of the Chinese overseas for China has been rather controversial. In the past, some Western scholars argued that the Chinese overseas were crucial to Beijing and that China's relations with each country hosting the Chinese depended on the latter's treatment of its Chinese minority. Other Western as well as non–Western scholars maintained that the Chinese overseas were not high in China's foreign policy agenda and hence would not be the major determinants of its foreign policy. With the rise of China since the end of the twentieth century, the position of the Chinese overseas has become more important. But does this mean that the first view prevails over the second view now? Would China protect the interests of the Chinese overseas at all costs?

CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE CHINESE OVERSEAS

Foreign policy tends to serve the national interest of a country, and the national interest is defined by its leaders. This also applies to the PRC. It is not easy to define the national interest of China as it may change from period to period. Nevertheless, the PRC, like other countries in the contemporary period, has been concerned with its national security, territorial integrity, political ideology represented by the Communist Party of China (CPC), and social and economic development. In addition, China, as a major power, would like to be the leader of the third world and eventually a world leader. It should be noted that China is an emigrant state that has a large number of Chinese overseas. Therefore, in the earliest PRC Constitution of 1954 and the latest one of 2004, despite several amendments, there has always been a clause to the effect that China would “protect the legitimate interests of huaqiao ”. From this, one can categorically maintain that the protection of the “overseas Chinese” is part of the national interest of China.

The national interest of China has many components. Among these, national security is paramount. National security for China refers to the security of the Chinese nation–state, which involves the survival of China as an entity, domestic political stability, and the survival of the CPC and the ruling elite.

The previous chapters dealt with Beijing's responses to both external events involving the Chinese overseas and domestic events or domestic needs in which the Chinese overseas were involved. These events occurred around the turn of the century, coinciding with the rise of China. This chapter summarizes various case studies showcasing China's new policy towards the Chinese overseas and their relationship with China's national interests. It becomes clear that, increasingly, Beijing has perceived the Chinese overseas as a form of social and economic capital for the development of China and hence fine–tuned its policy towards them. It would appear that Beijing is adopting Chinese transnationalism once again. It even had plans to introduce a Huayi Card that would allow persons of Chinese origin residency, but not voting, rights in China but the project was shelved owing to unfavourable responses from some Chinese overseas and non–Chinese.

BEIJING'S RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS FROM NON–INTERVENTION TO DIRECT INTERVENTION

As noted in Chapter 4, in 1998, Beijing adopted a “hands–off policy” towards the Chinese overseas during the anti–Chinese violence in Indonesia. However, Beijing's responses to external events differ from country to country as the objective conditions in each have not been the same. As noted earlier in this study, there are various types of responses, which produce different models.

The so–called Indonesian model, the non–intervention (non–protection) model, was unique and is unlikely to be repeated. At that time, China was diplomatically isolated and required the support of a major country in Southeast Asia. As Indonesians of Chinese descent were being beaten up and raped and their homes looted, China watched helplessly as these people were no longer Chinese citizens. Many Chinese Indonesians fled to safer places and China did not stage any protest. It was only a few months later that Beijing appealed to the newly–installed Indonesian government to protect its own citizens, including those of Chinese descent.

However, it seems that there was some debate in China'sforeign policy circles as to whether non–intervention was the right decision, but the policy prevailed as it served the national interests of the PRC. However, if large–scale anti–Chinese riots were to occur in Indonesia today, it is likely that Beijing would intervene.

I have been studying Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia for many years. In 1978 I published an occasional paper on the topic, which was subsequently expanded into a book entitled China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (1985). In the past thirty years since that study, many new developments have taken place. When I first conducted my study, China was still weak. But, since the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twentyfirst centuries we have witnessed a rising China, the growing overseas presence of China's state–owned enterprises (SOEs), and a new wave of Chinese migration. China has also fine–tuned its foreign policy. Within this changed context, it would be interesting to re–examine Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas.

Beijing's policy today shows elements of both continuity and change. But, is change more significant than continuity? Is the new policy a form of Chinese transnationalism used by Beijing to serve its own core national interest? Is the policy more effective than before as a rising China is more appealing to the Chinese overseas? What will be the likely impact on Southeast Asia and beyond?

When I was director of the Chinese Heritage Centre at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University (CHC–NTU) from January 2006 to October 2013, I wrote a few brief articles commenting on Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas. However, there were then few examples to support a discussion of continuity and change. I was also busy with other responsibilities and could not do a more detailed study of Beijing's policy.

I am glad that ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute has given me the opportunity finally to embark on this long intended study. Nevertheless, this is a brief study, limited to Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, Africa, and the Middle East. The emphasis is still on the Southeast Asian region, which is my major area of interest. A comprehensive study that covers other regions should be conducted to obtain a more thorough understanding of Beijing's relationship with the Chinese overseas.

The fourth example involves China's response to the 2014 anti–China/Chinese riots in Vietnam. This episode took place sixteen years after the anti–Chinese riots in Jakarta. By then, Xi Jinping had assumed the presidency of the PRC and had begun to adopt a more assertive foreign policy in the region, especially in the South China Sea, where China has a territorial dispute with Vietnam. The anti–China/Chinese riots of 2014 should be seen against this backdrop. Beijing was able to offer effective protection to its nationals, who were the victims of the riots. From China's foreign policy perspective, is this another example in which the interests of the Chinese overseas are paramount? Or can China's behaviour be explained in terms of its traditional foreign policy behaviour?

BACKGROUND

Vietnam was a vassal of China in ancient times although the Vietnamese people occasionally rebelled against continued domination by China. In the nineteenth century, Vietnam was colonized by France. After World War II a communist regime established itself in Hanoi in the north and started a war of national liberation against the French and their South Vietnamese allies (the First Indochina War). The United States took over as patron of South Vietnam after Hanoi forced the French to retreat in 1954 and soon the Second Indochina War began. In both wars, Hanoi received tremendous support from the PRC as well as the Soviet Union. It eventually managed to repel US forces and achieve the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975.

Soon after reunification, Vietnam started a socialist transformation programme, which adversely affected the ethnic Chinese in the country, especially those in the south. The Chinese, who formed the middle class in Vietnam, began to leave the country in large numbers.

Meanwhile, despite receiving help from the PRC in their fight for independence, the Vietnamese resented being continually influenced by China. In 1976, at their fourth party congress, the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership purged the pro– Beijing group in their midst, and relations between China and Vietnam became tense. More importantly, Vietnam'srelationship with the Soviet Union, which had begun to intensify, culminated in a formal alliance in June 1978, which was perceived by Beijing as an act to encircle the PRC. Subsequently, on 25 December 1978, Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia, which was an ally of Beijing.