INTRODUCTION

Large scale labour migration into the constituent regions of Malaysia i.e., Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak began in late nineteenth century when these regions were under British rule. For Malaya, the first of the three regions to attain independence the large inflow was induced by the introduction of capitalistic economic enterprises at a time when the region was sparsely populated. Millions of workers were brought in from India, China and Indonesia to work in the expanding production of tin and agricultural products for exports and the accompanying infrastructural development (see among others, Kaur 2006 and Khoo 2008, pp. 11–31). Many of the early labour migrants stayed on such that on independence in 1957, there were millions of foreigners comprising mainly those from China, India and Indonesia in Malaya. On independence, the immigrants were accorded citizenship by naturalization made possible by Article 16 of the Federal Constitution. The newly independent Federation of Malaya adopted a democratic government, based on a power sharing formula between the three major ethnically based political parties — the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) who formed the Alliance party. The Alliance party which gained power in 1957 election was later enlarged to form the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) with the incorporation of more political parties in the early 1970s. With the establishment of Malaysia in 1963 which saw the incorporation of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak into the federation, this political power sharing formula was continued with more ethnically based or ethnically dominated political parties joining the BN. Since then the BN which now comprises thirteen political parties from the Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak remains the party in power. Given this demographic and political background, managing race/ethnic relations is highly problematic and ethnic conflicts and violence occur once in a while, the worst being the May 13 incident in 1967. The balance of power between the ethnic political parties is keenly guarded by the respective ethnic party leaders. This race paradigm is not confined to the political arena only; it also pervades into almost every aspect of Malaysian life.

An issue persistently focused on in public discussion in Malaysia today is the challenge of becoming a high-income country and a developed nation — and to do this by the year 2020. Time is running out, and yet influential Malaysians feel they have “become stuck” or “trapped” at a middle stage in the developmental trajectory. What is it that holds Malaysia back and prevents the country from achieving its promise? Attention is repeatedly drawn to the ethnic or racial structure of its population, and the policy demand on the government that arises because of the inequalities in this structure. Blame for Malaysia having become trapped is often attributed to the consequences of a demographic fact — to the country having a ‘plural society’ driven by racial or communal difference and contest, and a damaging structure of race-stirring politics generated by that society. But are we dealing here with givens? What of human agency — and, in particular, of the role of ideas and ideological skillfulness?

This book argues that the ideological aspect of the “Malaysia question” has been neglected, and that there is a need to examine closely the construction of what became established as the dominant societal paradigm of social and political life in the country. The authors consider first, the way the race paradigm — the rigid structure of “Malay”, “Chinese” and “Indian” — has been both constructed and contested; and secondly, the particular manner in which the paradigm continues to be employed in a range of practical, policy areas. Although the range of issues examined in the second half of the book is by no means comprehensive or exhaustive, nevertheless, they include significant areas in the policy discourse — namely poverty eradication and income distribution; foreign workers; trade policy formulation; and foreign policy. Each of the issues throws light on whether there are signs that the race paradigm is becoming less influential; and, also, what other ideological constructions are available — constructions which might be of greater strategic value to a country determined to achieve a new level of economic and political development? Seen in this way, each chapter provides some insight into the workings or impact of the race paradigm in official discourse and policy formulation as well as public and academic deliberations.

Can Malaysian society and politics ever move beyond a race-based paradigm? The need to do so has been stressed by many of those who are working to move Malaysia to a new developmental stage — but, as the Introduction to this book points out, the potency of this paradigm should not be underestimated. How then has the race paradigm become embedded, and in what ways has it been contested and defended? Is it possible to conceptualize Malaysians in terms other than “Malay”, “Chinese” and “Indian” (with allusions to a list of further indigenous groupings)? This last question is often asked. Some analysts have begun to envisage a national “transethnic solidarity” (Loh 2010, p. 11; Mandal 2004, p. 49), a “growing feeling of multi-racialism” (Gomez 2004, p. 21), a move from a “plural to a multiethnic society or nation” (Ong 2009, p. 478), a “nation of equal citizens” (Ong 2009, p. 478), a more “inclusive citizenship” (Hefner 2001, pp. 45, 48), an emerging “language of inclusion and civility” (Abdul Rahman 2001, pp. 72, 81), and a greater stress on “cosmopolitanism” (Yao 2003). In the past, there have been attempts to imagine a “Malayan” citizenship, a “Malayan Union”, a multiethnic identity under a “Melayu” label, a “Malaysian Malaysia”, a “Bangsa Malaysia” (a Malaysian “race” or “nation”) — and in recent years the federal government constantly invoked the idea of a “1Malaysia”.

The formulation or countering of these concepts has of course been shaped by specific economic or political circumstances — the aftermath of the Japanese Occupation, the Communist Insurgency, the 1969 race riots, dramatic downturns in the economy, and so forth. Insisting that ideas and the way they are debated are significant and deserving of analysis in their own right is not to deny their context. The issue is one of focus, and our concern is to examine the manner in which the race paradigm came into being, and then a number of the various attempts that have been made to replace it. To recover both the history of the race paradigm and the range of other conceptualizations operating or advocated in the past makes sense right now — not only for historical purposes, but because of the contribution it could make to the practical deliberations at present taking place in Malaysia.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter proposes that the rakyat paradigm is an inclusive paradigm that has the potential to break through the dominant race-based societal paradigm that has dominated Malaysian history of nation-building in the last five decades or so. This inclusive paradigm can be creatively tapped for the purpose of building and maintaining social cohesion in a diverse multiethnic society like Malaysia. To understand the progressive content of the rakyat paradigm, a historical sociology approach by examining, in particular, the history of ideas and their social forces in different periods of Malaysian society is necessary.

The chapter argues that while the concept rakyat already gained extant usage during the pre-colonial feudal era of kerajaan or the raja-centred polity in the Malay states, it did not have the racial or communal overtones because the rakyat were subjects of a ruler, irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin. Nevertheless during the feudal era, rakyat was always the subject class, subservient to the ruler, and in terms of social status, they occupied the lowest rung in the social hierarchy. When the idea of the nation and nationalism was invented during the early decades of the twentieth century in colonial Malaya — the era of “the invention of politics” as Milner (2002) puts it — the imagined nation had to reside or had to be located not only within a territory, but also and very importantly within the womb of a people. It was during this period spanning several decades before the Second World War and the subsequent post-war decade that the rakyat paradigm dramatically changed; the semantic permutation took place whereby the rakyat who was the subject class subservient to the ruler, was transformed to embody the yet to-be-born nation, the imagined community (Anderson 2006 [1983]).

With the spread and deepening of the anti-colonial movement that relied on the mobilization of the people, the notion of daulat also underwent a transformation whereby we saw the emerging notion of kedaulatan, or sovereignty — from raja's daulat to kedaulatan rakyat or sovereignty of the people in whose imagination the nation is embedded. Nevertheless, the long historically constituted symbiotic relationship between the raja and rakyat had to be addressed in a way that accommodated not only the new political awakening and democratic impulses of the people but also the institution of the kerajaan and raja itself.

INTRODUCTION

The scope, goals, approaches and strategies of Malaysian national security reflect the struggle to build a nation out of a state inherited from British colonialism — an effort which is increasingly premised on broader notions of comprehensive security incorporating the political, military, economic, socio-cultural, psychological, and environmental dimensions of national survival and advancement. Malaysian conceptions of national security are therefore informed by factors based on history, geography, political culture, pluralism, Malay nationalism and ethno-religious identity, the character of political and economic development, problems and goals of national unity and integration, as well as perceptions regarding the nature of internal, regional, and international conflicts.

Ethnicity or race has played an important role in national and international politics. In America, the Jewish lobby is known to exercise disproportionate influence in terms of the numerical size of the Jewish community. In India, for instance, “caste” can be substituted for race to produce a similar effect, i.e. affirmative action policies are constitutionally endorsed for protecting and promoting the welfare of “schedule castes”. In the Malaysian context a Malay-dominant political elite has emerged with attendant consequences for foreign as well as domestic politics — with the management of foreign policy largely in the hands of the politically dominant Malay/Muslims. The impact of domestic, regional and international developments such as the drive towards modernization, industrialization, regionalization and globalization has impelled the national leadership to redefine and reinvent the nation by infusing a new sense of purpose and direction that would strengthen national security as well as regional peace and prosperity. In pursuing this thrust, the UMNO-dominant political leadership has attempted to maintain and even consolidate the dominant race paradigm anchored in Malay hegemony.

This conceptualization of security in Malaysia contains both domestic and external dimensions. Conceptions of domestic security clearly continue to emphasize internal peace, law, and order so that the daily business of governing and fulfilling the needs and demands of a multiracial society is not disrupted by chaos leading to violence. Internal tranquility is a sine qua non for development and progress, and in Malaysia it carries the idea of a Malay race whose political dominance remains paramount while its economic strength depicts an upward trajectory.

In this study, I analysed in what ways institutional reforms concerning the three dimensions of accountability (electoral, vertical, and horizontal) reshaped the quality of democracy in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In other words, I addressed to what degree institutional engineering concerning these three dimensions of accountability contributed to a deepening, stagnation, or regression of the democratization processes in the three countries.

To this end, I first analysed what kind of institutional reforms have been undertaken by political decision-makers who intended to transform political accountability in each of the three cases. Then I connected these findings with their impact on the respective democratization processes. From a comparative perspective, this study found that electoral accountability is strongly determined by the respective type of government and election systems. In Thailand and Indonesia, major electoral reforms contributed to changes in how voters can hold their representatives accountable, whereas in the Philippines, only technical modifications took place. In Thailand, electoral reforms introduced by the 2007 Constitution reduced the accountability of legislators and the government, and thus democratic quality. In Indonesia, the modified rules for the election of the president and the parliament can be interpreted as a power struggle between political parties who want to retain their power as intermediaries between citizens and political institutions. In this case the institutional reforms stabilized democracy.

In terms of vertical accountability, defined as the impact of subnational institutions on the overall quality of democracy, the three countries varied to a great extent. Due to a lack of power, Thai subnational administrative structures are less capable of acting in accountability relations with the national level. This is different in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia, the far-reaching autonomy and successful transfer of democratic procedures to the local level has brought a new dynamic and generally positive impact on the quality of democracy at the national level. In the Philippines, local authorities enjoy sufficient autonomy and impact national politics to a great extent. However, local democracy is, in most cases, limited by the dominance of wealthy and powerful clans, which translates into the capture of political institutions at the national level. Because of this vertical accountability relations do not support the deepening of democracy in the Philippines.

Reforms on horizontal accountability were manifold in all three countries. Particularly the mushrooming of independent government watchdog organizations was remarkable.

In the previous chapters I analysed institutional reforms in regards to the three dimensions of accountability in the three countries under research. In this chapter I will give a comparative analysis of the impact these institutional reforms have had on the quality of democracy.

Reforms on Electoral Accountability and their Impact on Democratization: A Comparative Perspective

There were few institutional reforms concerning the presidential elections in the two presidential systems of the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines, the electoral system has not been altered since it was inaugurated in the 1987 Constitution. It has retained problematic features, such as the non-requirement of an absolute majority in a single round and the missing possibility for re-election of an incumbent president. In contrast, the Indonesian president enjoys much higher legitimacy than his Philippine counterpart due to an electoral process that is in accordance with an amended constitution, which contributes to the stabilization of the democratization process. The absolute majority of the votes, which is required in Indonesia and made possible by run-off elections, guarantees that at least half of the voters supported the winning candidate. The possibility for a single re-election in Indonesia holds the president under the judgement of the general public for his or her first term. If the president performs well in the eyes of the electorate he or she can hope for another five-year term. This scenario, which occurred with President SBY in 2009, is generally not possible in the Philippines. In terms of electoral accountability, Philippine presidential elections are thus a prospective rather than retrospective measure. Here, the president is a “lame duck”, beholden to all the negative consequences from the first day in office. The re-election of an incumbent president in 2004 was an unusual exception to the rule, and in terms of constitutionality very controversial.

The nomination process for presidential candidates is another remarkable difference between the two countries. In the Philippines, every naturalborn citizen who is literate and at least forty years of age (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 2) can run for the presidency. In Indonesia, access is more restricted. There, candidates for the presidency can only be nominated by political parties represented in the House of Representatives (DPR). The only major institutional reform that changed the mode of presidential elections concerned the required percentage of votes and seats for a presidential nomination.

In this chapter, I will analyse how institutional changes concerning mechanisms of horizontal accountability affected the quality of democracy in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. As described in chapter 2.6, horizontal accountability refers to a system of “checks and balances” between the different state institutions. This particularly applies to the accountability of the elected government vis-à-visthe other branches of government.

In the following I will analyse what kind of institutional reforms concerning the dimension of horizontal accountability took place in the three countries under research. Executive-legislative relations will be the first aspect, followed by the executive-judiciary relations. Finally I will analyse how independent watch-dog organizations, such as counter-corruption commissions, audit agencies, and election commissions were effective in exerting control over government actions. As in the previous chapters, I will start with Thailand and then continue with Indonesia and the Philippines.

THAILAND

Executive-Legislative Relations

The 1997 Constitution aimed to raise the institutional stability of the political system. A separation of powers, as described in chapter 2.6, is quite different in a parliamentary system, as the separation of powers between executive and legislative does not occur between government and parliament, but rather between the cabinet including its supporting parliamentary majority and the minority/opposition in parliament. In such a parliamentary system, the opposition in the parliament, a possible second chamber, an independent judiciary, and independent watch-dog organizations are possible institutions that might keep the government in check.

The drafters of the 1997 Constitution attempted to strengthen the executive power for stable governments and at the same time provide checks and balances to control governmental actions. The position of the prime minister was strengthened in comparison to previous constitutions in order to provide more political stability. The prime minister presided over the dominant coalition majority in the House of Representatives, was allowed to select the cabinet independently and without consent of any other institution, and had the right to dissolve the legislature.

Michael Nelson argued that

The latter target was also reached by other electoral reforms in the 1997 Constitution.

As explained in chapter 2.5, vertical accountability in this study refers to an accountability mechanism between central and local levels of a political system. Citizens and institutions at the local level are important by exercising accountability towards local governments and at the same time by exerting control over national politics.

In order to analyse institutional engineering in regard to vertical accountability, I will assess what kind of institutional reforms concerning local democracy and centre-local relations were undertaken in the three countries under research. I will start with the Philippines, followed by Indonesia, and then Thailand and an assessement of the respective legal frameworks in order to determine the level of autonomy and powers of local governments. Following, I will then examine the working of democracy at the local level. In a next step I will analyse the degree to which ethnic conflicts and separatism in the troubled regions of the three countries were impacted by the course of the decentralization process. Finally, I will take a closer look at the interactions between central and local governments and examine in which ways the accountability mechanisms are structured and work in practice.

THAILAND

Thailand had traditionally been ruled by bureaucratic elites, whose political struggles took place almost exclusively within the bureaucratic institutions of the centralist state. Frequent military coups and decades of authoritarian rule further strengthened the centralist tradition. Until today, the dominant legacy of centralized governance, which is deeply embedded in Thai society and politics, has been a major barrier to decentralization (Haque 2010, p. 686).

Thailand's political and economic power was and is concentrated in the capital, Bangkok. The next state sub-division is the provinces (changwat). Due to their relatively high number (about 80), in addition to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, the provinces have little importance in national politics. Traditionally, the role of each governor was to carry out the orders of the national government and to coordinate the work of the other sub-divisions. Among them are about 900 districts (amphoe), more than 7,000 sub-districts (tambon) and about 75,000 villages (muban). Before 1997 more than 90 per cent of the sales and excise taxes collected by local governments were transferred to Bangkok (Hunsacker, quoted in Hicken 2009, p. 117). Consequently, subnational government expenditures were less than 10 per cent of the national GDP prior to 1997.

As has been described in chapter 2.4 institutional reforms concerning electoral accountability are very important in order to analyse the progress of democratic deepening in a political system. In the following, I will apply the criteria from chapter 2.4 to draw conclusions on the democratization processes in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines and will proceed in this order. Starting with Thailand, I will illustrate and analyse major features of the post-founding elections. In a next step, I will then take a closer look at processes of institutional engineering and assess institutional changes concerning the electoral accountability of the national parliament and the second chamber. Finally, I will present and discuss reforms concerning political parties and their contribution to electoral accountability. The same structure and proceeding will be applied in chapters 3.2 to Indonesia and 3.3 to the Philippines.

THAILAND

The 1997 Constitution

Thai electoral regulations are usually very closely defined in their respective constitutions. Since the transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one in 1932, Thailand has been able to maintain a constitution for more than ten years only between 1932 and 1946. Frequent changes were made due to the numerous coups the country witnessed. As every new regime wanted to create a system of government that suited its own vision, a plethora of constitutions was decided upon. The constitution became a tool of those in power only to be replaced when power switched hands. In other words, Thai constitutions “have functioned as mere political documents serving the interests of the executive branch” (Klein 1998, p. 17), or rather that of the coup plotters.

Some constitutional principles remained untouched, however. The King's role as head of state in the constitutional monarchy was never questioned, as well as the corresponding parliamentary system with a prime minister as head of government. The 1997 Constitution differed from the previous fifteen in that it was drafted as a part of the democratization process by a representatively composed Constitutional Drafting Assembly instead of being drafted by the ruling powers. Hence, it was commonly called the “People's Constitution” and generally regarded as the most democratic constitution Thailand had ever seen. Some Western observers were even convinced that “the 1997 Constitution represents a revolution in Thai politics. It was a bold attempt at conferring greater power to the Thai people than had ever been granted before.

METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES

This study will use a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, but with a clear preference towards qualitative research findings. Since the impact of institutional reforms can hardly be expressed in figures and numbers, an in-depth analysis provides more insight and leads to more realistic results. Therefore, the primary research method will be the analysis of significant scholarly literature on democratization as well as relevant literature on Philippine, Thai, and Indonesian politics. If available, statistical material and organization data from the countries under research were also included as well as (legal) official documents such as constitutions, laws, and regulations.

In order to raise the quality of the evaluation, I conducted qualitative interviews with local experts during various field trips to Manila, Bangkok, and Jakarta and other cities in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Interviews with Southeast Asian government officials, parliamentarians, and politicians provided additional first-hand experiences and gave a local voice to the assessments in this study. To avoid a partisan bias, the selection of the interviewed politicians and government officials included the different political camps in the respective countries and members of the government as well as opposition forces.

To obtain further background information, I also conducted a variety of interviews with local journalists, NGO activists, political analysts and scholars. The purpose of these interviews was to cross-check assumptions and to get additional information. Often a personal interview with an expert gives you more country-specific insights than just the study of his or her publications.

The interviews in Indonesia were supported by the German development cooperation agency GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit), for which I produced an evaluation study of their portfolio in good governance and decentralization in 2008. Most interviews were conducted in Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) with a few in English. Most interviews in the Philippines were facilitated by the local branches of the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation and Friedrich-Ebert- Foundation, while in Thailand the local branches of the same organizations helped to organize the interviews. The interviews did not follow a strict questionnaire, since the questions were adapted to the function of the interviewee. The statements which are quoted in this study have not been tape-recorded, but written afterwards from notes during the interviews. Therefore, they should not be taken as official statements, but rather as informal information given to the author.