The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

INTRODUCTION

Between late December 2019 and early January 2020, several Chinese fishing boats and coastguard vessels entered Indonesia's Natuna waters illegally, generating diplomatic tensions between Jakarta and Beijing. Indonesian newspapers reported on these incursions from an Indonesian perspective, as one would expect, and on 2 January 2020, Kompas, the largest newspaper in the country, published a report with the title “Indonesia Rejects China's Claims”. The following day, Tempo, a leading news magazine and daily newspaper, published a report with

a similar headline “Indonesia Clearly Rejects China's Claim Over the Northern Natuna Sea”. That same day, CNN Indonesia carried a provocative report with the headline “China's Vessels Enter Natunas, the Indonesian National Army Get Ready to Fight”. It is apparent that Indonesian official responses were not united on this issue. While some took a hard line, Luhut Pandjaitan, then Co-ordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment, and Prabowo Subianto, then Minister for Defence, downplayed the issue. In this tense situation, one question begged to be answered: What was the response of the Chinese-language newspapers in Jakarta to this event?

All the reports in Chinese-language newspapers on the event were translations from Indonesian-language sources. Interestingly, unlike during the 2016 Chinese incursions, this time they carried no commentaries on the Natunas, indicating caution on their part in expressing their views. Yindunixiya Shangbao (印度尼西亚商报) published a report on its front page with the title “Indonesia Strongly Rejects the Claims of China over the Nansha Islands”, which is the translation of the Indonesian foreign ministry statement. Yinni Xingzhou Ribao (印尼星洲日报) and Yinhua Ribao (印华日报) published a similar report on page 3. However, Guoji Ribao (国际日报), the largest Chinese-language newspaper in Indo-nesia, began to follow the events on the front page closely from 6 January 2020 for three days.

The first report was with the title “Luhut: Don't Play Up the Chinese Fishing Vessels Event”, showcasing their attempts to remain neutral.

INTRODUCTION

History books are filled with examples of angry youths, through fierce idealism and economic desperation, forcing through a change in the political landscape, either through protest, political participation and co-option or a peaceful or violent revolution. The self-immolation of a young and poor Mohamed Bouazizi, who exemplified the economic hardship of Tunisia's youth population, sparked an anti-government uprising that soon spread across the Arab World: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. Professor Mulderig of Boston University argued that the Arab Spring “could not have occurred without the ideological and numerical push of a huge mass of angry youth”. The most common protest profile was a young Arab aged 15 to 24, which represented approximately 20 per cent of the population in the region, resulting from years of high birth rates and prolonged lifespans.

An example like this was not uncommon. The 1968 student-led protest in Paris by the National Union of Students of France remains etched in the memories of the French today, as it moved more than 22 per cent of the population into action, bringing the economy to a standstill. In the same historic year, a coalition of students also ushered protests in Mexico, originating from excessive spending on the Olympics Games, which resulted in a tragic massacre and lasting political reforms. The Iran Revolution in 1979 and the Velvet Revolution in 1989 were two other significant marks to show that youths and political change are not strangers.

However, Malaysia's youth story does not share the same history as these significant other cases. Other than a few isolated student protests at university, Malaysian youths have been widely considered as less engaged in politics, partly due to a small, registered voter group, and partly due to laws that discourage political participation among students and youths. In the past, youth voters in Malaysia had consistently lower voter turnout rates than other cohorts. TindakMalaysia director Danesh Chacko offered two examples in Malaysia's 14th general election (GE14) in Sungai Rambai and Batu Lintang, where youths between 21 to 29 years old had a voter turnout rate that was 2–5 per cent lower than other cohorts.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The 15th general election (GE15) in Malaysia produced surprising results. The conservative coalition of PN emerged as the dark horse of the election, overtaking the longest-ruling coalition, BN, by a significant margin. The two largest coalitions post-GE15, PH and PN, represent ideological opposites, which may spell a polarized future for Malaysian youths. This paper intends to understand what happened to the youth votes and provide possible hypotheses for future trends.

• • In West Malaysia, constituencies with a larger share of young voters (under 30 years old) registered a higher voter turnout rate. A majority of seats with 30 per cent or more of voters under 30 years old (considered “young” seats) were won by PN, followed by PH, and thirdly BN. This demonstrated PN's relatively stronger hold on young seats in GE15. Discrepancies between pre-GE15 survey findings and actual results could be explained by the Shy PN factor—or PN-leaning voters’ reticence towards revealing their preference—and a swing from BN to PN.

• • Of all voter groups, PN voters have shown the highest loyalty and affinity to their coalition of choice, largely led by PAS voters. This is followed by PH and then BN, where the latter has shown the lowest support durability and the highest likelihood of swing. Unsurprisingly, voters from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum of PN and PH share a high degree of coldness towards each other, implying that a middle ground will be hard to reach between the two voter groups.

• • Increasingly, a clean and Islamic government would become a feature that Malay youth voters would favour. PN currently fits this trend the best, although this may change depending on the political climate. BN had over the years lost its clean government credentials, especially with the criminal charges against its party leaders, whereas PH continues to struggle in shedding its image as being dominated by the Chinese community.

• • PN and PH voters were almost equal in passive forms of political engagement such as following political news. However, PN consistently ranked higher in active political engagement and belief that their vote matters, which was probably what translated into a marginally higher voter turnout rate. Under all circumstances, BN voters were the least engaged, either actively or passively. In GE15, seats won by PN had a consistently higher median voter turnout rate than non-PN seats.

Voter profiles were generated, based on the findings described in the articles. These are listed in the table below.

An important caveat needs to be made: The voter profiles are generated from youth respondents’ self-proclaimed leanings in the telephone surveys and focus group discussions, which may contain inaccuracies and misreporting. Thus, these voter profiles are best used as a heuristic device to understand the relative differences and broad characteristics of each youth voter group rather than an archetypal representation of voter profiles.

Once the world's fastest-growing economy, between 1987 and 1996, Thailand has been stuck at a middle-income status for forty-six years. A consensus of opinion has been reached that the only way towards sustainable prosperity for Thailand is innovation-led growth. In response, the government announced “Thailand 4.0” in 2015 as a new national development directive that would focus on technological upgrading and lead the country to becoming an innovative society. What are the policies and projects that have really been implemented? How has Thailand fared before and after the 4.0 initiative? And what are the next steps the country should take? In this chapter, we seek to take stock of the progress made in terms of policy for science, technology and innovation (STI) and to track the current state of Thailand's innovation against economies within the region and its incomegroup classification.

On the one hand, we illustrate how the Thai economy is more dynamic and innovative than conventionally assumed. Since the 1990s, Thailand's development trajectory has been notoriously denigrated as “technologyless industrialization”. Even a recent study in 2021 comparing Thailand, China and South Korea arrived at the old conclusion that “The Thai case in particular demonstrates the limitations of investment-led growth strategies to sustain a country's industrial development. It has failed to sustain economic growth without indigenous technology development efforts.”

However, when examined closely, Thailand's technological development has not been that static, especially in the period since 2011. The country has undergone an impressive surge in terms of R&D expenditure and personnel. Private firms, both large and small, have innovated more actively. Almost a third of exports are high-tech products, and this figure is higher than the average of upper-middle-income economies. In the meantime, whilst engaging increasingly in global production networks, Thailand has been able to maintain domestic value added at 69.3 per cent of its gross exports (in 2018), which is a higher ratio than those of Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore.

For all its improvements and dynamism, however, there are certain hard nuts for the country still to crack. We present here the most updated dataset and raise concerns over issues of uneven capabilities among Thai firms and of the aftereffects of highly concentrated markets.

The arrival of 2022 marked the start of the end of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in Southeast Asia as countries in the region decided to try to live with the virus. The decision was driven by a combination of factors, including the reduced virulence of new strains of the virus, rising vaccination rates, and lockdown fatigue. By the end of the first quarter of 2022, most countries had opened their borders. Still, Southeast Asia, as well as most of Asia, lagged behind Europe and North America in unwinding domestic and border mobility restrictions put in place in response to the pandemic.

The earlier easing of restrictions in Europe and North America unleashed huge pent-up demand, and the unevenness of their recovery placed pressure on the production side of supply chains in Southeast Asia. This came on top of the ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China, which had escalated over time and resulted in disruption and some relocation of supply chains. Logistics were also under strain as bottlenecks emerged at ports and other transport nodes. While this demand spurred growth and recovery in Southeast Asia, it also increased price pressures. This was compounded by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, raising food and energy prices as well as geopolitical risks.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had major social and economic effects in the region, as well as across the world.1 The lockdowns lasted long enough to induce economic scarring. The direct effects of the pandemic have already increased unemployment, poverty and inequality. The indirect effects, such as the push towards the digital economy, will further increase unemployment and inequality unless policies that enable greater factor mobility are put in place. Such policies have become more urgent given the ageing populations at varying speeds in Southeast Asia. However, the forces against globalization, which have garnered strength and momentum from the pandemic, are likely to increase the resistance towards such policies. New forms of protectionism, disguised as attempts to increase resilience and strengthen self-reliance in an increasingly divided world, are also gaining favour.

If the post–Cold War era is defined as a period when great power cooperation generally prevails over great power competition, its final demise arrived in 2022. Following Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February, relations between the West and Russia reached the highest level of hostility since the mid-1980s. The United States’ National Security Strategy released in October identifies China as America's biggest long-term strategic competitor and declares that “the post–Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is under way between the major powers to shape what comes next”. How has Vietnam navigated the growing uncertainties and disruptions in the global politics and economy as the post–Cold War era came to an end? This chapter examines the key developments in the country's economy, domestic politics and foreign relations throughout 2022, and emphasizes the need for the country's leadership to embrace a new worldview going forward.

The Economy

Vietnam's economy in 2022 was on a recovery path after two years of slow growth because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to grow by 8 per cent, the fastest pace annually since 1997 and a sharp rebound from the 2.9 and 2.6 per cent levels of 2020 and 2021, respectively. This performance can be attributed to a number of factors, including the government's macro-economic management, the removal of COVID-19 restrictions, the achievement of nationwide vaccination, and increased foreign investments and better access to export markets as a result of US-China trade tensions, China's zero-COVID policy and Vietnam's numerous free trade agreements (FTA).

In January, the National Assembly approved a US$15.4 billion economic stimulus package that accounts for 4.2 per cent of the 2021 GDP. The stimulus package was expected to boost the GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points in 2022 and 0.2 percentage points in 2023, helping to meet the 6.5–7 per cent target for the average annual GDP growth of the 2021–25 period. While much of the world suffered from high inflation as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Western sanctions on Russia, and the pandemic-driven bottlenecks in the global supply chains, Vietnam was able to keep inflation at an estimated 3.5 per cent for the year, significantly lower than the average 5.1 per cent for Southeast Asia and 4.4 per cent for developing Asia.

After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, there was a serious political liberalization of trade union organizing. One of the first things carried out by President B.J. Habibie was Indonesia's ratification of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) covenant of trade union rights. Legislation soon followed. This ended the thirty-two years of state-controlled trade unions. Since then, unions have been established in thousands of enterprises, and several union confederations and federations have formed. Despite the multiplication of unions and the end of direct state intervention into the unions, the union movement remains a basically impotent force in Indonesian political life. It has totally failed in all its major campaigns aimed at reversing or reforming government policies.

There was a period between 2010 and 2013 when most of the unions united to conduct a series of campaigns—first around health insurance legislation and then wage increases—which had some success. In fact, the campaign demanding that the parliament pass health insurance was a major success. Between 2010 and 2013, militant campaigns involving rallies, pickets and, in 2013, some strikes also won very large increases in a minimum wage, sometimes over fifty per cent. These increases were embodied in formal government decisions setting a minimum wage for different economic sectors and in different municipalities and districts. These decisions were made on the recommendation of tripartite committees in district governments in an atmosphere framed by escalating worker militancy.

But even in 2013 it was looking increasingly the case that these were all pyrrhic victories. First, many employers, while forced to accept the wage rises in formal agreements, still either delayed or, according to union activists, simply did not pay the agreed increases. Second, and this is perhaps the most serious factor, many firms employed workers through labour hire companies—a practice in Indonesia called “outsourcing”.

Outsourcing has long been illegal in Indonesia for work associated with the primary production processes of a business. It is only legal for the more peripheral work such as security guards, catering for workers and so on. However, unions constantly complain that many businesses still employ people via “outsourcing” for primary production process work.

The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) and its civil arm, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has been a significant development within the ecosphere of ethnic armed organizations (EAO) in Myanmar over the last decade. Five years of violent confrontations with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's army, from 2015 to 2020 brought about a radical change in the distribution of power in Rakhine State. In November 2020, an informal ceasefire gave way to a year of relative calm, which the AA/ULA used to solidify its rule. Tensions rose again in late 2021 and led to a resumption of the conflict in 2022. Another informal ceasefire concluded in November 2022 was immediately described as “hanging by a thread”.

During the hot phase of the conflict with the Tatmadaw (2018–20), the AA had been designated a “terrorist” organization by the army (2017) and the NLDled government (2019).3 But the military coup of 1 February 2021 upturned the status of the AA as an opposing party. Both the junta's State Administration Council (SAC) and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a group of newly elected NLD parliamentarians, promptly retracted the terrorist appellation, hoping for neutrality from the AA or even its help. But the SAC failed to undermine the group's popular support or lure Rakhine nationalists towards a political compromise with the military. The AA chose rather to support anti-junta forces.

Even before Myanmar was torn apart by the coup in 2021, Rakhine State had been afflicted by chronic insecurity, tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) faced harsh livelihood conditions, and there were towering questions about the place of its marginalized Muslims who also call Rakhine State their home. While the AA/ULA does not always appear as a protagonist, it is nonetheless entangled in concerns that are wider than simply the domestic context, including border complications with Bangladesh, the pressing issue of Rohingya repatriation, China's strong economic presence, and India's geopolitical assertiveness. Its achievements in the field and unfailing recruitment have empowered the AA, but its self-ascribed identity as a defender of the Rakhine people is tested by these domestic and transregional challenges.

Coming out of a perfect storm of the COVID-19 pandemic, devastating floods and political indecision of the previous year, Timor-Leste celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its independence in 2022 with some rays of hope. The presidential elections in May saw the return of José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize colaureate, also a prior presidential office bearer between 2007 and 2012, as the new president. With his victory, the resistance generation leaders remain at the helm of Timor-Leste but they are confronted with a myriad of governance problems, including the shrinking sovereign wealth fund, lacklustre economic growth, food insecurity and youth unemployment. As a seasoned diplomat with international standing, Ramos-Horta has actively pursued a multi-pronged foreign policy to keep Timor-Leste on an even keel among key partners—namely, Australia, Indonesia, China and ASEAN.

The Shifting Political Landscape

The seeds of political crisis had been sown back in February 2020 with the withdrawal of the National Council for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) party, headed by resistance hero and former president José “Xanana” Gusmão from the three-party coalition comprising the CNRT, the People's Liberation Party (PLP) and the Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan (KHUNTO, which stands for “Enrich the National Unity of the Sons of Timor”). The youth-oriented KHUNTO, however, unexpectedly broke ranks with Gusmão and the CNRT afterwards and threw its support behind the fledgling alliance between the PLP and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (FRETILIN). This new coalition gave Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak, leader of the PLP and also former president of Timor-Leste, an extended mandate to govern until 2023 so that he would oversee the looming COVID-19 health crisis. He nominated five FRETILIN members and one member of the coalition partner Democratic Party (PD) to fill long-vacant positions in the government's Council of Ministers. By June 2020, the new coalition government—or the Eighth Constitutional Government, as the current administration is formally known—was in place with Gusmão sidelined and with the Ruak government continuing in office as of this writing. It was against this background that Gusmão plotted a comeback not directly but working through a trusted protégé to unseat the FRETILIN-held presidency.

Brunei Darussalam, through its national vision, the Wawasan 2035, aspires to be among the world's top ten countries by 2035, with high income per capita and high quality of life, a well-educated and highly skilled workforce, and a dynamic and sustainable economy. As a high-income welfare state, Brunei provides its citizens free healthcare and education, low-cost housing, subsidized land purchases, and highly subsidized necessities like food, water, fuel and electricity. The country has persistently scored high on the human development index (HDI), along with HDI sub-dimensions of long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living—it is considered a very high human development country, ranking 51st in 2021. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 Sustainable Development Goals Report of the United Nations (UN) highlighted Brunei's achievements in many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in the areas of health and well-being, decent work and economic growth, and sustainability, among others.

Brunei has been managing the COVID-19 pandemic with a whole-of-nation and whole-of-government approach that aimed to effectively minimize socioeconomic disruptions by maintaining the well-being of the public, protecting jobs and providing support for individuals, supporting and assisting businesses, and promoting the national vaccination programme.

With these decisive interventions, the first wave of COVID-19, which started in March 2020, was successfully contained. However, the highly contagious second-wave infections caused by the Delta variant from August to December 2021, and the third wave caused by the Omicron variant from January to May 2022, hit Brunei hard with soaring daily cases that only peaked in March 2022. Since then, the infections have gradually slowed down, notwithstanding the fourth wave (BA.4 and BA.5 variants) that has been taking place since June 2022. With ninety-seven per cent of its population fully vaccinated, Brunei entered the endemic phase beginning in June 2022 as the country gradually lifted its domestic restrictions and completely lifted travel restrictions by land, sea and air on 15 September 2022. While these new measures have propelled an upsurge in socio-economic activities, inevitable inflationary pressures also came into play as global food prices have risen rapidly because of supply disruptions caused by the Russian-Ukraine war.

The year 2022 was one of multiple transitions for the Philippines. The country geared towards a resumption of normalcy not seen since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. After struggling with its pandemic response, the Duterte administration prevented another COVID-19 surge but accumulated a significant amount of financial debt. But the equally important transition has been the political succession in the government through the May 2022 national elections.

Under an election year, the Philippines proved once again that politics is an all-family affair. Political pedigree remained a crucial political asset as Filipinos tend to vote for trusted brands offered by political dynasties. At a time when populist strongmen like Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have either fallen from power or are besieged, the Philippines stood out in 2022 as a case where populist illiberalism consolidated and gained an unassailable popular mandate. In May 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—son and namesake of the Philippines’ former dictator who ruled from 1965 to 1986 before being deposed in a popular uprising against human rights violations and corruption—won the presidency in an electoral victory that could only be characterized as the apex of the “restoration” of the Marcos political dynasty. Marcos has the distinction of being the first president in post-authoritarian Philippines to win an outright majority of nearly sixty per cent of the electorate. Less novel, however, is his family origin since the presidency has passed on to descendants of former presidents in nearly two-thirds of the last two decades. Generally regarded as Asia's oldest democracy, the Philippines is ironically also the country with the most presidential progenies in the world.

Past major electoral contests featured intensified competition between national political clans akin to what George R.R. Martin's famous novel-turned–television series The Game of Thrones described as a “dance”—a violent feud—between dynasties over political succession. The 2022 elections featured a more orthodox meaning of a “dance” of the dynasties as a unified, well-choreographed political performance for the hearts and minds of Filipino voters. Marcos Jr. forged a formidable alliance with the outgoing president Rodrigo Duterte's daughter and preferred successor, Sara Duterte, as his running mate. Together with other political dynasties, the tandem presented themselves as capable of continuing the legacies of the outgoing but still popular Rodrigo Duterte.