Totalism states that one population is better than another iff it has higher total welfare. One counterintuitive consequence is the Repugnant Conclusion (RC). Totalism also entails that a very large population of animals with lives barely worth living is better than a smaller population of happier humans. Furthermore, the strategies that have been used to avoid the troubling normative implications of the RC do not work in the animal case, so we may have reason to bring about such a population. I introduce the notion of ‘Efficiency of Welfare Production’ – that animals of different species vary in the efficiency with which they convert resources into welfare. If we want to maximize total welfare, without any speciesist bias, we should identify which species is most efficient and try to maximize the population of that species. This has counterintuitive implications whether we accept hedonism or a more sophisticated theory of welfare.

Thomas Taylor's parody of Mary Wollstonecraft's support for rights of women and humans raises a question: does his satire unwittingly propose a defence of animal rights found in Wollstonecraft's arguments? While Wollstonecraft's later works do not mention animal rights, her early educational writings offer arguments on animal ethics. These works explore the value of animals from moral, theological, and consequentialist perspectives, emphasizing both their instrumental and inherent value. This article argues that Wollstonecraft's moral psychology and theology highlight a benevolent attitude towards animals, underscoring their value beyond their utility.

Money pushes sports to extremes. As the rewards for success grow, so does the pressure, with sportspeople pushing themselves ever harder. In equestrian sports, this can mean pushing the horse as well, too often to the point of abuse. This article discusses the beautiful side of equestrianism as well as its darker side, which is a bitter reality for many competition horses. It sets out a comparison of legal standards for equine animal welfare (at the level of international law, EU law and national laws) as well as those coming from sports laws. It also examines dependencies between animal protection rules under EU law and animal protection rules under the laws of individual EU Member States concerning equestrian sports. It aims to answer the questions of whether equestrian sports constitute a general exemption to their being considered animal abuse and on what grounds this exemption might be changed in the future.

African (Bantu) philosophy conceptualizes morality through ubuntu, which emphasizes the role of community in producing moral agents. This community is characterized by practices that respond to and value interdependence, such as care, cooperation, and respect for elders and ancestral knowledge. While there have been attributions of morality to nonhuman animals in the interdisciplinary animal morality debate, this debate has focused on Western concepts. We argue that the ubuntu conception of morality as a communal practice applies to some nonhuman animals. African elephant communities are highly cooperative and structured around elders; they alloparent, protect their communities, mourn their dead, and pass on cultural knowledge between generations. Identifying these as important moral practices, ubuntu provides a theoretical framework to expand our ethical concern for elephants to their communities. In practice, this will deepen our understanding of the wrongness of atrocities like culling for population management or trophy hunting.

Ancient India is famous as a home for the ethical concept of ahimsa, meaning ‘non-violence’. Among other things, this moral principle demanded avoiding cruelty towards animals and led to the widespread adoption of vegetarianism. In this article, it is argued that the reasoning which led the ancient Indians to avoid violence towards animals might actually provide a more powerful rationale for vegetarianism than the utilitarian rationale that is more prevalent among animal rights activists nowadays.

Dairy calf welfare is a growing interest within the veterinary field. However, a limited understanding of the conception of calf welfare by dairy cattle veterinarians can hinder efforts to promote welfare improvements on farms. The aim of this study was to explore how focus groups can promote learning about dairy calf welfare issues among cattle veterinarians. Focus groups (n = 5), that collectively had 33 participants representing five Canadian provinces and different geographical regions, were conducted as part of a continuing education workshop for Canadian cattle veterinarians. Two trained individuals undertook exploratory data analyses using applied thematic analysis and adult learning theory to develop a codebook of the data and identify the main themes. There were three main themes about learning that emerged from guided peer-discussion: (i) defining a shared concept of animal welfare from the veterinary perspective to diagnose the problem; (ii) understanding the problems of calf welfare by self-examination and group reflection; and (iii) negotiating the best approach to address the problems through sharing of ideas on improving calf welfare, including strategies for addressing welfare problems. In conclusion, focus groups can facilitate animal welfare learning within the veterinary profession.

The use of genetically modified (GM) animals in biomedical research has increased during recent years and its ethical aspects have been subject to ongoing academic discussion. In order to reinforce this discussion, we analysed applications submitted to animal ethics committees in Sweden during 2002. The aim was to investigate the researchers' statements concerning the production and use of GM animals, as well as the committees' assessments of the applications. For our analysis, we constructed an analytic form. In part, we included the questions and categories of the mandatory application form, noting for example species, degree of severity regarding pain and distress, the management of pain, and endpoints. In addition, we included our own specific questions and categories, and classified the applications accordingly. In particular we focused on the methods of GM animal production and on the expected clinical symptoms attributable to genetic modification and experimental use. Our analysis, which was partly quantitative and partly qualitative, revealed that applications were often approved by the committees despite containing insufficient information regarding ethically relevant aspects, that the arguments for using GM animals were often unclear, and that some applicants indicated awareness of possible unintentional welfare effects attributable to genetic modification. In more than 36% of the applications, obvious or minor clinical symptoms attibutable to genetic modification were expected. However, we also noted that many applicants emphasised that certain GM animals were to be used without the expectation that the animals would display any clinical symptoms. This was obviously viewed as an ethical advantage.

In many situations choices must be made that will have an impact on the welfare of companion animals. Often one of the options will be to euthanase the animal in question. The way in which one views this option will depend not only on one's assessment of the quality of the animal's life (or the lives of other affected parties), but also on how one values an animal life as such. Clearly, a companion animal may be valued by a human being or by another animal. A dog's death may affect its owner's quality of life (QoL), or it may affect the QoL of other animals in the household. But does the life of an animal have any value other than that? Is anything lost, for example, when a dog that lived with a sole owner, now deceased, is euthanased? Conversely, would anything be gained if the dog were re-homed (apart from the potentially positive contribution to the new owners' QoL)? More generally, in prolonging, or refraining from ending, the life of an animal, is it thereby ensured that something of value persists? There seem to be three main views on this matter. The first is that animal life has no value in itself. The second is that animal life has value to the extent that the life in question is worth living for the animal. The third view is that the life of an animal has a value that exceeds what is ‘in it’ for the animal in question. The view one accepts here will have a dramatic impact on one's attitude to many of the choices to be made about the treatment of companion animals — choices in which one must balance quality of life against, as it were, quantity of life. So the heart of the matter is not only quality of life. It is also value of life. Unfortunately it may prove much more difficult to agree about the value of animal life than it is to agree about the significance of animal welfare.

‘Animal Ethics Dilemma’ is a freely available computer-supported learning tool (www.animalethicsdilemma.net or www.aedilemma.net) which has been developed primarily for veterinary undergraduates but is applicable also to students in other fields of animal science. The objectives of the computer program are to promote students' understanding of the ethics related to animal use, to illustrate ethical dilemmas that arise in animal use, to broaden students' moral imagination, and to enable students to differentiate between types of ethical argument. The program comprises five case studies: (1) the blind hens; (2) ANDi the genetically modified monkey; (3) euthanasia of a healthy dog; (4) animal slaughter; and (5) rehabilitation of seals. Special consideration has been given to enhancing the pedagogic value of the program. Students can control their learning by selecting a variety of ways to explore the program; for example, they can navigate the program using the ‘Assist Me’ option, which explains the basis of the ethical arguments. Reality text provides details of real events on which the case is based, and a glossary of terminology is available for the students to explore. Selected access to a case template is also available, enabling students and teachers to create their own case studies. Evaluation of the program has been ongoing during its development.

Throughout the world, male chicks from layer breeds are killed just after hatching, as they are not profitable as regards the production of meat. The Dutch and European parliaments have insisted on research into possible alternatives to the killing of day-old chicks. In the present study we have investigated Dutch public opinion on the acceptability of these alternatives by means of discussions in so-called focus groups and via a public survey through computer-aided personal interviews (CAPI). To inform the participants about the subject, a film was made to explain the current practice and introduce a number of technological alternatives that would prevent development of male embryos, as well as the possibility of creating a ‘dual-purpose chicken’ that would allow male chicks to be used for meat production. The topics addressed in the study included the willingness of participants to pay a premium for eggs and chicken meat, were it necessary to prevent killing of male chicks. Focus-group discussions showed that many participants were unaware of the current practice of killing male chicks, and were shocked by this practice. However, once informed, the participants seemed able to take various considerations into account and rank the alternatives. The alternatives ‘looking into the fresh egg (to determine sex of the egg and not incubate male eggs)’, and ‘dual-purpose chickens’ scored best out of all the possible alternatives, and higher than maintaining the current practice. ‘Influencing the laying hens such that they produce fewer male eggs’ scored the same as maintaining the current practice. The use of ‘genetic modification to facilitate looking into the fresh egg’ scored only slightly lower than maintaining the current practice. Alternatives whereby developing male embryos die, or are killed, scored lower than maintaining the current practice.

It is frequently claimed that breeding animals that we know will have unavoidable health problems is at least prima facie wrong, because it harms the animals concerned. However, if we take ‘harm’ to mean ‘makes worse off’, this claim appears false. Breeding an animal that will have unavoidable health problems does not make any particular individual animal worse off, since an animal bred without such problems would be a different individual animal. Yet, the intuition that there is something ethically wrong about breeding animals — such as purebred pedigree dogs — in ways that seem negatively to affect welfare remains powerful. In this paper, an animal version of what is sometimes called the non-identity problem is explored, along with a number of possible ways of understanding what might be wrong with such breeding practices, if it is not that they harm the animal itself. These possibilities include harms to others, placeholder arguments, non-comparative ideas of harm, an ‘impersonal’ approach, and concerns about human attitudes and dispositions.

Animal protection issues are being advanced increasingly by Non-Government Organisations, yet the views of their supporters are little understood. We surveyed attitudes towards animals and other social issues in 3,462 university students from over 103 universities in eleven European and Asian countries. The extent to which those respondents that supported animal protection organisations had more concern for animals than those who did not support such organisations was investigated, and whether this concern was generalised to other world social issues. Of the respondents, 36% sometimes and 6% very often supported animal protection organisations and 2% identified themselves as key members. Supporters and key members had increased scores on indices that measured their concerns for animal welfare (+ 6%), animals in experimentation (+ 7%), and other major social issues (+ 5%), compared with non-supporters. Supporters were also likely to have lived with pets for longer, suggesting that this was one of the drivers for their increased concern for animals. Key members of the organisations rated the sentience of humans lower (-9%) than other students rated them, and nearer to that of animals. The level of support for the organisations was directly related to avoidance of poultry, pork and beef meat. It is concluded that support for animal protection organisations is an indicator of attitudes towards animals and other social issues, and food consumption habits.

This paper argues that beliefs about human nature are central for animal ethics as beliefs about animal nature ground human treatment of animals. It shows that what constitutes animal nature is a contested question, and that animals have long been considered inferior to humans in Western thought. In Judaeo-Christian ethics, God gave humans dominion over animals. This exacerbated the long-established prejudice in Western culture in favour of rationality as the defining characteristic of human beings. Rene Descartes was influential in arguing that animals were but machines that moved and made sounds but had no feelings. In such a context it was easy to portray animals as quasi-clockwork animated robots — ‘furry clocks’. Jeremy Bentham first advocated the direct inclusion of animals in our ethical thinking, introducing the concept of sentience, or the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, as the central criterion. Peter Singer's work is in this tradition. He also popularised the notion of speciesism — a bias in favour of one's own species. Now, Martha Nussbaum has introduced a new approach, the capabilities approach, a Quality of Life approach which lists ten capabilities, nine of which apply to animals as part of their nature. It applies to the whole range of animals (and throughout this paper the term ‘animals’ refers to sentient animals unless otherwise specified) — companion animals, farm production animals, animals in zoos, rodeos, museums and laboratories. Her work is the main focus of this paper. It is argued, therefore, that the capabilities approach contributes to understanding the relation of notions of animal nature to animal welfare, and what a good life for animals entails.

Previously assumed to be unintelligent animals, many species of birds display high levels of cognition and may even possess conscious awareness. In particular, both corvids and parrots have been the focus of cognitive research including studies on problem-solving, social intelligence, and sentience. Despite their similar neural architecture and cognitive abilities, the laws regarding these two families of birds differ greatly. In the United States, it is illegal to keep corvids as pets. Parrots, however, are one of the most commonly kept pets in America, although their care in captivity remains largely unregulated. Captive parrots suffer from a number of medical and psychological issues and experience high rates of neglect and abandonment. At the same time, wild parrot populations are dwindling due both to habitat loss and capture for the pet trade. This review examines the novel findings on avian cognition and applies them to the potential ethical implications of keeping parrots in captivity. In addition, suggestions for future directions are presented, including the development of legislation to protect captive and wild parrots.

People affect animals through four broad types of activity: (1) people keep companion, farm, laboratory and captive wild animals, often while using them for some purpose; (2) people cause deliberate harm to animals through activities such as slaughter, pest control, hunting, and toxicology testing; (3) people cause direct but unintended harm to animals through crop production, transportation, night-time lighting, and many other human activities; and (4) people harm animals indirectly by disturbing ecological systems and the processes of nature, for example by destroying habitat, introducing foreign species, and causing pollution and climate change. Each type of activity affects vast numbers of animals and raises different scientific and ethical challenges. In Type 1 activities (keeping animals), the challenge is to improve care, sometimes by finding options that benefit both people and animals. In Type 2 activities (deliberate harm), the challenge is to avoid compounding intentional harms with additional, unintended harms, such as animal suffering. For Type 3 and 4 activities, the challenges are to understand the unintended and indirect harms that people cause, to motivate people to recognise and avoid such harms, and to find less harmful ways of achieving human goals. With Type 4 activities, this may involve recognising commonalities between animal welfare, conservation and human well-being. Animal welfare science and animal ethics philosophy have traditionally focused on Type 1 and 2 activities. These fields need to include Type 3 and 4 activities, especially as they increase with human population growth.

Policy-making concerned with animals often includes human interests, such as economy, trade, environmental protection, disease control, species conservation etc. When it comes to the interests of the animals, such policy-making often makes use of the results of animal welfare science to provide assessments of ethically relevant concerns for animals. This has provided a scientific rigour that has helped to overcome controversies and allowed debates to move forward according to generally agreed methodologies. However, this focus can lead to policies leaving out other important issues relevant to animals. This can be considered as a problem of what is included in welfare science, or of what is included in policy. This suggests two possible solutions: expanding animal welfare science to address all ethical concerns about animals’ interests or widening the perspective considered in policymaking to encompass other important ethical concerns about animals than welfare. The latter appears the better option. This requires both a ‘philosophy of animal welfare science’, a ‘philosophy of decision-making about animals’, and greater transparency about what is included or excluded from both animal welfare science and the politics of animal policy.

William Russell and Rex Burch's 3Rs principles were developed 1959 before animal ethics emerged as a scientific discipline in the 1970s and before many ground-breaking developments in modern biotechnology, such as genetic engineering. From this starting point we sought to analyse the normative foundations of the 3Rs principles in contemporary terms and concepts of animal ethics. After establishing the normative groundwork of the 3Rs, we will look at their practical implications within the context of present-day biotechnology. To this end, we shall investigate whether the genetic disenhancement of research animals to limit their ability to feel pain (GPD) complies with the original 3Rs principles. We use GPD as a practical example, since it is being discussed today as a promising way of solving one of the key moral issues raised by animal research, notably animal pain and suffering. By discussing GPD in the context of the 3Rs we aim also not only to gain insights into whether GPD is compatible with one or more of the 3Rs, but also to develop a better understanding of the specific normative foundation of the 3Rs principles and the conceptual limitations and practical implications of that foundation. We argue that reducing moral concerns about animal research to those that are intelligible within a sentientist framework (eg harm and suffering), as the 3Rs do, represents an oversimplification of the moral issues involved. We suggest that interference with abilities, instrumentalisation, flourishing, and death are all important aspects of animal ethics requiring consideration.

In Fellow Creatures, Christine Korsgaard claims that human beings ought to treat all sentient animals as ends in themselves. However, in this article, I argue that Korgaard's method goes beyond what a coherent constructivist conception allows, and I claim that we should therefore adopt a Humean rather than a Kantian version of constructivism. I believe that such a conception permits us to hold substantial ethical positions about non-human animals without having to compromise our ontological commitments.