This chapter explores and develops the relationship between two key concepts that have been central to Gary Jacobsohn’s work over the past decade or so: constitutional identity and constitutional revolution. In particular, it addresses the issues of (1) how and to what extent constitutional revolutions impact constitutional identity, (2) whether they do so in a single or uniform way, and (3) the implications of the broadening of the concept of constitutional revolution in the recent book for the possibility of the “substitution of one constitutional identity for another.” With respect to the latter, the chapter identifies a certain resistance in the new book to the idea of a new constitutional identity but argues both that its thesis is perfectly consistent with this possibility and that the idea provides the best way to understand certain constitutional revolutions.

Gary Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional identity speaks to normative questions about the exercise of constituent power in constitution making. To gain purchase on these questions, this article applies Rousseau’s description of three "moments" of citizenship to the creation and maintenance of constitutional orders. Jacobsohn’s understanding of constitutional identity as something that emerges over time as opposed to an episodic expression enriches the Rousseauian model’s response to the paradoxes of democracy. Ultimately, Jacobsohn’s model implies that true constituent power is exercised only in the form of a dialogue within a shared understanding of democratic legitimacy, raising the possibility that moments of violent disruptive constitutional change cannot be accommodated to the requirements of democratic legitimacy at all – a return to Rousseau’s paradox of founding.

The chapter describes first the importance of Jacobsohn’s work to constitutional theory in general as it relies on the ideas of dynamism, fluidity, disharmony and imperfection to describe a constitution’s functioning. It then focuses on the German constitutional conflict on binding electoral gender quotas in order to illustrate the pertinence of his theory that describes so aptly the functioning of a constitution. It concludes with the finding that, in terms of constitutional theory, Jacobsohn has indeed cracked the genetic code of a constitution.

This chapter considers how Gary Jacobsohn’s concept of ‘constitutional identity’ can ‘travel’ from the discipline of law to that of international relations, with a particular focus on how it can inform analyses of the ‘ontological security’ of states. The concept of ontological security is used to understand subjectivity and focuses on managing anxiety in the constitution of self-identity. When a state is ontologically insecure this can challenge its ability to do, act, and be. Using a case study of Timor-Leste, this chapter argues that a constitution – and the constitutional identity it generates – can contribute to creating a sense of ontological (in)security for a state and its people. A constitution can provide answers to existential questions and help to define a state’s self-identity by narrating a sense of biographical continuity and by establishing the institutions and practices that build the routines required to create a protective cocoon for a state’s citizenry.

Constitutional identity, although remaining distinct from national identity, does like the latter carve out an imagined community. It must process and reprocess material to promote a vision that integrates the ethnos and the demos in a constitutionally viable manner. In this pursuit, the elaboration of constitutional identity relies on three principal interpretive devices: negation, metaphor, and metonymy. The objective is to integrate the polity as a whole, the individuals subject to the constitution, and the plurality of groups within the nation that possess a legitimate claim to constitutional recognition. The resulting construct must draw on national identity to reinforce unity and depart from the latter where necessary to maintain constitutional integrity – e.g., to deescalate ethnic strife within the polity by banning ethnic-based political parties. The turn to populism poses a challenge that calls upon reframing constitutional identity. Indeed, as populism by its very nature casts only part of the people as the people, and labels those not included as the enemy, it calls for disaggregating and recombining existing liberal constitutional identities. We illustrate the adverse effect of populism’s recourse to ethnic cleavages and to religion in reframing constitutional identity through the salient example of Viktor Orban’s Hungary.

The identity of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 is defined by the unusual story of its making process. This constitution was already born with both internal and external disharmony. The new constitution fundamentally changed the former constitution of the Meiji regime; however, it did not replace the former imperial constitution but revised it by using its amendment clause. The continuity between the former and latter regimes was disconnected in a substantive sense but maintained in a procedural sense. This is the internal disharmony. This twisted legal inconsistency can often arise in hard times after losing a war, but it was of grave concern to Japanese legal scholars who tried to justify such legalistic chaos as the “August Revolution.” Nevertheless, it was not the new constitution itself that brought about the revolutionary impact, but the Potsdam Declaration as a condition of surrender imposed by the Allied Forces on the Japanese Government. The Constitution of Japan was not unjustly imposed by the Allied Forces but was legitimately imposed by the Potsdam Declaration, which the Japanese Government itself accepted upon its defeat in the war. More precisely, it is a constitution based on an imposed revolution. This is the external disharmony.

Increasingly, illiberal and authoritarian governments are seizing upon the concept of constitutional identity in order to justify and vindicate their political projects in the face of external criticism. This contribution raises questions about what these invocations tell us about the normative value of constitutional identity. The authors argue that, in the European context of supranational legal integration, constitutional identity should not be seen as an unconditional source of value. Invocations of constitutional identity only deserve recognition to the extent that they serve the ideals of constitutionalism. Where constitutional identity is invoked as a normative argument, the normative expectation of constitutionalism is implied – claims from constitutional identity that stand at odds with the ideals of constitutionalism, in fact, invoke the former ironically and frivolously. Exemplary cases in which constitutional identity is invoked to justify forms of ‘illiberal’ constitutionalism – notably the Polish and Hungarian cases – should be considered abuses of the concept as they do not live up to the normative expectations which they evoke.

This chapter considers how Confucian values constitute constitutional identity in three Confucian-influenced countries in Asia: China, South Korea, and Singapore. Drawing on Professor Gary Jacobsohn’s framework for the comparative study of constitutional identity, this contribution argues that Confucian commitments are embodied in the formal and/or prescriptive constitutions in the three Asian jurisdictions. The constitutions’ Confucian heritages are continuously dynamic. Disharmony provokes a change in Confucian constitutional identity. The change involves not only judicial but also social and political activities.

This chapter reflects on whether and how large-N empirical studies can help our understanding of constitutional identity. It argues that although we cannot simply count and measure many aspects of constitutional identity, empirical analysis can help us better understand the concept and offers some practical suggestions for how it can do so. Next, it presents original data from nationally representative surveys conducted in five countries (the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan) and analyzes respondents’ responses to whether they feel represented by the constitution. The main finding from this exercise is that respondents who are older, male, higher-educated and have high incomes feel more represented than younger, female, lower-educated, and low-income respondents. In essence, groups that are relatively well off in society believe that their values and interests are better represented by the constitution than those who are less well off. While it does not directly tell us what the constitution’s identity is, these data do tell us something about the nature of the relationship between the constitution and those governed by it. Notably, they are consistent with accounts that suggest that constitutions reflect elite interests.

Discussions around Indian constitutional identity often focus upon the Constitution’s “basic structure”, as articulated by the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court by Kesavananda Bharati. In this essay, I attempt to interrogate – and expand – that discussion. Following upon the work of Professor Gary Jacobsohn, I argue that identity, as articulated through the basic structure, is best understood as dynamic and contested, rather than concrete and unchanging. I also argue that the basic structure does not tell the complete story of Indian constitutional identity. That story needs us to understand the Indian Constitution through the lens of power, and how the Constitution organises power relations. A study of constitutional identity through the lens of power reveals – broadly – a “centralising drift” that is present both in the constitutional text and in judgments interpreting the text. While the “centralising drift” might be a dominant feature of Indian constitutional identity at the present moment, it is also important to remember that, as in its more substantive avatar, this version of constitutional identity, too, is contested, revisable, and always open to transformation.

This chapter builds upon Gary Jacobsohn’s work conceptualizing constitutional identity as characterized by contestations, rather than consensus. I argue that once we abandon the mythical, imagined creature called ‘We, the people’, we find a society that is far less cohesive and, often, far less agreed or agreeable about certain fundamental ideas. Within this realistic view of society, constitutional disharmonies and contestations make more sense. This chapter drills down on how these constitutional disharmonies and contestations can be understood as competing claims about constitutional identity. I look at the modalities of disharmonies and the narratives that constitutional actors employ in relation to ‘constitutional identity’ and identify two modes of argumentation that challenge extant claims about constitutional identity: ‘constitutional mis-identity’ and ‘constitutional dis-identity’. These two modes of argumentation help illustrate the dynamism of this contestation over constitutional identity. Through a case study of the state-religion contestations within two seemingly divergent constitutional systems, that is, Malaysia and the United States, I show how the framework of dis-identity and mis-identity allows us to better parse through the different forms of contestations over the centrality of religion in their respective constitutional identity.

Gary Jacobsohn’s work on constitutional identity was an early exemplar of constitutional theory, testing and refining broad theoretical claims against a deep analysis of constitutional developments in diverse constitutional systems. One aspect of Jacobsohn’s rich and multi-textured theory is the claim that constitutional identity constrains amendment powers. This chapter explores that claim through the lens of the two seminal Irish cases with which Jacobsohn engages. These cases, while rejecting unamendability, illustrate Jacobsohn’s central distinction between generic constitutional identity and particular constitutional identity. The chapter argues that while Jacobsohn is correct to claim that generic constitutional identity – conformity to the moral values of constitutionalism – constrains constitutional amendment, it is problematic to assign moral salience to a country’s distinctive constitutional identity. The chapter interprets Jacobsohn’s particular constitutional identity not as a substantive constraint on amendment but rather as an argumentative frame for debate about the legitimacy of amendments. This argumentative frame, however, lacks a sound normative basis and encourages an excessive focus on the constitutional past, diminishing the potential of constitutional amendment as a site of democratic deliberation.

The concept of “constitutional identity” in the context of the EU has evolved significantly over the years, leading to complex debates and challenges. This chapter explores the historical trajectory of constitutional identity in the EU, from its early emergence in response to concerns about sovereignty to its current state of political and legal contestation. The chapter highlights that while constitutional identity is a global concept, the European experience exhibits distinct characteristics. Two noteworthy factors contributing to this distinctiveness are Europe’s legal integration and the inclusion of an identity clause in EU law (Article 4(2) TEU), a unique feature in supranational constitutionalism. The chapter argues against abandoning the concept of constitutional identity due to its recent abuses, asserting that it is a legally recognized notion within EU law. Instead, the chapter claims the focus should be on identifying and addressing abuses while acknowledging the concept’s importance in balancing competing fundamental principles within the EU legal framework. It concludes by emphasizing the need to distinguish between legitimate uses of constitutional identity and its abusive applications, advocating for the protection of constitutional identities that align with EU core principles and calling for the development of a European constitutional identity as a complementary concept.

This essay explores different relationships between constitutional identity and constitutional politics. One purpose is descriptive. The first five sections briefly discuss the five relationships between constitutional identity and constitutional politics. Constitutional politics may be an instrumental means for achieving a particular constitutional identity; the means designed to achieve a particular constitutional identity; constitutive of constitutional identity; the constitutionally prescribed means for achieving a constitutional identity; or the constitutionally prescribed means for achieving any constitutional identity. The more fundamental goal is to undermine the “apple of gold” metaphor as a device for thinking about constitutional regimes. Constitutional politics in most constitutional regimes is as constitutive of constitutional identity as the substantive principles announced in such documents as the Declaration of Independence.

Using the case of France, this paper seeks to expand Gary Jacobsohn’s concept of “dual constitutional identity” by examining the tensions between the democratic component and the religious component of dual constitutional identities. I argue that constitutional identities are protected by a common set of mechanisms derived from militant democracy: bans/dissolution of political parties, eternity clauses and states of emergency. In the case of dual constitutional identities, militant democracy is used as a tool to protect the state religion from real or imagined threats from religious minorities – doing so in the name of democracy rather than in the name of religion. The democratic trajectory of France illuminates how constitutional identities tying a religious (or secular) identity to democratic principles and giving their courts the tools of militant democracy to police constitutional faith may in fact threaten the very foundations of democracy.

In this concluding chapter, we identify two potent contributions of the concept of constitutional identity, underscoring and exploring its relationship with the associated ideas of disharmony and difference. We first discuss the relationship between constitutional identity and constitutional development, before turning to lessons that the concept of constitutional identity offers both scholars and practitioners. Against this background, we then identify three promising areas for future scholarly reflection and briefly sketch the first steps of a research agenda oriented towards carrying forward the project limned in this volume. Inspired by the analytic purpose underlying the concept of constitutional identity, our comments in this section are intended to be less prescriptive than interpretive. The scholarly futures we discuss emerge as much from the political world in which constitutional governance must now proceed as from the progress that scholars have made towards understanding the aspirations of that enterprise.

This chapter focuses on constitutional disharmony as central to forging constitutional identity by looking at the place of Black citizenship prior to the Civil War. While there are powerful arguments that the Constitution could be seen as antislavery, even while it allowed for slavery to persist where it already existed, those who were antislavery did not give much thought to the place of Blacks within the constitutional order—particularly not to the question of Black citizenship. It was, rather, events such as the second Missouri Crisis of 1821 that forced the issue of Black citizenship onto the polity. Events forced constitutional actors to wrestle with questions that were not clear, or easily answered, by way of constitutional text. This chapter offers an important contrast to more prevalent approaches – to either originalism or moral readings – that too often try to dissolve constitutional disharmony.

This chapter puts the developed theory to the test. First, after outlining the most important case law of the CJEU on the relationship between EU and Member State law, which has introduced primacy of EU law (also over Member State constitutional law) and the doctrine of direct effect, this chapter also displays the most important judgments by Member State constitutional courts generally holding that there are limits to the primacy of EU law. After analyzing the most important theoretical conceptions and doctrines in literature addressing the difference between the CJEU and the Constitutional Courts of some Member States, this chapter shows how consent-based monism can provide for relief. According to consent-based monism, the EU is the larger circle with regard to its Member States. All EU Member States in turn are independent smaller circles which are also part of the EU circle. The EU competence regime is decisive in this regard. It is vital to pinpoint exactly which competences have been shifted to the European level. According to consent-based monism, an “integration resistant core” must not violate any consensus that has been obtained at the level of the larger EU circle. The larger circle must not autonomously add competences without authorization by all of the smaller circles.