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Chapter 3 covers national criminal law on terrorism worldwide. A total of 188 States (of the total of 197 recognized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as treaty depositary) have domestic legislation in place specifically criminalizing acts of terrorism. Despite certain commonalities, the definitions of these crimes are unique to each individual State. At the time of writing, only one State, Micronesia, had no dedicated legislative provisions on terrorism of any form in its domestic law. A further seven States – the Republic of Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Kuwait, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Yemen – repress the financing of terrorism with criminal sanction but do not also establish the perpetration of an act of terrorism as a distinct criminal offence.
Chapters Three concludes the study of this political and constitutional transition by exploring the most important legal reform of this time: the Indian Penal Code (1860). Codification represented a highly political exercise that established the terms of the relationship between the subject and sovereign in India, while also further entrenching ideas of colonial difference into the everyday administration of criminal justice. In this chapter, I first examine how the crisis of 1857 shaped the final design of the IPC. I then pay close attention to the figure of the judge and the institution of the jury. I argue that colonial ideas of caste, culture, race, and gender informed the distribution of discretionary authority across the code in ways that would prove consequential for the administration of colonial justice.
Trials of Sovereignty offers the first legal history of mercy and discretion in nineteenth and twentieth-century India. Through a study of large-scale amnesties, the prerogative powers of pardon, executive commutation, and judicial sentencing practices, Alastair McClure argues that discretion represented a vital facet of colonial rule. In a bloody penal order, officials and judges consistently offered reduced sentences and pardons for select subjects, encouraging others to approach state institutions and confer the colonial state with greater legitimacy. Mercy was always a contested expression of sovereign power that risked exposing colonial weakness. This vulnerability was gradually recognized by colonial subjects who deployed a range of legal and political strategies to interrogate state power and question the lofty promises of British colonial justice. By the early twentieth century, the decision to break the law and reject imperial overtures of mercy had developed into a crucial expression of anticolonial politics.
Suppose a ‘law’ required individuals to report neighbours of a certain race for extermination. If individuals complied with such a ‘law’ to avoid the penal sanction of a death sentence, should a tribunal involved in the process of transitional justice in a successor regime punish them? Radbruch suggests that intolerably unjust ‘laws’ are not legally valid. According to Radbruch's Formula, reporting the neighbour would not be justified by law. The logical implication of this Formula is that the act of reporting was, in substance, abetment to murder (or possibly, genocide). Yet, punishing individuals who complied with the purported ‘law’ in the predecessor regime seems unfair, particularly as some legal positivists would regard the law as valid. Individuals might have acted according to what they believed was law and under duress (out of fear of penal sanction for failure to comply) in the predecessor regime. I examine whether these are valid considerations in proceedings before a tribunal prosecuting individuals for acts done in compliance with intolerably unjust ‘laws’ in predecessor regimes. While the perceived unfairness might militate against acceptance of Radbruch's Formula, if the considerations are not valid, Radbruch's Formula is unobjectionable.
Since its inception in England and Wales, the partial defence to murder of loss of control has generated a steady stream of appeals. Individually, those appeals have illuminated key aspects of the plea's operation. This paper, though, is the first to explore that operation via a systematic analysis of every loss of control appeal to date (110 cases). Using that data, the paper frames more effectively, and thus improves understanding of, a neglected phenomenon in the plea: specifically, the decision-making roles of criminal justice ‘gatekeepers’ – principally trial judges, juries and prosecutors – in governing access to loss of control. In doing so, the paper assesses how far these gatekeepers interpret the plea's requirements in a ‘civilising’ way – one which prioritises meritorious loss of control claims above those which are unmeritorious. It contends that each gatekeeper struggles to regulate loss of control in such a way. Ultimately, this diminishes the symbolic value these reforms may have had and frustrates any civilising potential of homicide law reform.
This Article examines the criminal law defense of provocation in the U.S., which employs an objective reasonable person standard, as applied to recent Asian immigrants. It discusses approaches taken in other countries and describes the cultural defense. The Article concludes with different possibilities for a hypothetical Asian defendant who was provoked: Improving education about U.S. laws as a preventative measure, using expert cultural witnesses at trial, and taking the defendant’s characteristics into consideration during the sentencing stage.
This Article uses various concepts of Husserlian phenomenology to explain the disparate opinion between the North American and Italian public in response to the prosecution and ultimate acquittal of Amanda Knox. This Article argues that the comparative difference in public opinion is due to an extensive shift in culture that is necessarily accompanied by a shift in spatial-temporal location. In this Article, the Husserlian concepts of intentionality, the Self, the Other-I, and empathy overlay the judicial opinions and media releases critical to shaping North American and Italian public perceptions of Amanda Knox. As applied, these Husserlian concepts function as interpretive lenses, providing the reader with a novel framework for analyzing the cause of interpretive difference across cultures.
Before gays and lesbians could claim their full rights as Americans, they needed to overcome a host of laws and legal practices that created an imposing barrier to reform. This chapter provides a brief overview of the antiqueer world of mid-century America, detailing the myriad laws and policies that kept gays and lesbians out of public life. It then examines how and why lawmakers began decriminalizing homosexuality, detailing the demise of sexual psychopath, consensual sodomy, and vagrancy laws. It argues that the key to these changes was not lawyers, legislators, or judges, but rather sociologists – more specifically, Alfred Kinsey. His research revealed that same-sex intimacy was far from aberrant, which undermined the assumption on which the laws were based. His work influenced the thinking of leading legal scholars and advocates, who pressed for law reform.
This article examines how intention became key to criminal responsibility in nineteenth-century England. It focuses on trials where judges wrested with defence counsel and juries for control over its determination. The most important rule that developed to support proof of intention was the presumption that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The article charts the origins and functions of the presumption to offer a revised view of the nineteenth-century foundations of the modern law of criminal intention.
Les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits s’inscrivent dans une volonté de transformation de l’organisation de la justice en cherchant à régler « autrement » les litiges judiciarisés. L’émergence de ces modes répond également aux impératifs de la nouvelle gouvernance publique, où les questions de l’efficacité et de la célérité de la justice deviennent cardinales. Ces modes alternatifs exigent que les parties y participent volontairement. Or, les justiciables composent avec certaines contraintes subjectives qui se répercutent sur leur motivation à s’engager sur la voie d’un mode alternatif de règlement des conflits. À partir de données empiriques, ce texte présente de quelle façon les coûts humains et financiers qu’assument les justiciables sont susceptibles de se répercuter sur leur décision de s’engager sur une telle voie, laquelle découle généralement de l’atteinte d’un point de rupture par rapport à ces coûts. Cette recherche, effectuée au Québec, fait état de la situation en droit civil, en droit criminel et en droit administratif.
Quelle relation les avocats entretiennent-ils avec les exigences éthiques de leur profession? Ce texte pose l’hypothèse qu’il existe un décalage entre la définition déontologique, universelle et abstraite établie par le Code de déontologie des avocats et les prises de décisions éthiques prises au quotidien par les professionnels du droit dans le contexte de leur domaine de pratique et des relations qu’ils tissent avec leurs clients, leurs collègues et l’administration judiciaire. Ainsi, nous avons identifié les différents sites de socialisation où les professionnels sont susceptibles de faire l’apprentissage des normes propres à leur pratique. Nous nous sommes alors plus directement intéressés aux dimensions systémiques et institutionnelles de celle-ci. À partir des résultats d’une série d’entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès d’avocats en droit criminel et en droit social, nous avons pu constater que leurs prises de décisions éthiques étaient fortement influencées par les manières d’être et les logiques de pratique au sein de leur communauté, c’est-à-dire par l’ethos spécifique à leur profession.
This chapter describes the legal topics treated in the biblical collections – topics that legal historians would use in their work. They include personal status, family law, property, contract, and harms.
This Companion offers a comprehensive overview of the history, nature, and legacy of biblical law. Examining the debates that swirl around the nature of biblical law, it explores its historical context, the significance of its rules, and its influence on early Judaism and Christianity. The volume also interrogates key questions: Were the rules intended to function as ancient Israel's statutory law? Is there evidence to indicate that they served a different purpose? What is the relationship between this legal material and other parts of the Hebrew Bible? Most importantly, the book provides an in-depth look at the content of the Torah's laws, with individual essays on substantive, procedural, and ritual law. With contributions from an international team of experts, written specially for this volume, The Cambridge Companion to Law in the Hebrew Bible provides an up-to-date look at scholarship on biblical law and outlines themes and topics for future research.
Many educational presentations continue to straightforwardly frame both consensual and nonconsensual intimate image distribution among youth as child pornography. This continues despite the availability of a purpose-built offence for nonconsensual intimate image distribution (NCIID) that was designed, in part, to avoid the use of child pornography offences in NCIID cases and the existence of a “private use exception” that limits the applicability of child pornography offences in cases of consensual “sexting” among youth. This sometimes inaccurate and, I argue, inappropriate focus on child pornography offences is especially common in presentations by police and public safety personnel. Through a discursive analysis of Canadian case law and a case study of educational approaches provided by the CyberScan unit, I find that the continued dominance of a child pornography framing is based on both genuine misconceptions of how these offences apply to intimate image distribution and intentional misrepresentations of the legal context.
The Art of Legal Problem Solving: A Criminal Law Approach is a sophisticated skills book designed to help students develop the problem-solving techniques necessary for their legal careers. This succinct yet comprehensive book provides the perfect mix of general instruction and specific examples to encourage students to think about problems both in depth and broadly. It follows a clear roadmap presented in a logical progression, beginning with the fundamentals, fact finding and statutory interpretation before turning to the advanced areas of analysing and writing answers to problem questions. While written primarily for criminal law students, the skills imparted are generic and can be applied equally in any area of the law and in any jurisdiction. The Art of Legal Problem Solving is an indispensable work for law students who want to not only improve their problem-solving skills but master them.
Law students routinely forget that the legal tradition has been concerned with fact finding for centuries. The entire body of evidence law has evolved for two important purposes: ensuring that the evidence presented to a court is legally admissible; and ensuring that the evidence presented to the court is reliable so that the tribunal of fact is able to draw conclusions about whether or not an alleged fact existed in circumstances where the tribunal of fact has not witnessed the event for itself. Legal reasoning is empirically grounded and draws upon centuries of human experience in the examination of materials of this kind. With that in mind, principles from evidence law can be used to help us to think about facts as part of the analysis of a legal problem. Indeed, turning your mind to the rich body of evidence law is essential. It is not possible in a book like this to engage with evidence law in any detail. Evidence law in Australia is comprehensively examined by several authoritative authors, to which the reader is referred to for detail.
The discipline of law is unique as a body of knowledge. It is both theoretical and applied. Abstract and concrete. Moral and amoral. Just and cruel. And at its heart is a moment in which the abstract is translated into concrete action, a process that depends on theoretical application to the physical world. That application is linked to the art of problem solving. Human beings are problem-solving animals. All of us possess skills and experiences that enable us to engage with obstacles and problems in life. A problem is characterised by some event, experience or situation where our usual methods of operating and achieving desired ends are slowed down, prevented from operating or simply no longer work in that environment. Failure to successfully navigate a problem creates a crisis, during which we engage in different forms of conduct and thinking to find a resolution. Crises operate on a spectrum. Some are life- threatening. Some are innocuous. But the underlying dynamic is much the same. Problem solving is an adaptive and evolved trait that humans share with other animals and that enables us to survive in changing environments.
Writing up your answer is shaped by context. As a student, you are often called upon to answer a problem question in a specific format, such as a memorandum or letter of advice, with the added complication of a word limit. Students are often not aware that the requirement to write in a particular manner, with specific limits, is a pedagogical tool intended to reflect the kinds of documents used in practice, along with the need to strike a balance between accuracy and brevity. Being able to write sharply is an important skill in practice. Practitioners are also restricted by context. By now you should have a sense that the process is a complex one, and part of the art of lawyering is being able to translate complexity in ways that different audiences need to understand the situation. A person without legal training needs to have things explained as simply as possible. A practitioner will need the necessary detail, but keep in mind that time is money, and verbose correspondence is unnecessary and not appreciated. A barrister will need all the relevant information presented in such a way that the issues and complexities are clear and sharply identified.
In this chapter the aim is to undertake something of a guided analysis of a problem and apply the principles discussed so far. To that end, let’s now return to the problem set out in Appendix A. For this exercise, it is useful to begin by making notes, both of the information within the hypothetical and of the law. Using the steps explored in the last chapter as a guide, simply begin by reading the hypothetical in Appendix A. Note the people involved, the event(s), and especially the question you have been asked. Make some notes on your initial thoughts, before looking back over the Chapter 5 context. Then begin a systematic examination of the information.
Problem solving is an art form, which takes years of practice, experience, a thorough understanding of the law, and a thorough understanding of human behaviour. This chapter presents some basic ideas to set you on the path. There are several steps involved in dealing with a problem. Please keep in mind that legal reasoning is not linear, although it can be. Much depends on the nature of the problem. It involves the ability to proceed in a linear, logical approach in some cases, and a universal, nomadic approach in others. In this chapter we look at strategies for problem solving. Up to now we have talked about way of thinking about law and fact in the context of a problem solving analytic. The discussion is then steered towards application. Two approaches are suggested: one basic, the other advanced. Both approaches are outlined here. The model you choose really depends on your purpose and the depth of analytical detail needed.