Money pushes sports to extremes. As the rewards for success grow, so does the pressure, with sportspeople pushing themselves ever harder. In equestrian sports, this can mean pushing the horse as well, too often to the point of abuse. This article discusses the beautiful side of equestrianism as well as its darker side, which is a bitter reality for many competition horses. It sets out a comparison of legal standards for equine animal welfare (at the level of international law, EU law and national laws) as well as those coming from sports laws. It also examines dependencies between animal protection rules under EU law and animal protection rules under the laws of individual EU Member States concerning equestrian sports. It aims to answer the questions of whether equestrian sports constitute a general exemption to their being considered animal abuse and on what grounds this exemption might be changed in the future.

This Article addresses the pressing issues surrounding the use of automated systems in public decision-making, specifically focusing on migration, asylum, and mobility. Drawing on empirical data, this Article examines the potential and limitations of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act in effectively addressing the challenges posed by automated decision-making (ADM). The Article argues that the current legal definitions and categorizations of ADM fail to capture the complexity and diversity of real-life applications where automated systems assist human decision-makers rather than replace them entirely. To bridge the gap between ADM in law and practice, this Article proposes to move beyond the concept of “automated decisions” and complement the legal protection in the GDPR and AI Act with a taxonomy that can inform a fundamental rights analysis. This taxonomy enhances our understanding of ADM and allows to identify the fundamental rights at stake and the sector-specific legislation applicable to ADM. The Article calls for empirical observations and input from experts in other areas of public law to enrich and refine the proposed taxonomy, thus ensuring clearer conceptual frameworks to safeguard individuals in our increasingly algorithmic society.

This contribution analyses the current situation of the implementation of the Rule of Law in the EU focusing on three essential aspects: the role of Article 2 of the TEU as a legal paradigm, the issue of effectiveness of secondary law to strengthen Supranational mechanisms for the defense of the Rule of Law; and the thorny issue of the primacy of EU Law in the current Era of European Integration.

This Article draws on research into precedent and the European Court of Justice to argue that it is distinctive in almost never retreating from a standpoint it has taken, or overturning an earlier judgement, by contrast with other Supreme Courts where this is a more common occurrence. The Article then considers the implications of this finding for research into the relationship between the Court and other actors, such as Member States, litigants and institutions. It suggests that in considering how the Court may be influenced and constrained this research takes insufficient account of its apparently limited capacity to change doctrinal direction. Evidence of doctrinal path dependence needs to be a more central part of discussions of the Court as a relational actor.

The concept of a systemic fundamental rights violation refers to a particular set of violations that are both widespread and embedded, so their reoccurrence may be assumed to be likely. It takes on at least two distinctive roles in EU asylum law and policy. One role is linked with the functioning of the principle of mutual trust, a principle that obliges Member States to recognise each others’ systems and decisions, presuming them to be legal, apart from exceptional cases. In this context, the principle sets the standard from when the presumption of legality is rebutted. In its conceptualisation and application, it is in tension with European human rights law, and, for a period, set up frictions between the CJEU (in NS/ME and Opinion 2/13) and the ECtHR (in MSS and Tarakhel). This tale of judicial frictions is not merely of historical interest. Its legacy is, we conclude, a thin concept of systemic breach, characterised by an over-individualized approach to assessing the human rights risks. The second role for the concept of systemic violations relates to embedded violations, including at the EU’s external borders. We demonstrate the utility of this other invocation, in particular as systemic breaches often signal deeper rule of law issues both within particular national systems and embedded within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). We illustrate that the CEAS itself brings about systemic human rights violations. Identifying and responding to the “systemic” in asylum increasingly relates to the credibility of the EU as a Union based on the respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law.

This paper aims to question the dominance of human rights as the primary normative framework for European social media regulation, and academic research in this field. Analysing EU legislation and recent ECJ cases, it shows that issues like discriminatory content moderation, profiling, and promotion of stereotypes cannot adequately be addressed within a human rights framework. The centrality of individual rights in the EU legal regime not only fails to address collective issues, like platforms’ influence on culture and social norms, but cannot even offer effective, equal protection to individuals. In policy debates, the depoliticised and individualistic language of human rights can legitimise corporate activities and downplay important questions about the political economy of this privatised, highly-concentrated, advertiser-funded industry. The paper also considers interpretations of human rights as structural conditions or collective values, and argues that they cannot fully overcome the limitations discussed here. Given the entrenched role of fundamental rights in EU law, critics of social media cannot avoid relying on them. However, academics should also seek to develop more explicitly political critiques, based on alternative normative visions.

The term ‘competition’ is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU’s very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations.

The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission’s annual reports on competition (1971–2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in ‘hard’ contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in ‘softer’ contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent – selection of enforcement priorities). While the ‘hard’ contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the ‘soft’ contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories.

Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment.

Europe’s aggravating housing crisis lies in the blind spots of law. While central in constructing housing both as a home and as an asset, law bears the task of mediating between housing’s multiple – social, economic, and cultural – dimensions. However, inner-legal fragmentation and a legal imaginary of property, the nation state, and its welfare system have depoliticized, deflected and rendered inaccessible the ‘housing question’. Turning to tenancy contract law in particular, this article argues that the ‘social’ orientation of this early example of a ‘materialised’ field of contract law is not only ill-suited to reflect the recent structural shifts in the housing market brought about through financialisation. Tenancy contract law has effectively taken a conservative drift by claiming to adequately administer the bilateral landlord–tenant relation while being insensitive to macro-level developments. Tenancy contract law reindividualises tenant responsibility in the eye of hardships whose roots lie outside the contractual sphere and thereby furthers, rather than curtails, neoliberal housing policies. As a reaction, the article proposes political economy as a conceptual vantage point from which to develop a ‘holistic housing law’. Such a perspective combines a concern for democratic and collective agency with careful attention to law’s tacit and technical role in shaping the flow of finance and the techniques of landlords’ governmentality. Part of this is a ‘transformative tenancy law’, to be reformulated to protect not against landlord bargaining power in the first place but against a hegemonic and expansive market rationality that structurally corrupts the social and material meaning of housing.

The norms of labor law that regulate the relevant relationship between the employee and the employer are constantly evolving under the influence of various factors, including society and the State. Labor law trends have become especially prominent over the past several years, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Lockdown restrictions have dealt a serious blow to the labor field and have required urgent action from both companies and governments. In view of this, a number of relevant subtopics have been formed in labor relations, the study of which is of interest to the entire scientific community. The purpose of the research paper is to study the main trends that have emerged in modern labor law and their impact on the formation of the labor legislation system in Ukraine and the European Union (EU) from a comparative perspective. The article analyzes the main directions that the authors have identified as especially relevant in the development of labor relations and the legal regulation of such issues. Considering that some trends have arisen spontaneously under the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, and many States were not ready for them, we have analyzed how the legislator settled such issues. The laws of Ukraine, the EU, and individual EU member States are examined here in a comparative perspective to draw upon and understand a complete picture of the modern development of labor relations in Europe and to identify the most beneficial approaches to regulating topical issues of labor law. The information obtained as a result of the study can be used to improve Ukraine's national legislation, bring it in line with European standards, further study the issue of the modern development of labor relations, and teach and develop methodological support for educational disciplines related to labor law and social security law.

Traditional approaches to teaching EU law can seem almost deliberately alienating; there is a lot of incomprehensible stodge that students are told they ‘just have to get through’ before they can really begin. So courses start with memorising technical terminology, institutional facts and then some principles that, without context, can just seem like more jargon. By the time they move on to case-law and legislation, the idea that these things are useful domestic tools has long since vanished. Instead, a contextual approach mitigates a trio of risks that have beset traditional EU law teaching – the risks of excessive positivism, excessive abstraction and excessive black-letter lawyering. Context requires critical engagement with, rather than simple absorption of, law; it makes the law accessible and applicable; and it involves socio-legal and interdisciplinary methods and materials. It is, of course, risky in different ways – but we should have a greater appetite for risks related not to cognitive stagnation, but to intellectual challenge.